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TuE present volume is the sixth of a series of small volu_mes 
on contemporary economic proplems. Other volumes either 
are in preparation or are contemplated for later publica-
tion. 
The publication of such srnall volumes on problems of 
such complexity may seem to call for some explanation. 
The practical exigencies which inspircd thcir preparation 
wcre two: In the first plncc, it hns bccn difficult to plnce 
in thc hands of collcge stu<lcnts approprintc rcnding mnttcr 
for gcncrnl courscs on cconomic problcme or to aupplc-
mcnt thc dcscriptivo nn<l thcorcticnl contcnt of clcmcntnry 
tcxtbooks of cconomice. In thc second plncc, thcrc hn11 bccn 
supposcd to exist a lnrge number of general readcrs, dc-
sirous of .:icquainting themsclves with the essential fca-
tures and issues of problems of cconomic policy, who either 
have limited time to devote to the pursuit of such knowl-
edge, or may profitably approach more extensive reading 
by the avenue of a concise analysis written by a compctent 
authority. For college use the preparation of separate small 
volumes has seemed preferable to a single inclusive vol-
ume, since it permits instructors to choose the exact range 
of topics with which they wish their students to familiarize 
themselves, while providing for more adequate treatment 
of the various problems than is to be found in any of the 
general books on economic problems. In addition, through 
a continuing series, it will be possible to keep the title 





to extend t 
an aim whi, 
prospect of 
lndeed, the 





point of vi 
The autho, 



















1crc hns bccn 
rcadcrs, dc-
!Sscn tial fea-
.y, who either 
such knowl-
nsive reading 
· a compctent 
eparate small 
.nclusive vol-
e exact range 
to familiarize 
lte treatment 
in any of the 
tion, through 
:eep the title 
1ditional vol-
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umes. The policy of bringing these books ou~ in a form 
which permits .their sale at a very low price is designed . 
to extend their use and multiply their educational value, 
an aim which has led the publishers tobe content with the 
prospect of small profit and the writers with small reward. 
lndeed, the various authors have cooperated in the prtpa-
ration of this series almost wholly by reason of their 
concurrence in its educational aim, and their work has 
represented a ·sacrifice of time which will be inadequately 
compensated in a pecuniary way. 
Thc series as such is designed to support no particular 
point of view, nor to expound any economic philosophy. 
The authors have been carefully chosen solely on account 
of their ability to deal competently with their respective 
subjects. The opinions expressed with respect to the appro-
priate solution of the various problems are personal to 
their authors. The sole editorial suggestion has been that 
cacl) writer subordinate bis own views to the primary aim 
of carcfully analyzing the problem and stating the contro-
vcraial issuea in a m·anner to promote further thought on 
thc part of thc readcr. 




S1NcE the days of Adam Smith, during the whole period, 
that is, in which economics has been able to make any 
pretensions to scientific status, sentiment among econo-
mists has been overwhelmingly hostile to protective tariffs 
as a general and permanent policy. The economists' pres-
entation of their case has, however, fallen on stony 
ground. Apart from some local and impermanent successes, 
their arguments have made little impression upon public 
opinion. In part, perhaps, this has been due to the form 
in which the arguments have been cast. There are sound 
reasons for avoiding a statement of the matter in terms of 
money, and economists have usually shunned doing so. 
But, unless the case is so stated, it is bound to seem un-
rea_l to those whose thinking on economic subjccts is in-
evitably. conditioncd by the monctary medium in which 
they live, and move, and have their economic bcing. The 
present book, being intcndcd not for mature cconomists 
but for a lcss expert audiencc, therefore approaches the 
matter from the monetary side. This does not smooth 
away all difficulties but it may help in an understanding 
of the elements of the matter. 
There are dangers in any knowledge short of unattain-
able omniscience. Though it is by no means impossible to 
know that another man is wrong, no one can ever be fully 
sure that he himself'is right. The reaction of economists 
against the popular fallacies associated with the protection-
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X FOREWORD 
the assumption that it has, the casc for prot~ction will 
hcre bc presented with sympathy, though no support will 
bc givcn to arguments which stand no chance of surviving 
scientifi.c scrutiny. 
A logically sound casc . can often be made for measures 
of protection which might secure a temporary trading ,?d-
vantage at the expense of foreign nations. Little weight, 
however, will be attached to such possibilities. If oppor-
tunities of this sort were not reciprocal, something might 
bc said, on national grounds, for an attempt at realization 
of them wherever they were present. But they are recip-
rocal. ·For purely selfish if for no other reasons, therefore, 
the commercial ·policy of a great nation should avoid the 
tactics of a casual horse-trader and should compare in 
dignity with that of a solid private concern which expects 
tobe in bu iness indefinitely. A commercial policy worthy 
of the name must proceed on the basis of long-run consid-
erations. The inability to see other than immediate eff ects 
has been responsible for many persistent and disastrous 
errors. 
Legislation will always more or less closely reflect pre-
vailing opinion in the constituencies from which the legis-
lators come. The public is grossly misinformed on the 
elerr.-ents of commercial policy and our tariff legislation is, 
in consequence, singularly bad. By far the most impo_rtant 
part of our commercial · policy is the protectionist system, 
but there is a scarcity of good elementary books devoted 
solely to this topic. Highly intelligent people without spe-
cial training in economics have, therefore, no readily avail-
able corrective of the na'ivete which one so often hears 
cxprcssed. The present treatment may, perhaps, do some-
thing to fi.11 this gap. The writer is acutely conscious of its 
dcfects but he has deliberately avoided the technicalities 
which a thoroughly ~omprehensivc discussion would de-
FOREWORD xi 
mand. One cannot develop philological concepts in a 
primer. No more can the nicetics of what is, perhaps, thc 
most complex branch of economic theory be cxpounded in 
a handbook. lt is enough if the substance of scientific opin-
ion can be conveyed. There has, even so, been a constant 
necessity of choosing between an unexceptional but esoteric 
statement and an exposition which·will not be too technical 
for the lay reader. The writer has, to some extent, been 
impaled on both horns of this dilemma. He trusts, how-
ever, that the text will be reasonably clear, • even to thc 
uninitiated, and such refinements as are attempted have 
been put in footnotes and appendices. However poorly the 
task may have been done, he cherishes the hope that no 
reader of this book will henceforth fail to receive with 
scepticism the crude arguments with which we are per-
sistently assailed, from both sides, in the press and plat• 
· · form discussion of protection. 
lt would be futile to attempt many acknowledgments 
but the impress of Professor F. W. Taussig of Harvard 
University, a great teacher, will always be present on any-
thing I may do in the field of the present study. I have, 
however, gathered from innumerable more or less con-
sciously apprehended sources. Most of the ideas expre!.sed 
have long been common property. Refcrence to the v·ork 
of others is therefore rare. This is not to deny borrowing. 







MAGNA EST VERITAS SED ERRARE EST HUMANUM 
TRUTH is mighty but it must wage an incessant and 
unequal war against wdl-nigh immortal error. There 
is, moreover, a marked difference in the charactcr of 
this struggle in the social and in the physical sciences. 
In the physical sciences progress is steady; positions, 
once gained, are consolidated; errors, sloughed off, do 
not readily reappear; and every conquest is followed 
by further forward thrusts from a relatively assured 
and solid base. This is true both of the theory and of 
the practice, of the science and the art. In the social 
sciences, on the other hand, and particnlarly in eco-
nomics, this is far from being the case. Th~ pure theory 
of economics, it is true, like that of the physical sci-
ences, proceeds fairly steadily from strength to strength, 
but the art persistently falters. Hampered by supcr-
stitions, pcrverted by ignorance posing as knowlcdge, 
crippled by dissensions among its practitio:iers, and lost 
in a welter of contradictory counsels, that art advances 
slowly at bestand, time and again, loses ground already 
won. . 
The reason for this contrast between the rnechanical 
and the economic arts is not far to seek. In the realm 
of physical phenomena, discussion is on a high plane; 
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no onc asks, or receives, a hearing unless he is so con-
versant with the technology of his subject as to bc 
worthy of some respect; the great mass of uninf_ormed 
laymen are docile, and the rest are ignored. But in the 
. realm of economics, the bulk of discussion is puerile; 
nearly everyone cherishes the illusion that he under-
stands such matters; and one has but to find common 
ground in popular prejudices to be acclaimed "econo-
mist" by those who would be quite incapable of recog-
nizing a real master of economic phenomena if they 
should stumble upon him. 
The need for careful training in the technique of 
cconomic analysis is not understood by the general pub-
lic as it is understood with respect to the problems of, 
let us· say, physics or chemistry.1 The world, in con-
sequence, is filled with self-constituted economic ex-
perts, often with a considerable though meretricious 
reputation, who thrust their incongruous opinions on 
the more or less receptive masses. The humble men of 
whom these masses are composed, if left alone, would 
be quite incapable of the perversions to which they are 
often brought by blind leaders who believe themselves, 
and are believed, to be possessed of superior vision. In 
the natural sciences, moreover, w,here the influence of 
given factors can be isolated, erroneous action is ordi-
narily attended by evils which soon become unmistak-
ably traceable to their true cause. In economic affairs, 
on the contrary, the effects of given causes are so ob-
scurcd in thc gcncral mcdlcy of thc cffccts of thcsc and 
quitc othcr factors, that cconomic medicinc mcn can 
'Cf. A. C. Pigou and D. H. Roberuon, Economlc E11~1 a,ul 
AJJ,-11111, P. S. King and Son, Ltd., London, 1931, p. 61 for a 
dilcua,ion of thi.• topic. · 
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prosper, in honor, from age to age and, what is worsc, 
. can get their pernicious proposals adopted. 
There is an almost universal tendency to confound 
sound business or political judgment with economic 
wisdom. The two things have, in fact, very little in 
common. · A brilliant economist might, and probably 
would, make a very poor business man or politician; 
and successful men of business or politicians can be, and 
in fact almost always are, most incompetent guides in 
purely economic matters. lt is true that economics and 
business deal with the same objective material. Business 
men, as such, however, incvitably base their economic 
judgments upon the criteria which are applicable to the 
success of an individual business concern. The true 
economist, on the other hand, must be trained to think 
in terms of the general welfare. The ordinary business 
point of vicw on economic matters is thus quite as 
naive as is that of the theoretical economist on the 
details of business management. 
ACADEMIC AND POPULAR JUDGMENTS ON 
COMMERCIAL POLICY 
Nowhere, perhaps, is this contrast between the judg-
ments of typical business men and those of cconomists 
more sharply drawn than in the field of commercial 
policy. That, for instance, an existing industry should be 
in1·ured or eliminated by forcign competition is a bitter pi 1 for the ordinary busincss man to sw:il low; yct, to 
thc cconomist, it will frcqucritly appcnr o.s o. condition 
of thc success of somc alternative and bettcr industry 
and of cnlargcd general prospcrity. On a falsc analogy, 
again, with the affairs of a private business organiza-
tion, the business man will think that a persistent "fa-
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4 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
vorable" balance of international payments ( w~ich seems 
to him the national counterpart of · profits in his own 
business) is indispensable to the economic happiness of 
his country. The econo.r;nist knows, however, that such 
a balance is not only impossible but that it would be 
undesirable if it could be achieved. To the business ·. 
man, exports are an end in themselves and import:s a r 
more or less necessary evil. To the economist, on the 
contrary, imports are the end and exports but. the means 
of acquisition of as large a volume of imports as for-
eigners can be induced to offer in exchange for the 
exported goods. The business man will ordinarily put 
the stigma of disloyalty upon a compatriot who buy~ 
finished goods abroad on considerations of price and 
quality alone. 2 The economist, however, is alive to the 1 
fact that every purchase of foreign goods inevitably 
creates · a market for future, or is the correlative of past, 
exports from his own country, and that, in general, 
restraints upon the freedom to purchase in the most 
favorable market will in jure not only the consumers 
but also export producers in the country imposing the 
restrictions. The business man ( and with him the la-
borer) looks upon imports as a cause of unemployment 
and of a lowered scale of living, but rigorous logic leads 
the economist to the conviction that, in the long run, 
restrictions upon imports provoke at least as much un-
employment as they banish and that, far from p~event-
ing a fall in standards of living, they are a cause there-
of. Finally, the business man ( in the U nited States at 
any rate) thinks of low foreign wages as a cause of 
low money costs of production, but to the economist 
it is evident that such low wages are a result of low 
1 Note, for enmple, the campaign to Ußuy British" in the former 
1tronrhold of free trade.. . 
INTRODUCTORY 5 
productivity and that they are, as often as not, accom• 
panied by very high money costs per unit of output. 
Such contrasts in point of view could be multiplied 
indefinitely. Enough has been said, however, to show 
that just as, in spite of what "common sense" would 
lead us to believe, the sun does not move round the 
earth, so the views on commer~ial policy, even of im-
posirig figures in business and political life, are often 
as distorted as those of the able leaders of the Inquisi-
tion in their opposition to Galileo~ In the economic as 
in the physical world the obvious explanation is nearly 
always wrong. For this reason we shall find that most 
of the popular arguments for protection are fallacious, 
while such arguments for a system of restraints as are 
logically valid seldom find a place in ordinary dis-
cussion. 
THEORY VS. HISTORY AND STATISTICS 
The problems of commercial ·policy must, in the 
main, be handled deductively since history and statistics · 
throw a most uncertain light upon them. The march 
of events, after a given policy has been put into effect 
in one country or another, can of course be determined 
with some approach to accuracy, but it would. be vain 
to imagine that those events were the necessary result 
of that policy. One can never know what would have 
happened if the opposite policy had been adopted. To 
take a specific example, we may note the e~raordinary 
forward spurt. in British trade, production, power, and · 
prosperity after the adoption of the free trade policy in 
I 846, but it is open to an opponent of free trade · to 
assert that this would have occurred in any case and 
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can economic Iife under high, and generally increasing, 
protection. 
If, moreover, we lock at the status of countries in 
general, under one system or th~ other, ~e shal_l find -
that, urider high protection, certam countnes are m the 
van of prosperity with others wretc~edly ~oor, and that 
this is almost equally true of countnes wh1ch have low, 
or no protective duties. To · revert to historical data, 
we m~y note that the rate of economic progress in the 
U nited States appears on the whole to have been not 
much greater or less under the approach to a free trade 
system which m~rked the period 1833 to 18~1 than 
it has been in periods characterized by the oppos1te com- · 
mercial policy. . 
If, in this matter, we could learn anythmg from 
history our provisional condusions might then be: ( 1) 
that commercial policy is of but slight significance to 
the prosperity of any given country, or . ( 2) that differ-
ent policies are appropriate to different t1mes and places. 
Both of these conclusions have, in fact, something of 
' truth and a good deal of error in them. As far as the 
former of them is concerned, it should be recognized 
that the importance of a sound foreign commercial 
policy, though by no means insignificant, has been greatly 
exaggerated by partisans of both the laissez-faire and the 
restrictionist schools. Prosperity is dependent upon a . 
complex of factors of which commercial policy is, in most 
cases, by no means the most important. In the case 
of a poor country the best possible foreign commercial 
policy might lift the nation but slightly above the low 
level of income which was due to other factors in the 
situation, and a very bad foreign commercial policy 
might not prevent anoth~r nation from ~njoying mo~t 
of the fruits of an otherwise favorable con Juncture. rrus 
INTROLUCTORY 
is the more true, in both cases, in the dcgrec in which 
thc nation in question is a microcosrn substantially rc-
producing within its bordcrs the rclationship bctwcen 
the factors of production which prcvails in the world as 
a whole. Where, on the other hand, the national devia-
tion from such world relationships is wide, sound for-
cign commercial policy is of great significance. 
Referring now to the second provisional conclusion 
from history, that different policies are appropriate to 
different times and places, it will be enough here to 
say that the element of truth which it contains has 
usually been stretched beyond all reason by opponents 
of the classical free trade doctrines. Their interest has 
usually been anything but scientific. The fact is that 
there are certain principles in the field of for~ign com-
mercial policy which can be laid down, without hesita-
tion, as valid in all times and places. There are, on the 
other hand, special circumstances in which the usual 
. corollaries of those principles should not be drawn with 
rigor, or should be discarded. What these circumstances 
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CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF PROTECTION 
CONFLICT OF POLICIES 
THE United States permits the import of coffee, raw 
silk, rubber, and many other products, free of duty. 
These products could, at a pinch, be produced within 
the borders of the Union and would be so produced if 
a sufficiently high protective tariff were imposed upon 
their entry. All of the reasons ordinarily alleged for 
the · imposition of protection apply. The commodities 
mentioned are produced in their countries of origin by 
workers who are paid only a tithe of the current Ameri-
can rate of wages. Their free import prevents the set-
ting up of industries in this country or limits the 
demand for the products of indirectly competitive ind 
tries already established· here. If, behind a tariff wall, 
production of these commoditics · should be started in 
this country, much new emp;l,yment would be given 
and the workers engaged WL1-dd furnish a market for 
the products of other domc~ic industries. And so on 
lt is true that there is no p;-esent domestic production 
of these goods. They are therefore not directly com-
petitive with our own output, but this is solely because 
we have not provided protcction. There would be no · 
domestic production of many other commodities if we 
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10 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
commodities in Japan, Malaysia, Brazil and other · coun-
tries, having lost their American m,arket, wou1d be com-
pelled to resort to other pursuits and not improbably 
would undertake the production qf wheat, cotton, or 
manufactured commodities which they now import 
from the United States. Our foreign market for wheat, 
cotton, and certain manufactured commodities having 
then been lost or curtailed, we should simply have ex-
changed one ihdustry for another. 
A given number of American workers, however, will 
not be able to produce directly as great an amount of 
coffee, silk, or rubber as they would have obtained by 
producing the other commodities for which they had 
formerly secured coffee, silk, and rubber in exchange. 
Similarly a given number of foreigners will not be able 
to produce directly as much wheat, cotton, or manu-
factured goods as they would have obtained had free 
trading relations made it possible for them to concen-
trate on coffee, silk, and rubber, and, with the money 
proceeds thereof, buy the commodities which they will 
otherwise be impelled to produce at home.8 Both 
Americans and the foreigners will lose. In the case as-
sumed this is so clear as to require no emphasis. Thor• 
oughgoing self-sufficiency could obviously not be at-
tained except at extreme cost. But where is the line to 
be drawn? What products is it desirable to produce at 
home, and in what measure for each product? If it is 
clearly foolish to protect industries which, if they are 
'Even if the foreigners, aa a result of the exclusion of their 
original producta from the American market, do not shift to the 
production of American cxports, they will bc forccd into lines which 
will curtail the cxports of a third group of countrics. Thi1 third 
group of countries will thcn be compcllcd to takc up the production 
of good1 hitherto obtained from the United States. In any event the 





THE NATURE OF PROTECTION II 
to be · pursued in the United $tates, need duties of at 
least 1000 per cent, what shall we say ·of industries 
which need 500~ 100, 50, or merely 5 per cent? 
DRY CHARACTER -OF PRO _____ __ 
decision as to what is a reasonab 
oe made until it is realized that effective pro 
in its nature, discriminatory, and that ev1 
a Ta • • possible to "Erotect" one ind 
- time, m JUnng otner ind 
✓ 
_ ongress cannot gra 
"pt by fakmg fFom some what it gives to o 
ough imEort duties we cau C rr ' •~ 
~roducers aS!mst fore1gn compe 
·' . ' owever, eroted exeort md 
oouna to meet foreif:n comee . . J. 
tUt reasons above g1ven, tney wn lina that such ct mo" 
· · · • · :!d tfirougn die protecfi~ d 
"'U oy-me1rown töllfifry on otner Eroä 
ii11 be Hiat such ittdustries will d., ( " 
~ >f econo 
oana as rama1v as wowa ornenV1se [)( 
case. 
· urthermore, the great group of occupations includ-
ing construction, transportation, communication, whole-
sale and retail trade, service industries, education, the 
professions, and many others, which are neither subjcct 
to foreign competition from imports nor engaged in 
production for export, cannot be favored by import 
duties; on the contrary, in so far as a !arger part of 
the national income is devoted to securing at enhanced 
cost the commodities which can be and are, in fact, pro-
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12 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
1 
narrowed.4 To protect one group of industries, there- · 
fore, is to expose others to an increasingly" bitter wind. ~ .'.' 
· ~ lt is often supposed that protection can be made uni- ' 
versal, but this is an illusion. The attempt to widen 
protection to include all existing industries would ren-
der it completely ineffective and would establish essen-
tially free trade conditions though at a higher all-round 
price level. All industries are in competition with one 
another for· labor and for markets. One group may be 
favored at the expense of others, but it is not possible 
to favor all. To seek to do ~o is analogous to_ giving all · 
competitors in a foot race the same handicap. Farmers 
and other exporters are no doubt entitled, in equity, to 
a bonus on their exports equal to the benefit which such 
industries as would otherwise be open to foreign compe-
tition in the home market receive from protection. 
Bounties on ·export or similar devices, as a fair counter-
p~rt to protective import duties, require, however, ex-
pensive administrative machinery to attain the same 
real result as could be secured, under a regime of com-
plete free trade, without any machinery at all. The 
economic structure would be the same in both cases, but 
the internal price level ·in the country adopting the 
tariff plus bounty system would be high relative to 
that of the rest of the world. The prices of imports 
would be raised (in the domestic market) by the 
amount of the tariff duties, while those of exports 
would be raised ( in the domestic market) by the amount 
of the bounties. The product of industries putting out 
goods consumed at home would, in the play of compe-
tition, eventually sell at equivalent prices. With every-· 
• The gruter the sha.re of the national income paid for artificially • 
protected commodities, the lea there ia for the productl of other 
emplo~tl. 
THE NATURE OF PROTECTION IJ 
body paying as well as receiving high prices, all would 
be in the same real situation as would obtain under 
the lower free trade price level. Forcigners, in their 
turn, would be offcring goods to, and rccciving goods 
from, the "protected" country at the lower level which 
would correspond with their own internal price struc• 
ture. If the system could be so developed as to remove 
all discrimination the volume and composition of ex• 
ports, of imports, and of domestic production and con• 
sumption, apart from a diminution proportional to the 
expense of administration, would be precisely the same 
as if neither import nor expert duties had ever been 
levied. The same amount would be expended on expert 
bounties as was collected on import dutics, and no im• 
port duty or expert bounty could justly be set at any 
figure which would promote or limit such influx or 
effiux of the commodity ir·. question as would occur 
under perfectly free compet' :ion. 
Such a removal of discrimination would, it is clear, 
automatically remove protection. Disrcgarding foreign 
action, it would then be no more or lcss difficult for 
Americans to sell in foreign markcts ( or for foreigners 
to sell in the domestic market) than it would bc if im• 
ports were free of any charge. lt would, of course, be 
the height of folly, through clumsy and costly govern• 
mental machinery thus to attain an end which might 
. be realized without any machinery at all; but it must be 
admitted that it is sometimes better to answer a fool ac• 
cording to his folly than to seek to confound him with 
J the most perfect logic. 
/ Discrimination, however, is not necessarily bad; it 
may be the highest wisdom. The real point at issue is 
how, if at all, to discriminate, and to what degree. Dif. · 
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14 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
ferent effects. This is clearly brought out i~ the corttrast 
between protective and · revenue duties. The two are 
mutually inconsistent. In so far as a duty yields revenue 
it is not protective, and in so far as it is protective it 
yields no revenue. Any given duty may, indeed, be a 
compromise. The import duty on sugar in the U nited 
States may be cited as an example. As far as imports , 
continuc over the duty the government obtains reve_nae 
but the protection is, by the same token, incomplete. 
As far, on · the other band, as the dQt is eff ive in 
exc u m ore1 n su 1es an promotmg production 
at home there is a measure o ro ec 10n ut t ere is 
no revenue. ree tra e countnes, suc as reat Britain 
m t e pre-war period, may -tHerefore obtain much 
greater revenues from import duties than do protec-
tionist countries. A completely protectionist country 
would, in fact, obtain from import duties no revenue 
at all. Conversely, the greatest revenue could be ob-
tained from import duties in which there is no element 
of protection. 
To preserve the character of revenue duties any 
import levy, which would otherwise promote domestic 
production at the expense of imports of the commodity 
in question, must be accompanied by an equivalent ex-
eise tax. Revenue duties are one form of taxation. They 
are a discrimination against such 1'roducts as are singled 
out for taxation but not as between different sources of 
supply. The consumer pays an enhanceq. price for ·his 
prodµct and the differential charge accrues to the Treas-
ury. Protective duties impose a similar burden on the 
consumer but no corresponding receipt appears in the. 
Treasury's accounts. Protective duties may pcrhaps, • 
thcrefore, be regarded as taxation but, if so, they are 
taxation without r:cvenue. If revenue were the O?ject 
THE NATURE OF PROTECTION 15 
J>l American tariff policy, duties would be levied on thc 
J very products which now come in free-such as tea, 
coffee, silk, rubber, and tin--and would be lowered on 
those products which are now excluded and produced 
at home. The esscnce of a practical frce tradc policy is 
not lack of tariff taxation or even lack of discrimination, 
since all special taxation is to some extent discrimina-
tory~ but absence of that type of discrimination which 
distinguishes directly between producers at home and 
abroad, and indirectly between the domestic producers 
of thc protected and other commodities, and by so doing 
substantially alters the composition of the national in-
dustry in a generally noxious manner. 
THE BASIS OF PROTECTION 
Since there is no fiscal compensation for the discrim-
ination involved in protective tariffs, such discrimina-
tion must be justified as inherently beneficial. The im-
, position of . protective duties, however, mcans that the 
levying nation, as a w hole, tends to buy certain com-
modities at higher prices and to sell others at lower.6 
This, in itself, is no way to get rich. The higher prices 
· will, it is true, be paid to domestic producers; but such 
/ producers_ do not make extraordinary profits since their 
costs are so great that, in the absence of protection, they 
would prefer to engage in other activities. Such higher 
prices as are paid for imports and such lower prices as 
arc received for the national cxports are thercfore with-
?Ut• present compensation • . Domestic producers of thc 
protected commodity gct a larger market but domestic 
• Thi, folloM from the contraction of the market for export ln-
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16 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
producers of exports find their market narr.owed. The 
net immediate result is a loss. 
pponents of protect1on ase their case not on the 
fact that protection is discriminatory but that the dis-
crimination is worse. than futile, that it involves gratui-
tous ·waste. The argument can be successfully met only 
if it can be shown that the immediate disadvantage is 
compensated. by ulterior benefits. All protective duties 
. are co~tly in ;he present, but some may yield compen-
sating advantages in the future. No approximation to 
other than a na'ive policy is possible without a careful 
estimate of the relative weight of these present and 
future factors, or without preci~e notions a.Q, to the in-
dustries it is good for the nation to have, the share in 
the national er.onomic structure which each should hold, 
and the cost of changing thc composition of the national 
industry. To ~hcse considerations wc shall rcturn in a 
later chapter. 
The very name "protection" has a comforting but 
misleading connotation. If we should· call protection 
what it is, discrimination, and should recognize that _ 
this discrimination immediately affects adversely not 
only the foreign producer of the commodities concerned 
but also the great bulk of domestic producers who can-
not be protected, as well as practically all domestic con-
sumcrs, we should then regarq the matter with clear eyes 
instead of through a fog of unwarranted hope, fear, and 
favorable prejudice. The case turns entirely on possible 
eventual compensations of the present lass. 
CHAPTER III 
CRITIQUE OF POPULAR, AND FALLACIOUS, 
ARGUMENTS FOR PROTECTION 
PROTECTION, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE STANDARD 
OF LIVING 
THE plea that protection is essential as a. safeguard of 
a high standard of living, and as a prcvcntivc of uncm-
ploymcnt, is politically potent but almost _ whnlly falla-
dous. The real issucs involvcd in protcction c:rn profit-
ably be discusscd only aftcr thcsc falsc vicws have bccn 
dismissed. The nai've acceptance of such views ariscs 
from illusions with regard to the relationship betwcen 
wages and prices, to the real sources of prosperity, and 
to the causes of unemployment. 
If we· reflect that the national sta'ndard of living is 
absolutely ·conditioned by the national output plus im-
ports minus exports, that, with a given national mone-
.. tary income, high prices reflect not prosperity but ad-
versity, and that unemployment is no greater a problem 
in countries with a liberal than in those with a restric-
tive commercial policy, we shall not easily fall into the 
error of approving a general restriction of imports, a. 
general raising of prices without corresponding increase 
in money incomes, and the building up of certain indus-
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18 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
Clarity of thought on these matters is furthered wh.en 
we take a genetic view of the deveiopment of our econ-
omy and note that, with the increasing complexity of 
cconomic life, there has occurred one of those perver-
sions of thought in which emphasis comes to be laid 
upon means to the exclusion of the ends they were 
originally designed to serve. 
When the American colonies were first settled com-
munication ~th Europe was so difficult, uncertain, and 
commercially profitless, that the pioneers were forced 
into self-sufficiency. ,The ideal of isolation, whatever its 
worth, was then rather fully realized. The colonists, 
however, were far from satisfied. If, in their religion 
and politics, they desired only to be let alone, they were 
by no means of the same · mind when it came to trade. 
On the contrary, as soon as transport and trade could 
be developed, they cheerfu.lly abandoned some of their · 
activities in order to concentrate all of their productive 
powers in lines in which they, and their new country, 
were most apt. A monetary system, in the European 
understanding of the term, · hardly existed-barter was 
prevalent-but it was obviously advantageous to spe-
cialize upon the production of those things which, after 
allowing for cost of transfer, could be sold in Europe, 
or elsewhcre, for more money than need there be given 
for other goods which could be produced in the colonies 
only at higher cost than that expended on the exports. 
There were definite human and material resources 
available. The task of the colonists was to use them to 
the best advantage. The problem was solved solely by 
consideration of prices in foreign markets relative to 
cost in the colonies. If units of transportable goods, 
which required a given outlay to produce at home, 
werc selling. for varying prices abroad, it was clear gain 
POPULAR ARGUMENTS FOR PROTECTION 19 
to abandon the domestic production of such of these 
goods as were selling at relatively low prices in foreign 
markets so that the conserved productive power might 
be applied to those which were selling at a higher fig-
ure; to continue this process as long as price differences 
existed; and to secure in trade, at low prices, the com-
modities on which production was being abandoned. lt 
made not the slightest difference what the absolut8 
prices in foreign markets happened to be or what were 
the absolute costs of production in the colonies.1 Trade 
was in any event the means of obtaining the maximum 
real income, the ·way to have more of every good than 
could otherwise be secured. 
If there were any unemployed the clearly sensible 
thing was that they should work, along with their fel-
lows, at those things which commanded high prices in 
foreign markets relative to cost of production at home, 
rather than that, as a result of the exclusion of imports 
1 Supposc that the priccs, in English markets, of a unit of wheat 
and a unit of nails, each of which could be produccd at equal coat 
in the colonics, wcre [.i and f.1 respectivcly, lt would bc clearly 
advantagcous for the colonists to specialize in · wheat nnd import 
naila. lt would bc equally advantageous to do so ahould the prices in 
Engliah markets fall to, lct us say, [.1 and [.¼ reapcctively, or ahould 
riae to f.4_ and [.2. The aame is true, if, as a result of tcchnical or 
other changes, the cost of production in the colonies should fall for 
both commodities to onc-half, or any othcr fraction, of its formcr 
levcl or rise to any common multiple thereof. Without a clear grasp 
of ·the fact that absolute price and cost levels are irrelevant to the 
theory of trade, that it is only relations/Ji-ps betwcen individual 
prices that matter, confusion and error arc inevitable. Absoh.te 
prices, of · course, determine trade carr.ied on under anything like 
free conditions. But this is only because trade in money itsclf bring, 
international price lNJels into such approximation to equality as to 
make absolute and relative prices -substantially the same thing. Thc 
prescnt discussion of course applies only to auch goods as are not 
rendered immobile by prohil>itively great artificial reatrictions on 
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20 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
of relatively low-priced goods, they should _ enter up,m 
the production thereof.2 Since the workers, under the 
circumstances posited, could not produce as much of the 
hitherto imported commodities as could have been ob-
tained in exchange for the exports they might otherwise 
have turned out, the general standard of living must, for 
the time being at any rate, have suffered a reduction on 
the adoptio~ of a policy of restraint of imports. 
The general standard of living in the colonies and in 
foreign countries, though affected by commercial policy, 
was, like absolute prices, a factor of no significance in 
determining what that policy should be. In the be-
ginning the colonists' standard of living was very greatly 
below that of the European countries with which they 
carried on trade. When later it rose, the change had no 
bearing on the benefits from the overseas trade. As time 
went on, inventions, improvemcnts, changes in demand, 
or. the necessity for using poorer resources as the pro-
duction of any one commodity in any one area was 
extended, altered, on both sides of the water, the costs 
and prices of the v;irious commodities exchanged, and 
affected the composition and even the direction of over-
seas trade, but did not affect the fundamental principle 
above laid down. 
Far from rejecting imports because they were cheap, 
the colonists were served by Yankee traders who combed 
the markets of the world with the rational objective of 
securing importable goods as cheaply as possible. The 
1 The picture of colonial life and policy given in thi1 chapter is 
an idealization not meant to be historically accurate. lt presents, I 
think, the tr1ml. of events; but the path to economic ·realism in the 
colonies, u elsewherc, was obstructed by traditional modes of 
thought inherited from the former environment of the aettlen. Cf. 
E. A. J. Johnson, AttUrie.an Economic Thought in tlu SnJente,ntl, 
Cmtury, P. S. ~g & Son, Ltd., London, 193a. 
POPULAR ARGUMENTS FOR PROTECTION ZI 
colonists were calmly indifferent to foreign wages, con• 
ditions of labor, and standards of living. They knew 
that their own standard of living was not conditioned 
by that of foreigners but was a resultant ( 1) of their 
own prodµctive skill and resources, and ( 2) of trading 
shrewdly at as high prices for exports and as low prices 
for imports as could be attained. They were not afraid 
of imports or of the competition of low-wage labor. 
The freest of trade could not roh them of their efficiency 
and, whatever the wages and standards of living of other 
· peoples might be qr become, they knew that their own 
welfare was dependent upon their own productive ef-
forts. The principle still holds. 
NATIONAL PRICE STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL 
EXCHANGE 
Proceeding from harter to the use of such media of 
exchange as wampum, which had no currency iq the 
Old World, the pioneers still had but little opportunity 
for direct comparison of national price structures. Thcre 
was, consequently, . small room in their minds for the 
false notions that high wages make high prices and that 
a rich c0untry will somehow be ruined by trading with 
a poor one. The price level in the New W orld was di-
vorced from that of the Old World, and both were a 
matter of complete irrelevance in international trade. 
lt was only the variation of individual prices, within 
either price structure, which was of significance. Whether 
each of two commodities cost 10 or 1000 strings of 
wampum in the colonies was as irrelevant as was the 
absolute price level in foreign countries. Whatever the 
absolute height of foreign prices might be, if only the 
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same relative price as at home, it paid the pioneers, and 
the Europeans, to concentrate on the production and ex-
port of those goods which, re.lative t? other articles, we:e 
reciprocally more valuable m fore1gn markets than m 
their own. 
U nder the lower of the colonial price levels in the 
above supposition colonial traders ~ould lay out 10 
strings of wampum per 1.mit of export; sell their stock 
in foreign markets; buy, with the foreign currency pro-
ceeds, a larger number of unit.r of the commodity rel_a-
tively cheap in the foreign center; dispose of t~em m 
the colonial market at 10 wampum strings per umt, and 
thus make a wampum profit pro rata with the percentage 
differcnce in the forcign price of the two commoditics. 
The same principle applics equally well to the higher 
of the two price levels. The trade could, of course, be 
conducted with equal advantage by foreign as by colonial 
me:rchants, and the price structure which made it ad-
vantageous for the inhabitants of one country to con-
centrate on the production of the one commodity made 
it equally advantageous for others to concentrate on the 
alternative. 
In lieu ·of round-trip trading under a single entre-
preneur, specialization in exporting, importing, and 
transportation soon made its appearance. This speciali-
zation called for an exchange of currencies. Since wam-
pum was a valid medium of exchange only in the 
colonies, the amount of foreign currency offered for a 
unit thereof depended upon· the general commodity pur-
chasing power of wampum as compared with foreign 
currency units. Its precise foreign currency value at any 
giv~ moment settled at the point at which the demand 
for, and supply of, wampum against foreign currencies, 
and thereforc of foreign currencies against wampum~ 
POPULAR ARGUMENTS FOR PROTECTION z3 
were in equilibrium. Foreign currency demand for 
wampum came from the possessors of foreign currencies 
who wanted to make purchases in the colonies, and the 
supply of wampum against foreign currencies from such 
colonists as wanted to make purchases abroad. The 
equilibrium momentarily ~stablished would be stable 
only when the rate of exchange tended to provoke a 
persistent equality between both the wampum and the 
foreign exchange value of the total of mat4ring claims 
and counterclaims arising from international trans-
actions. 
If the foreign exchange value of total imports tended 
to exceed the forcign cxchangc valuc of total cxports, 
the rate at which wampum would scll against forcign 
currencics would declinc, This would make colonial 
· products cheaper to foreign purchascrs and Old W orld 
products dearer to the colonists, would expand colonial 
exports and contract colonial imports, until equilibrium 
in the foreign exchange and the wampum value of total 
exports and imports was achieved. The opposite tend-
ency of total exports to exceed tot.al imports would be 
corrected by an enhancement of the foreign currency 
price of wampum with attendant effects the contrary of 
those just described but also leading to equilibrium. 
The course of exchange ratcs would thus show minor 
fluctuations about a norm w hich reprcsented the rcspec-
tive current general purchasing powers · of the currencies 
involved. Whenever the purchasing power of wampum 
and foreign currerlcies changed relative to one another, 
the norm would alter, but there would have been no 
such tendency if they had changed in equal degree and 
in the same direction. 
The pioneers were much · too eager for consumablc 
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goods to store up dead assets in silver· and-gold. Thc 
precious metals, whenever acquired, were therefore 
shipped out as a ·means of payment for imports. When 
the need for a money more convenient than wampum, 
or like substitutes, made itself feit, recourse was had to 
inconvertible paper monetary media, the changing for-
eign exchange value of which was deterrnined in essen-
tially the same manner as has just been described for 
wampum. The same principles are, .of course, applicable 
to ·the inconvertible paper currencies now so widely in 
use. 
Eventually, however, silver was more or less defi-
nitely established as currency in the colonies or in the 
states which evolved therefrom. Some English coin was 
· used, but Spanish currency soon became dominant and 
continued to be employcd in this country long after the 
Reyolution. The Spanish coins were also current not 
only in Spain but in most of South America, the West 
Indies, and other countries. The North American 
scttlers of course sold their exports at as high prices in 
Spanish silver as they could gct, and they divcrtcd the 
supply of any givcn commodity from the domcstic to 
thc forcign mnrkct, or vico v"t1rsa, until thc nct rcturns, 
in Spani h silvcr, from n salc nt homc 11nd nbrond wcrc 
cqual. Imports, on the other hand, werc obtained from 
foreign producers who were pursuing the same policy. 
The wholesale price level of mobile goods8 in the 
various colonies was thus brought into a fixed relation-
ship of substantial equality with the similar price level 
in other countries using the same or allied currencies, 
some commodities being priced lower ( exports) and 
• These are tbe only prices which have any direct bearing on in-
ternational tradc. 
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others higher (imports) in any one of the countries with 
respect to the others. • The use of the same currency as 
was employed in other countries made the colonial price 
level of mobile goods part of a world system to which it 
was automatically tied. lt could neither rise substan-
tially above, nor fall substantially below, this world price 
level. 
The Spanish coins came into the N orth American 
colonies only because the settlers preferred to take some 
of the proceeds of their exports in this form rather than 
in directly consumable commodities. Whenever this was 
overdone, however, the colonists, having plenty of 
silver, would bid higher silver prices for both domestic 
and imported commodities, while the inhabitants of the 
other countries using the same currency, an excessive 
part of which bad now movcd to North Amcrica, would 
bid lower silver prices for all typcs of products. 
The result was that the N orth American colonists 
not only obtained, for the moment, a !arger share of 
their own output, and thus left lcss for cxport, but thcy 
also obtaincd a largcr sharc of thc commodity output 
of othcr countrics in thc form of imports. This nltcrntion 
in thc ratio of commodity cxport~ to imports cnllcd for 
nn cffiux of coins from North Amcrica in pnyment for 
the relativcly enlarged commodity import and, through 
this effiux of coins, the whole process was reversed. The 
trend toward deviation of one price level from a posi-
tion of substantial equality with others could clearly 
then not proceed very far in eitl~er direction. 
'The diffcrcnce in price from one country to anothcr was ap-
proximately cqual to the cost of transfer of the commodity bctwccn 
the two markets. Mobile commodities not actually transfcrrcd of 
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PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
While wholesale commodity price ltrUels -of mobile 
goods were substantially equal in all the countries using 
a common medium of exchange, wages and other money 
incomes varied greatly from one country to another. The 
North American colonists were selling in foreign mar-
kets certain commodities which were being produced in, 
and exported from, other parts of the world. All sellers 
in any given. market had, of course, to take the same 
price for goods of like quality. The monetary return to 
the producer was therefore proportionate to his protluc-
twity, and this was reflected in wage rates. 
The transition from the monetary systems above de-
scribed to those now in use was almost insensible and in-
volved no new principles. After the formation of the 
U nited States bimetallism was established, with a na-
tional silver and gold coinage based on the Spanish dol-
lar _which continued to be widely used. The price struc-
ture ~as determined substantially as in the past, though 
national meta! monetary units, instead of moving freely 
in unchanged form from circulation in one country to 
circulation in another, were first melted and then re-
coined. However, exchange rates between metallic cur-
rencies repre~ented the respective weight of meta! in the 
currency units, and national wholesale price levels of 
mobile goods, measured in any givcn weight of silver 
( any silver currcncy), maintaincd thcir relationship of 
substantial equality practically unchangcd. Bimetallism 
in this country gave way to the gold monometallic 
standard to which most of the world, following the ex-
ample of England, adverted during the nineteenth cen-
tury. The principles o{ international price determina-
tion undcr an international gold standard, however, are 
thc same as they wcre under silver. Under inconvertible 
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paper standards, they are much the same as under 
wampum. 
The price structure in any internationally trading 
country is thus linked with a world price systcm. lt is a 
condition of the maintenance of the gold standard in any 
country that the gold wholesale price level of mobile 
goods shall not rise above the similar price level in other 
nations by even the slight amount which would bring 
'Permanent disequilibrium between total imports and 
total exports other than gold. If no adequate action is 
taken by banking authorities to prevent such a rise, the 
eventual inevitable abandonment of the gold standard 
might leave prices high, or even increasing. The mone-
tary unit, however, would then fall in gold value, andin 
the rate at .which it would exchange against foreign gold 
currencies, to a point at which the existing domestic 
price level, at the then current rates of exchange, would 
bear the same relationship to foreign gold or paper 
prices as if the country in question, and all other coun-
tries concerned, were still upon a gold currency basis. 
The same principles thus apply, whatever the character 
of national monetary systems. 5 
As long, therefore, as any foreign trade pcrsists, the 
countries from and to which goods move will have inter-
dependent price structurcs, with the wholcsale price 
levels of mobile goods, mcasurcd in any given currcncy, 
substantially equal. This tcndcncy is wholly automatic. 
The prcvailing opinion that countries of high wagcs arc 
countries of high prices, and countrics of low wagcs 
countries of low prices, is quite without foundation. Na-
tional wholesale commodity price levels of mobile goods 
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28 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
arc fixed in a substantially equal relationship to one an-
other by that equilibrium of total. exports and imports 
imposed by the necessity of giving a "quid" for a "quo.'16 
Other commodity prices are linked with this interna-
tional price level and vary inyersely with the effective-
ness of domestic, relative to export, industries in each 
country. 
WAGE STRUCTURES 
Wages are the resultant of earning power within the 
international price system as a datum. Money wages are 
not a cause but an effect of prices cum productivity. The 
absolute height of prices and. wages is irrelevant to na-
tional prosperity, once all adjustments have been made 
to a given price and wage structure. The significant thing 
is the relationship between the said prices and wages. 
Prites in all countries, when measured in any common 
medium, fluctuate together in approximately the same 
degree and direction.1 National wholesale price levels of 
• Much confusion arises from the fact that only a varying part of 
the tc;>tal exports or imports of any given country is recorded in the 
atatistics ordinarily published. This part is usually called the 
"visiblen trade. What is and what is not visible, however, depends 
entircly upon the eyes of the viewer. In many cascs, official vision is 
so bad that it faila to note so obvious an item as an ocean' liner (or 
a whole ßeet of them) sold to foreign interests. Official statistics, in 
fact, merely show the rcsults of that portion of foreign commerce 
which happens to be easy of surveillance, or they reflect the statis-
tical whims of legislatures. They are of no value whatever for most 
of the purposcs to which they are ordinarily applied. Whether, 
under myopic legislation, trade ia or is not "visible„ ia, from the 
economic point of view, completely irrelevant. No distinction will 
bc made in thia book, therefore, between 10-called visible and in-
vi,ible item1. 
' Temporary deviationa may occur as a result of gros1ly disturbed 
monetary conditions. This 1ituation cannot peniat indefinitely and 
uaually doea not lut for ·any conaiderable period. 
') 
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mobi~e goods cannot deviate far from the similar world 
level. With prices given, however, wages will bc high 
or low proportionate with productivity. 
That differing national wage levels have no casual 
effect on prices is clearly indicated by the amusing mu-
tual fears of Premier Mussolini and ex-President 
Hoover. 11 Duce vehemently asserts that the ltalian 
worker must be protected against imports from the 
United States produced at low prices by mass methods 
and with high efficiency. The former American presi-
dent is equally convinced that the standard of living of 
American workers must be guarded by import duties 
against the output of ltalian and other industry where 
low wages are paid. Premier Mussolini is obviQusly im-
pressed by what he believes to be the general low unit 
costs in the United States arising from 'American pro-
ductive effectiveness, and Mr. Hoover by what he be-
lieves to be the general low unit costs in ltaly issuing 
out of Italian low wages. Each believes that his own 
country, without protection, would be completely under-
sold by the other. They cannot both be right but both 
can be, and in fact are, wrang. 
Neither efficiency nor low wages givcs one country 
any genera·l competitive advantage over another since, 
in any lengthy period, they must be inversely propor-
tional to each other. High wages in export industries 
cannot be paid unless effectiveness is high, and they 
·cannot be refused if it is.8 Similarly, low wages are in-
• Compctition among cmployen will force moncy wage, into linc 
with the moncy value of the workcr>1 contribution to output. If 
wagca arc lcss than auc~ contribution, profits will . be ao high u to 
1ct up an urgent dcmand for labor and raisc wagca, whilc if they 
are morc, uncmploymcnt will pcnist until a downward adjuatmcnt 
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evitable if productivity is low. The two factors balance 
each other in their effect on costs. 
-Any common export of ltaly and of the United 
States will be produced in both countries at substantially 
the same money costs per unit and will, of course, sell at 
the same price in neutral markets regardless of its 
origin. As regards -other commodities, the money costs 
per unit of output will, for some of them, be lower in 
the United States· than in ltaly and, for others, lower 
in ltaly than in the United States. The former com-
modities, if mobile, will be exports of the United States 
and, under free trading conditions, imports of Italy. 
The latter commodities, if mobile, will be exports of 
ltaly, and, under free trading conditions, imports of 
the United States. Neither the United States, Italy, 
nor any other country could ever in all lines undersell, 
or be undersold by, another; but every country, what-
ever the height of its wage structure, will be able, as 
long as it permits any imports at all, to undersell other 
countries in some lines just as it will be undersold by 
them · in others. 
Such is the automatic issue of the international price 
mechanism under free trade, protection, or any other 
policy. U nder any policy price levels will undergo such 
minor shifts relative to one another as are necessary to 
bring the value of total exports into equilibrium with 
that of total imports. Any policy which restricts either 
total exports or total imports will therefore tend to re-
strict the other in equal degree. Far from the wage 
structure determining prices, it is prices, together with 
productive effectiveness in export industries, which de- · 
termine monetary wage rates. Money wages and other 
incomes vary _with changes in ( 1) the money factor, and 
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( 2) the productivity factor. The one is, in the long run, 
of no concern to prosperity; the other is the essence of 
it. The one has no effect on real incomes; the other is 
vital to them. 
Abstraction being momentarily made of the question 
of employment, it is clear that protective tariffs can have 
no general effect on maintenance of standards of living. 
Tariffs, as such, cannot, of course, improve the resources 
in any country or the skill and diligence with which they 
are worked, though they can, and usually do, tend to 
give them a disadvantageous direction. They can scarcely 
increase the prices at which exports are sold or, there-
fore, the wages in these bellwether industries. If pro-
tective tariffs had any general influence in making Ör 
keeping a people prosperous there would be no poverty 
in the world. Standards of living, however, cannot be 
raised or mainta1ned by legislative fiat nor are they 
adversely affected by general free competition. 
Competition always seems less desirable to the par-
ticular competitors involved than does a monopoly. · lt 
seems more desirable, however, to everyone else. I t is, 
moreover, usually beneficial to the whole. This is as true 
of foreign as of domestic competition. Protective import 
duties give exclusive possession of the domestic market 
to certain classes of domestic producers but they do so 
only at the expense of other domestic producers and of 
consumers who cannot be so sheltered. lt is therefore 
credulous in the extreme to suppose that '~protection" 
can be universal or that it can have any general tendency · 
to raise or maintain standards of living. Once the notion 
is grasped that high real wages, far from deriving from · 
high prices, are on the whole inconsistent with them, 
confusion on this issue disappears. 
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THE LAW OF COMPENSATION IN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
Turning· now to the effect, if any, of a liberal trade 
policy on employment, it should first be noted that, 
unie·ss a nation is quite peculiarly lucky, it cannot secure 
imports without paying for them, and that payment for 
any increase of imports due to a liberal commercial policy 
cannot finally be e_ffected without giving rise to domestic 
employment on exports to a value equivalent to that of 
the expanded volume of goods secured from abroad.9 
Imports will simply not enter a country unless there is 
an equivalent volume of exports.10 This would be ob-
• Wc frcqucntly bcar of thc dangcr of an "inundation„ of forcign 
goods, If such an "inundation" should cver matcrializc it wou!d bc 
a cnsc of showcrs of blessings. Thc qucstion as to who would hc so 
generous as to send thi1 wavc of good things to our shores, without 
accuring anything in rcturn, has ncver been satisfactorily answt!red. 
lf it could bc, thc citizcns of thc "inundated" country could all go 
fishing, mcanwhilc living at a high standard on thc bounty of 
forcigncrs, without cven thc necessity of catching any fish. 
lt has, in particular, been allegcd that the capitalistic world is in 
"dangcr'' of such an inundation from Russia. The realization of 
this "danger" would surely bc thc triumph of capitalism si::~e it 
would makc thc Russians thc slaves of thc capitalistic world. In 
fact,. thc Russians arc not so foolish as . to export anything cxcept 
with the conscious aim of thcreby sccuring the means to pay for 
imports. The Russian dictatorship is brought face to face with the 
problcm of providing as well as possible for its population, and i1 
not unawarc of the fact tbat to sccure imports at a lower cost {in 
cxports) than must bc paid if such imports wcre made in Russia ia 
a grcat contribution toward that end. 
The diarupting effects of sudden changes in thc conditions of in-
ternational c.ompctition cannot, however, bc dcnicd. An inßux of 
imports far bcyond the usual scale may provokc partinl or gcneral 
unemployment even though payment i1 etf ected by the export of 
commoditiea, othcr than gold, from accumulatcd atocks. Thla 
phcnomenon ia not peculiar to countries of liberal commerclal policy 
and will preaently bc trcated in greater detail. 
11 Abttraction ia here made, for the momcnt, of international bor• 
rowinr and len~inr, which will be later diacuued. 
POPULAR. ARGUMENTS FOR PROTECTION 33 
vious if international commercial transactions were, in 
form, the harter which they are in fact. But here, as 
elsewhere in economics, the use of money ( or of instru-
ments with certain monetary characteristics) pulls wool 
over our eyes. The statement erroneously attributed to 
Lincoln that "when we buy goods abroad we get . the 
goods and the foreigner gcts the money whereas whcn 
we buy goods at homc we have both the goods and the 
money ," seems to the man on the strcet like inspired 
common sense. In truth, however, in its implications at 
any rate, it is arrant nonsense. A domestic trading trans-
action does not, of course, alter either the amount of 
goods or the amount of money in the country. A pur-
chase of foreign goods with gold, on the other hand, 
alters both. lt alters them, however, in opposite direc-
tions, increasing the amount of goods and diminishing 
the amount of money. Since the goods would not have 
been bought if they had not been worth more to the 
purchaser than the money material which he gives for 
them, there seems to be no reason for inhibiting the 
transaction. 
lt will be worth while, however, to follow somewhat 
farther the purchase of foreign goods for money. Let us 
suppose, first, that every foreign commercial transac-
tion involved a cash payment by the importer to the 
exporter. Since gold 'is the only thing which even closely 
approximates an international money we may, for the 
momcnt, take such cash to be gold, whether in the form 
of coin or bullion.11 Thcre are only two ways for any 
u Silvcr i1 used in aomc countrica, lt doca not aecm worth whilc, 
however, to include 1ilver in thi1 exposition, The principle, are 
preciaely analogoua whether gold or ailver ia uacd, Bill, of cxchange 
are not moncy and will prcacntly be conaidercd acparatcly, Paper 
moncy, whcthcr convertible or inconvertiblc, haa practically no 
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country to get gold. lt may produce it within its own 
borders or it may secure it from abroad. lf-it produces 
gold, the provision of the gold by means of which for-
eign commodities are purchased has obviously given em-
ployment to its own miners to an amount which would 
not have been called for if there had been no import 
of goods. If, on the other hand, such a country had 
originally secured the gold abroad it must have paid for 
it by the export of goods or services.12 The provision 
of such goods or services must have given employment . 
to its population.18 The gold, moreover, can be used 
again to pay for imports to the country in question only 
after it has been repossessed, presumably in exchange 
for exported commodities and services the production · 
of which involves employment. 
lt will be clear that the situation is essentially the . 
same if, instead of giving gold in exchange for foreign 
goods, such goods are paid for in the usual way by a 
bill of exchange, or draft, giving the importer of com-
modities, on payment of an equivalent in his own money, 
the command over the requisite amount of foreign cur-
rency which he proceeds to assign to the exporter. If 
we take anormal transaction of this type, involving an 
American importer as the purchaser from an American 
bank of a sum of foreign currency, elementary analysis 
will show that, apart from loans and other financial 
circulation outside its count'ry of origin and thua does not hcre 
come in qucstion. 
u The acquisition of gold by gift, theft, or other non-commercial 
method, is ordinarily of such slight quantitative ;~ ·ortance as to be 
aafely ncglccted. lt will, in any ca,e, prescntly •• ,.ear that auch 
receipts have no probabl~ effect on employment in either country 
concerned. 
11 The writer ia far from auppoaing that what a country needa i'1 
employment rather than producta but, in vicw of popular paychol-
OJY, it ,eem, beet to preacnt the matter in thi, lirht, 
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transactions, the stock of foreign currency from which 
the sale is made by the bank must derive from an export 
of gold, other commodities, or services from the U nited 
States; that, whichever of these is the sourcc of the ex-
change, its production for export must have provided 
employment for American labor; and that the replace-
ment of the amount of foreign exchange taken by the 
importer ( the condition of the continuance by the bank 
in this business and of sales to later importers) involves 
further employment at home in the expert trades. With 
whatever variations exchange transactions may be con-
ducted, the result will be the ·same. 
THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL BORROWINO AND 
LENDINO 
As far, however, as imports are financed with the pro-
ceeds of net foreign borrowing or other financial re-
sources, there is no necessity, or indeed possibility, that 
the total value of the present expert of tangible goods 
or of services will be equal to the total value of. such 
imports.14 Imports so financed, nevertheless, do not 
terid to diminish employment in either the borrowing, 
the lending, or any other, market. A loan by the citizens 
of one nation to those of another increases the present 
monetary purchasing power of the borrowers and di-
minishes that of the lenders. After the loan, the bor-
rowers can buy all that they could have bought in their 
domestic market without floating the loan, and they can_ 
1
' A prcscnt book~ eping cquilibrium is attained through the 
inclusion, in tlu acc"!unt, of the prcsent worth of a promisc of 
futurc income, «1iz., thc 1ecuritie1 or other righta acquircd in cx-
changc for the 1011n of prcscnt purch:uing power, For a more 
thorourhroinr diacu11ion of thc b11lancc of paymcnta, acc Appendix 
u. 
36 
have the ir 
course, ma} 
eign exchar 
chasers of · 




their sale o 
borrowing 
ultimately b 
try of the 1, 
the demand 
rowers or tl 
If now w 
that althoug 
ate ability tc 
is reduced, 1 
goocis is co1 
abroad whic 
those to wl 
their loan. l 
on old loans 
sa.me positio 
position as 1 
borrowing a 
and amortiz. 
of money, h 
tary demanc 
involved.11 ~ 
1.1 Since they 
eourccs, their a 
extent both bcf 
111 Foreign fu 
CTION 35 
from which 
)m an export 
n the United 
·ce of the ex-
Lve provided 
: the replace-
taken by the 









ralue of. such 
:less, do not . 
1e borrowing, 
1y the citizens 
s the present 
wers and di-
oan, the bor-
mgh t in their 
and they can 
ed through the 
,f a promise of 
acquircd in ex-
:r, For a more 
u, sec Appendix 
PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
have the imports as well.15 The actual borrowers, of 
course, may sell, for their domcstic currency, the for-
eign exchange proceeds of the foreign loan. The pur-
chasers of this exchange will then take the increased 
volume of foreign goods for which alone the borrowed 
money can be spent. In compensation, the original bor-
rowers will extend, in equal measure, their purchases in 
the domestic market, using in payment the proceeqs of 
their sale of · the foreign exchange arising from their 
borrowing operation. Though a foreign loan cannot 
ultimately be used except to make purchases in the coun4 
try of the lender, this in no way, therefore, diminishes 
the demand for domestic goods on the part of the bor-
rowers or their compatriots. 
If now we look at the lending country, we shall find 
that although, after a foreign loan, the lenders' immedi-
ate ability to purchase in their own or any other market 
is reduced, this reduction in their demand for domestic 
goods is compensated by the increased demand from 
abroad which must issue from the borrowers or from 
those to whom the borrowers assign the proceeds of 
their loan. Payment of interest, repayment of principal 
on old loans, and gifts put the payers, or donors, in the 
same position as lenders, and the receivers in the same 
position as borrowers, under a new loan. International 
borrowing and lendipg, payment and receipt of interest 
and amortization, as well as .donations, tribute, or theft 
of money, have therefore no bearing on the total mone-
tary demand for the products of any of the countries 
involved.18 The direction of the demand is shifted, but 
11 Since they would prcsumably not borrow if they had other re-
eourccs, their ability to purchase will evidently be exerted to ita full 
extent both before and after the loan is made. 
11 Foreign financial transactiona tend to effect l<HfU alteration in 
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its total volume, in each and all of the co'untries co_n• 
cerned, tends to remain unchangcd. 
As a result of more or_ less foreign lending, of inter• 
national interest payments, of repaymcnt of old loans, 
of international gifts, tribute, or the like, the trade of 
any given country may become more or less interna• 
tional, and the direction in which demand within that 
country will be relatively strong or weak will show a 
shift. There is, however, no reason to expect any sig-
nificant effect on the total volume of employment. The 
ratio of commodity imports to exports of a country 
. which is a net borrower, or a recipient of interest or 
· principal repayments, will rise, and the same ratio for 
a country which is a net lender, or a payer of interest or 
principal, will fall. But there is no inherent reason for 
these shifts of the ratio of import to export being re-
flected in the employment situation. With a given 
amount of employment the proceeds of loans, or former 
investments repaid, enable the recipients to increase, and 
they force the lenders or payers to reduce, their con-
sumption. But it is the volume of consumption, and not 
of production, which alters in one country relative to 
another. What the lender refrains from consuming is 
taken by the borrower. So far as a liberal trade policy 
has any effect on international borrowing and lending 
it is likely to be on the side of an augmentation. This 
will tend to increase the total of international trade 
and ·will alter the ratio of exports to imports according 
to varying circumstances. Domestic trade will tend to 
shift in th_e opposite direction. 
the demand u between different commodities and some small 
change in relative national price levels. These are subtleties into 
which it would be superftuous to enter here, Relative monetary dc-
mand it ,hifted 1lirhtly but the ca.ae i, ,ubata.ntially u here depictcd, 
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U nderstanding of the facts above developed reveals 
the folly of "buy at home» campaigns which are merely 
an appeal to ignorance, prejudice, and credulity. Since 
any measure which limits imports tends to reduce the 
value of exports in an exactly equal degree, it can be 
laid down with certainty that, whatever the causes and 
eure of unemployment,17 imports are neither responsible, 
nor is their curtailment a remedy, for that dread disease. 
IMPORTS AS A LABOR SAVER 
lt should be recognized, however, that while imports 
call forth exports to an equivalcnt value it normally 
t·akcs Icss labor to producc this valuc in cxport lincs 
than it would to produce, at home, the imports which 
are secured in return. This, indeed, is the great ad-
vantage of the process. Foreign trade, in fact, effects an 
improvement in productive powers of precisely the same 
character as the invention of superior machinery. Both 
are labor-saving devices making for unemployment in 
the sense that, with their use, it is not necessary to e111-
ploy the same amount of labor to secure a given result. 
The released labor is then available for the satisfaction 
of a demand which ·must otherwise remain a desire only. 
The sole means to economic progress is this reduction 
of employment per unit of output. To lay general re-
strictions on imports is, therefore, on a par with the de-
struction of machinery or the policy of ca'canny. lt will 
increase the amount of labpr per unit of output and 
thcrefore diminish the product of a given amount . of 
work. We could, howevcr, makc "work" by digging 
holes and filling them up again. The important thing, 
11 For a ,uggestcd eure, c/. Frank D. Graham, Th1 Abolition of 
Utumllolt1U111, Princeton Univcnity Press, Princcton, 193_a • . 
llt! 
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though this is often forgotten, is not work but product; 
and it should be kept in mind that unemployment is per-
haps more likely to appear when costs are raised by arti-
ficial means than whcn frecdom is thc rule. 
That the problcm of uncmployment is not a problcm 
of lack of tasks to be clone, of gcncral ovcrproduction, 
. or of "excessive" imports, but solely of dislocatcd price 
relationships, will be evident if we turn again to our 
early economic structure, considcr its dcvclopmcnt, and 
contrast it with the prcscnt cconomic regime.18 Whcre 
there was little or no communication bctwccn familics, 
sclf-cmploymcnt was essential. Thc grcatcr thc popu-
lation thc morc work thcrc was to bc clone. If any 
individual felt that hc would rathcr bc idle than incrcasc 
his stock of commoditics, such unemployment as he 
could afford was purely voluntary and not due to any 
difficulty in finding work. The general feeling was that 
there was far more work than anyone wanted. This was 
true regardless of the state of economic well-being actu-
ally realized. Everyone wekomed any device which 
would save labor and, after some halting communica-
tion with the outside world was eventually established, 
was only too glad to purchase any commodity at less 
cost than the making of it would exact. 
SPECIALIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
The system of specialization, and indirect coöpera-
tion, came into existence gradually as individuals found 
that they could get more, by domestic or international 
,.. The following paragrapha draw heavily, even nt times to the 
extent of verbal repetition, from an article by Edwin Cannan, "The 
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cxchange, than by self-su.fficient production. No one was 
so foolish as to suppose that he' had been deprived of . 
employment when he abandoned one of his pursuits in 
order to concentrate on another. The coöperating circle, 
moreover, could always be expanded without difficulty. 
Our forefathers used to say that with every mouth there 
comes a pair of hands; but .we are in more need of being 
reminded that with every pair of hands there comes 
a. mouth, and a mentality with the desire for a far 
greater supply of economic goods than it has · ever 
been or is likely to be possible for us, as a whole, to 
satisfy. 
In the pioneer stage,. and in the simple communities 
which early developed therefrom, an increase in popula-
tion or of production per head never gave rise to the 
notion that it would be necessary to cut down on the 
hours of work or to keep some proportion of the popu-
lation idle and living on the rest. There were always un-
satisfied wants-we have not escaped from this condition 
-and if all the population were not immediately em-
ployed the "surplus" workers were distributed, or dis-
tributed themselves, among existing occupations so as to 
keep the total production of the s.everal commodities up 
to the amount "required" for an increasing population; 
or, where per capita output was rising, to give the com-
munity a little more of each of the products already pro-
quced; or, finally, to provide new goods such as the com-
munity had not hitherto been able to afford. The power 
to consume here, as always, was conditioned solely by 
the amount produced, and the whole population was 
cngaged in such proportions in the various industries 
as were appropriate to domestic needs on the basis of 
the existing quantum of productive power. 
The development .of foreign trade meant the shifting. 
of somc workcrs from thc production of commoditica 
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for the domestic market, in order to provide a "surplus" 
of other commodities for foreign markets. · This left a 
"deficit" in the supply of the articles in• which produc• 
tion was curtailed by the very act of specialization. The 
"hole" was filled by imports. Exports, in reducing do-
mestic consumption below the purchasing power pro-
vided by production, always must leave such a hole. If 
it is not filled by imports it will not be filled at all. Ex-
ports will then simply be given away, to the detriment of 
the standard of living of the donors. Export industries, 
in fact, do not arise because there is · any general surplus 
of production but solely because it pays to ,produce a 
surplus of certain commodities in order to gain, by the 
export-import process, a larger command over other 
articles. There is never any necessity of forcign markcts 
for the products of any country. Specialization is simply 
an improved method of production which, likc all im-
provements in production, increases the power to con-
sume pari passu with the power to produce. If produc-
tion were properly distributed as betwcen f the various 
commodities, all of the goods it is possible to produce 
could readily be consumed at home. lt would not be wise 
to build up such a structure of production, but it is 
feasible. · 
Production carried on by self-sufficient individuals, 
though inefficient from the point of view of potential 
output, has one great advantage in that it facilitates ad-
justment to changing demand and to improvements in 
technique. lnvoluntary unemployment is alien to its na-
ture. Such unemployment occurs only in a specialized 
exchange society and as a result of dislocations inside the 
coöperating circle.19 
u That unemployment f• due to dialocations of equilibrium nther 
than to deeper causes must be obvioua when we reflect that in apitc 
of a ateady increaae in population, a still larger enhancement of pro-
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A cessation or diminution of demand for some partic-
ular commodity, · the discovery of some ·improved 
method of producing it, or its acquisition by import at 
a low price, may render it impossible for some or all of 
the persons who had been engaged in producing the 
article in question to continue to find employment in 
that line or, at any rate, to continue to find employment 
at a wage equal to that of their fellows in other branches 
of industry. Such persons do not go back to the old non-
coöperative way of living because the condition of per-
sons inside the coöperating circle has become so obviously 
superior to that of those outside that no one would will-
ingly try to live in isolation. But transference from one 
specializ.ed occupation to another is not always easy, and 
it may · be hindered artificially by workers already em-
ployed in the industry in which an influx of labor would 
naturally occur. 
Specializ.ation, moreover, involves bargaining, and 
bargaining is attended by disagreements over the rate 
at which one dass of service is to exchange for another. 
When nearly all bargains are made in terms of money, 
and especially when the commodity value of money 
changes, it often becomes so difficult to effect an agree-
ment between those who have specializ.ed in the task of 
entrepreneur and those who have specializ.ed in the pro-
vision of labor services that unemployment ·on a !arge 
scale develops. 
duction and of imports, and an bccasional relaxation of artificial 
trade barriers, unemployment has practically ceascd whenevcr the 
temporary dislocations which cause it have disappeared. The proxi-
mate cause of unemployment in a capitalistic society is always such 
• ahift of costs of production relative to selling priccs as makes it 
impossible for entrcpreneura to securc a profit on a volume of output 
aufficient to employ the whole population. Whatcvcr the causcs of 
auch a ahift-and they are legion-unemployment ~n alwa.ya bc 
eucccaafully attack.cd by a reversal of thia proccu. 
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Unemployment, Qnce brought into being, is self-
generating. The demand of the unemployed, being nec-
essarily restricted by the fact that they have nothing to 
offer in exchange for the goods they desire, wipes out 
part of the market for the product of workers still cm-
ployed. What had been no .more than an equilibrium 
output of the latter product then becomes excessive. This 
apparent excess leads to new dismissals and these, re-
flected throughout industry, give rise to another chain 
of discharges of workers. The real difficulty, however, 
is not that there is too much general production but that 
there is too little. lt should never be forgotten that de-
mand for any one product or service can come only from 
the supply of another and that a diminution in general 
supply automatically cuts general demand in the same · 
degree. 20 On the other hand, an increase in general sup-
ply au~omatically expands demand in equal measure. 
This is as true of imports as of any other form of 
supply.21 No one, of course, would deny that the ex-
clusion of imports, by a protective duty or otherwise, 
will, in the levying country, provide employment in 
90 The supply of any one product in an amount sufficient to m:ike 
its sale, at an equilibrium price, impossible, should alw:iys be cor-
rected by a shift of workers to other lincs of output. In a pionecr 
society such a shift from the production of one to another com-
modity takes place immediately. In an exch:inge society, howcvcr, 
the transition is effected only with friction, involving uncmploy-
ment, which, unless counteracted, is self-aggrav:iting. The eure for 
unemployment is to put 'people to work in lines in which 1upply, 
however largc in thc absolute, is relatively low. · 
• The individuals or countries which send goods into an import 
market do not necessarily, or even probably thcmselves take out an 
cquivalcnt value of goods, in return. Howevcr, they aecure com-
mand over a certain amount of the importing country's currency. lt 
has already been pointed out that, if they do not themselves use this 
currency to make purchascs in the only market in which it ha• 
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those industries hitherto subject to competition from 
imported supplies. This is obvious. All tliat happens, 
however, is that the former foreign exporters of such 
articles, no longer being able to secure the currency of 
the levying country, cannot themselves import goods 
from that country. -Nor, on the assurription that they 
· would not themselves wish to do so, can they furnish 
its exchange to their compatriots, or anyone else, who 
would like ·to use it for that purpose. This is not so 
obvious, but it is equally true. 
No one, moreover, would deny that the elimination 
of an effective protective tariff would in jure the indus-
tries which it had hitherto been sheltering. But, in so far 
as the home market was opened to foreign goods, the for-
eign market of export industries would, for the reasons 
above given, show an equivalent expansion. Further-
more, the net saving which issues from a liberal com-
m~rcial policy releases purchasing power for expendi-
ture on increased consumption and thus increases the 
demand for workers. 
The policy of protection or its reverse .has per se, 
therefore, no bearing on the problem of unemployment . 
On the whole, that problem is likely to .be neither 
greater nor less under a permanent policy of high pro-
tective tariffs than under permanent low duties or free 
trade. While there is no virtue in protection as a eure 
for unemployment, there is also no case against it on this 
score. Objections to protection must be put on the ground 
not that it hinders employment but that it diverts em-
ployment into relatively unproductive channels. The 
real question is whether the composition of the national 
industry, under a policy of protection, is as effective a 
producing mechanism as the industrial structure which 
would be built up . in its absence. The ultimate test of 
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any commercial policy must be the product which issues 
under its provisions. Unemployment might conceivably 
be a factor to be taken into account. lt is not in fact, 
however, of any importance in a consideration of the 
relative merits of permanent and general high protec-
tion _and of unrestricted foreign trade.22 
CHANGES IN COMME~CIAL POLICY AS A FACTOR IN 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
lt should be noted, however, that, though the com-
mercial policy of any country, whether it be restrictive 
or liberal, is in the long run of no relevance to the prob-
lern of unemployment, it is neverthelcss true that sud-
den changes in policy, espccially where unemployment 
is already great, are likely to increase the existing diffi-
culties. This is true whether the shift is from free trade 
to protection, protection to free trade, or merely from 
a lower to a higher, or a higher to a lower, general pro-
tective schedule. All involve a dislocation of markets and 
such dislocations are never unaccompanied by friction. 
Unemployment, being a problem of maladjustment and 
friction, is, in consequence, ·likely to b~ accentuated by 
changes in tariffs in either direction. 
If, when protective tariffs are raised, the displaced 
• The freer the trade the greater will be the dcgree of specializa-
tion and the larger will be the markct, for any given pro<luct, of 
any given producing area. lt is somctimcs argucd that a large 
rnarket rnakes for stability and, other things being equal, .this would 
seem to be true, On the other hand, a narrower home market is 
often thought to be more stable than a market which includes both 
foreign and domestic consumers, and it is cert:dnly less likely to be 
wiped away in part by foreign legislation in which the producer 
has no voice. lt is not unlikely that specialization might furnish 
greater stability {less unemployment) in some cascs anc! that self-
aufficiency might do so in others. No general rule can be laid down, 
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PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
workers in such export industries as are injured by thc 
change were immediately absorbed by the industries 
destined to expand under the regis of the new schedules, 
or if, when protective tariffs are lowered, the displaced 
workers in the formerly highly protected import indus-
tries were immediately absorbed irr the export industries 
now destined to grow, all would be well. But this does 
not happen: Moreover, the chances are always strong 
that for some time the workers displaced under any 
tariff revision, up or down, will exceed in number those 
for whom jobs open up.23 
This does not, of course, mean that tariff policy should 
never be changed ( though frequent, and opposite, 
changes are a profound nuisance) but that it should not 
ordinarily be changed for the purpose of coping with 
unemployment. lt is necessary, however, to cite some 
exceptions. In • the first plac~, it seems not im probable 
that the latest of our crises, with its accompaniment of 
huge unemployment, was in some measure due to a 
conflict between a comparatively free system of. inter~ 
tional finance and a highly restricted system of interna-
tional trade. International finance being merely an ad-
junct to international trade, a complete throttling of 
international trade would render international finance 
quite nugatory. The economic world cannot well get · 
~ong half-slave and half-free.2• The restraints actually 
• Whether this ia or is not 10 depends to somc cxtent on thc gen-
eral conjuncture. If thc change is madc on thc up-swing of a business 
cyclc all may perhaps go smoothly; if not, things are likely to 
becomc worsc. lt is always possiblc to dischargc workcn immedi-
atelyj but new workcn cannot, in largc numbcn, bc takcn into an 
industry favored by any tariff changc until cquipment has bcen 
provided, This takes time. 
• Eithcr there will be an upward movcment of ti:adc more in 
correapondence with thc present volumc of international indcbted-
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imposed on international trade by nearly all . nations 
have been a factor of some importance in tying knots in 
an international financial system relatively free of po-
litical interference. 
Financial stress has, in turn, reacted adversely on both 
foreign and domestic trade and on employmcnt. A scal-
ing down of tariff walls, while introducing some new 
elements of friction, might therefore release immedi-
. ately, as it certainly would ultimately, much .more trade 
than it would temporarily embarrass. The general psy-
chological effect of such freedom, moreover, might be 
so good that, to the probably dominant extent to which 
depression is due to psychological causes, there would 
be a marked impetus toward improvement. 
The case, however, is rather to be put on the ground 
that permanent mutual benefits would accrue from a 
· general reduction of absurdly devcloped "protcctive" 
structures than that such rcductions would provc tcmpo-
rarily expedient in reducing unemploymcnt. That this 
is so will be clear when it is recallcd that extcnsions, 
rather than reductions, of protective dutics are frequently 
advocated as a eure for unemployment and that the argu-
ment does not always lack cogency. Unemployment be-
ing a problem of malad justment and dislocation, the 
disturbing force which, in any situation, has promoted un-
employment may sometimes be counteracted by another 
factor, in itself unsettling, which happens to give a jolt 
in the opposite direction. According to circumstances the 
appropriate jolt might be given by the imposition, or 
increase, of duties quite as well as by their removal or · 
remission. 
Protective tariffs were advocated by eminent authori-
neas, or thcre will bc a forccd downward adjustmcnt of indcbtedncsa 
to a rcatrictcd volumc of tradc. 
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ties in Great Britain in the early post-war period and 
later, on the ground that they would reduce the real 
wages of the British worker, would thus counteract the 
failure to deflate monetary wages to a level which, with 
due regard for changes in efficiency, would have corr~ 
sponded with post-war prices and the · increase in the 
gold value of the pound, and would, in consequence, 
permit the emergence of the profits on which employ-
ment depends.26 
The wisdom of a tariff policy which, in an attempt 
to eure a present evil better attacked in other ways, 
• Protection was also advocatcd in Grcat Britain as a mcans for 
improving the "balancc of tradc,» that is, prc\'enting an effiux of 
gold. lt must be conceded that, in ccrtain circumstances, protcctive 
Qriffs might be efficacious to this end as well as off ering some 
tcmporary relief from the burden of unemployment. Before their 
imposition the levying country may be paying for part of its im-
ports by drafts on its normal stock of gold, serving monetary pur-
poscs, without a corresponding reduction of the currency supply. 
The original acquisition of the exported gold must have given em-
ployment, and its presumptive rcposscssion would do likcwise. For 
thc momcnt, howcvcr, imports are bcing paid for, in part, in a way 
which docs not immcdiatcly stimulate production. Thls is true in all 
cascs in which a nation livca temporarily on its fat, that ia to aay, on 
c11pitd 11ccumulntions of aome aort or on credit o.nd, white doinl? so, 
pcrmita an unduc volumc of unemployment to pera iat. Thc reo.son 
for auch a devclopmcnt 1• prncticl\lly alwnya a domcatic prlcc lcvel 
above the cquilibrium poaition. Tbc o.ppropriate action, long rccog-
nized, ia 11. down ward adj ustmcnt of thc pricc lcvcl. The unwilling-
ncsa to takc this action, couplcd with a desire to rcmain on thc gold 
aundard, is then used as an argument for protective tariffs, which 
might prescrve both the desiderata, but only at the expense of potcn-
tiu real incomes. Whilc a country may temporarily live on its 
capibl or credit and thus for a time consumc forcign products in 
exccss of its cu""'' dclivery of a quill -pro quo, the fact has no 
direct bearing upon employmcnt or upon commcrcial policy. Tbc 
phcnomcnon might happcn with or without full cmploymcnt and 
undcr any commcrcial policy. lt is sometimes allegcd that an idlc 
rmtier class is essential to a position in which intercst ia rcceived on 
a la.rge nct forcign investmcnt. Thia is nonsense. Neithcr an individ-
aal nor a country need be idle because he happen• to be a rmtiw. 
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CHAPTER IV 
./ .· THE ARGUMENT FOR FREE TRADE 
INHERENT ADVANTAGES IN SPECIALIZATION 
r S1NcE prosperity is dependent on prices being low rela-
tive to wages and other incomes, a sound commercial 
policy is that which results in low prices at a given wage 
level or high wages at a given price level.1 Fundamcn-
tally this depends on efficiency in production, but it is 
also conditioned by the exchange of the produced goods. 
lt . is, of course, in the exchange of goods that the inci-
dence of commercial policy is first felt, but it affects pro-
4uction as well. lt is the contention of free traders that 
unrestricted exchange not only results in the maximum 
satisfaction from a given stock of goods but that it also 
brings about maximum production and consumptioq.l 
The argument in support of this contention will be 
offered in the prcsent chapter. 
As far as the exchangc of goods alroady producod is 
concerncd, it is clcar tha~ cvcry trading transaction 
tends to lower thc price of the affcctcd commoditics in 
thc relativcly high-priccd market to which, and to raisc 
them in the relatively low-priced market from which, 
they move. The constant tendency of trade is therefore 
1 Wage• (including salarics) arc quantitativcly the most important 
type of income and, unlcsa it ia otherwise clearly implied, will be 
wed henceforth . elliptically to cover incomea in general. 
50 
THE ARGUMENT FOR FREE TRADE 5 I 
toward ironing out price differences .. This is of universal 
benefit. A high price is evidence of relatively urgent un-
satisfied desire, and a low price of comparative satiety. 
To lower a high price means, therefore, that a rather 
urgent desire has been supplied, while to raise a low 
price means only that a somewhat unimportant desire 
must go unfilled. To put restraints on trade is to forego 
the satisfaction of a more urgent desire for the sake of 
fulfilling one of lesser significance, and, of course, it 
deprives the potential sellcr of the same advantage as 
it withdraws from the potential buyer. 
The question, however, is not only, or even mainly, 
that of maximizing the satisfactions from a stock of 
goods already produced, but, more important, of 
maximizing the volume of goods steadily issuing from 
farms, mines, and factories into consumption. Trade 
and specialization go hand in hand. Continuous trade 
is impossible without specialization and specialization is 
impossible without trade. Specialization, moreover, is 
the prime element in efficient production and, therefore, 
in prosperity. Most advances in productive technique 
since· time began are, in some of their aspects, an in-
crease in specialization. 
Such specialization is either ( I) occupational, or ( 2) 
territorial. Of occupational spccialization it is unncccs-
sary to say much in this placc. Its advantagcs arc uni-
versally rccognizcd. Thc plumbcr docs not nttcmpt to 
makc his own watch, nnd thc watchmakcr would but 
burn his hands if hc should attcmpt to wipc a joint. 
Not only is· therc much specialization by trades, but 
also within a given branch of production specialization 
has gone far to the advantage of all concerned. The 
entrepreneur in the automobile industry does not, in 
any literal sense, build automobiles, and the mechanic 
sz 
in that indl 
if hc shoul 
market it. 
On the eo. 
is directed b 
specializ.ed j 
this means, 
which he ca 
talents ·pern 
his efficiency 
whole of his 
in which he 
relatively b~ 
at his best. 
vaguely gue 
must be if, · 




mented by ~ 
of the possi 
achieved. 11 
the two fu1 
and natural 
to maximiz.t 




ovcr pcrfcct 1 
whilc tending 
wage ratcs frc 
ra.ise thcir ah 
band, would , 
RADE 51 
is of universal 
·ely urgent un-
arative satiety. 
1 that a rather 
to raise a low 
1portant desire 
de is to forego 
:or the sake of 
, of course, it 
: advantage as 
~ even mainly, 
>m a stock of 
important, of 








ttional, or ( 2) 
it is unncccs-
1tagcs arc uni-
1ot nttcmpt to 
:er would but 
wipe a joint. 
,y tradcs, but 
. specialization 
mcerned. The 
' does not, in 
the mechanic 
52 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
in that industry would quickly encounter \)ankruptcy 
if he should attcmpt to make a complete car and 
market it. 
On the contrary, every individual, so far as his course 
is directed by ordinary economic motives, takes up the 
specialized job at which he can make most money, and 
this means, in a freely competitive society, the job in 
which he ~ produce the maximum value which his 
talents permit. By concentrating in the line in which 
hi"s efficiency is greatest he raises that efficiency, for the 
whole of his effort, from a mere average of those· things 
in which he is relatively good and those in which he is 
relatively bad, to the level of that work in which he is 
at his best. What this means to production can be 
vaguely guessed if one considers how poor he hifJ!self 
must be if, instead of concentrating on a single job, he 
had to produce, in turn, his own food, clothing, shelter, 
houschold supplies, transport, and gcneral acccssorics 
of civilization. 
Unless, however, occupational concentration is supple-
mented by specialization of a regional type, only a part 
of the possible increase in general productivity can be 
achieved. In any given state of technical knowledge 
the two fundamental factors in production are labor 
and natural resources. Occupational specialization tends 
to maximiz.e the productivity of the labor factor while, 
in the absence of complete mobility of labor as between 
regions, regional specializ.ation secures the superior 
utilization of natural resources.2 . 
1 International tradc in commodities · has ccrtain grcat advantagca 
ovcr pcrfcct mobility of labor. Thc frecst tradc in commodities, 
whilc tcnding to cquatc prices, would do littlc toward cqualizing 
wage ratcs from one country to anothcr, and would, in any event, 
raise their absolute lcvcl. Pcrfcctly frcc migration, on the other 
band, would ope_rate atrongly toward equalizing wage ratea. The 
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INTERNATIONAL TRADR AND PRODUCTIVE I'OWER5 
International trade fosters both these types of special-
ization. The advantages of such regional concentration 
as issues out of differences in climate and other natural 
resources· are fairly obvious; but there is, in addition, an 
advantage to be gained through exploiting the marked· · · 
tendency to develop regional skills in certain lines of · 
production and giving to human resources everywhere 
the opportunity of most advantageous use. Interna-
tional trade is thcrefore indispensable to thc attainment 
of the best results not only from diverse natural re-
sources but also from labor. As long as lincs of compara-
tive competence arc pursucd, the more tradc therc is the 
bettcr for all concerncd. Trade, howevcr frcc, · will stop 
when thcre is no longcr mutual gain thercin. Traqc is 
itsclf presumptive proof of its own advantagc. To put 
artificial restrictions on trade, on thc other hand, is 
simply to throw away thc advantages of regional along 
with some of thosc of occupational specialization, and to 
make a deliberate choice of inefficient mcthods of 
production. 
Unless subjected to artificial restraint, trade will 
spring up whenever price differenccs of more than the 
cost of transfer of commodities between two markets 
appear. Such differences in prices will ordinarily arise 
only from differences in relative costs of production. 
Absolute ( effort or sacrificc) costs of production are, as 
. has already been noted, irrelevant. In a certain country 
countries of present high wagea would have every re:uon to resent 
and prevent thi1 proc~ss, 1ince high birth rates in the low-wage 
countries would mean a general leveling d,ow,vwara a, population 
pressed on resources. There is no such general reason for inhibiting 
the free movement of commodities. 
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the labor of a typical worker rnay, in one day, produce 
one unit of wheat, one unit of cloth, or one unit of gold 
( - $ 1.00). 8 · The gold price of w heat and of cloth in 
the markets of that country would then tend to be $ 1 .oo 
a unit, and wages $1.00 per day.4 In anothcr more pro-
ductive country the labor of a typical worker may, in one 
day, produce 3 similar units of wheat, 3 of cloth, or 3 
of gold (- $3.00). The gold price of both wheat and 
cloth in the ·markets of this as of the other country 
would then also tend to be $ 1 .oo per unit, but wages 
would be $3.00 per day. Since there is no difference in 
relative costs of production, there is no difference in 
either relative or absolute commodity prices. There is 
thus no occasion far, or advantage in, trade between 
the two countries. Territorial specialization here offers 
no benefits. 
But where there are differences in relative costs of 
pr09uction of the several commodities, either because 
it is absolutely easier to produce one group of com-
modities and more difficult to produce another in the 
first than in the second country, or because, though it 
may be absolutely more difficult to produce any com-
modity in the one than in the other, it is possible to pro-
. duce some commodities more easily than others (pro-
• Thc monctary unit indicatcd ia arbitra.rily choscn. For thc aakc 
of convcnicncc thc unit takcn is cqual to the amount of gold in thc 
(formcr) Amcrican gold dollar. 
'Capital chargcs may, for convcnicncc, bc subsumcd undcr labor. 
Tbc supposition would thcn bc that, counting thc labor neccssary for 
thc production of machinery and thc price of "abstinencc," the rc-
sults would bc as statcd. Similarly "wages1' is used clliptically for 
thc rctums to factors of production takcn as a wholc. Thc outlay of 
effort will, of course, depend, among othcr things, on the richncss 
of natural rcsources, whilc thc relative costs of production of vari-
ous commoditics will dcpend on the adaptability of thc human and 
~crial reaourcea to one rathcr than anothcr type of production. 
1 • 
\ 
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duction in the alternative country being taken as the 
standard), price differences will emerge, the occasion 
for trade will arise, and spccialization will tcnd to dc-
velop and will yicld bcncfits in incrcascd incomc for 
both countrics. 
Thus if, in a certain country, the labor of a typical 
worker will produce in one day- 2 units of wheat, I unit 
of cloth, or I unit of gold ( - $ I.00), the price of 
wheat in that country, in the absence of international 
trade, will tend to be 50c a unit, the price of cloth $ I .oo, 
and wages $ I .oo per day. In another more productive 
country the labor of a typical worker will produce, let 
us suppose, 3 units of wheat, 6 units of doth or 3 units 
of gold (- $3.00). Prices in this country, in the ab-
~ence of international trade, will thcn tcnd to be: wheat 
$1.00 per unit, cloth 5cc, and wages $3.00 per day. 
U nder these circumstances international trade bctwcen 
the two countries-the one exporting wheat and import• 
ing cloth, and the othcr the contrary-will spring up, 
specialization will occur, and the separate priccs of cach 
of the products will movc toward an equality in thc two 
countries, though this will be somcwhat modificd by 
costs of transportation.G The advantage of such speciali-
zation will be clear whcn we note that the first country, 
for every unit of cloth it ceases to produce, can produce 
two units of wheat; and that the second, for every unit 
of wheat it ceases to produce, can produce two units of 
cloth. 
This does not mean a doubling of total productio~, 
• The production of gold in both countries will tcnd to be stimu-
lated by thc incrcase in the production of othcr commoditics and the 
conscqucnt relatively high value of gold. This augmentation of gold 
production will tend to continue until the costs of production o: 
gold and of the wheat and cloth for which it will exchange are 
equal. 
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since there is no increase in productivity on that part of 
its own specialty which each country was formerly P:o-
ducing for itsclf; but it does mean, for the two countnes 
as a whole, four units of both products for every three 
under self-sufficing regimes. The first country would be 
willing to give anything up to two units of w~e.at for 
one unit of cloth, and the second would be willmg to 
take anything. n:rnre than one-half a unit of wheat for 
one of cloth. Disregarding transport costs, trade on any 
terms between one-half to two units of wheat per unit 
of cloth, or its correlative, one-half to two units of cloth 
per unit of wheat, will be advantageous to both. 
Transport costs have the effect of reducing the price 
range within which trade would be advantageous, and 
they may be so great as to eliminate the possibility 
thereof. The important point, however, is that whenever 
prices, including transport, make trade advantageous to 
one · party they automatically make it advantageous to 
the other. Trade and specialization increase the total 
output and the income of both parties to the transaction. 
Comparative ad van tage ( competence) and disadvan-
tage (incompetence) are, of course, correlative. Regard-
less of absolute productive powers, the possession by 
any country of a comparative competence in the_produc-
tion of one commodity is ipso facto the possess1on of a 
comparative incompetence in the production of anot_he:. 
If, judged by the standard of another country, 1t 1s 
comparatively easy to produce in a certain locale one 
of two commodities, it must be comparatively difficult 
to produce the other. Similarly, using the other of two 
countries alternatively as a standard, any commodity 
which it is comparatively easy to produce in one coun-
try must be comparatively difficult of production in the 
other. That t~e former, the less productive of the two 
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co,,mtries used above for purposes of illustration, has 
a comparative competence in the production of wheat 
inevitably implies not only that it is comparatively in-
competent in the production of cloth . but also that the 
latter of the two countries is comparatively incompetent 
in the production of wheat, along with its comparative 
competence in the production of cloth and its grearer ab-
solute competence in the production of both commodities. 
The question is not whether any given country is in 
general, or in a specific commodity, a more effective pro-
ducer than another, but which of two or more commodi-
ties it can produce most effectively. Iceland may not 
be able to raise either potatoes or peaches without great 
difficulty; but if, judged by the situation in othcr coun-
tries, it can, value for value, raise potatoes more easily 
than peaches the lcelanders would be foolish not to con-
centrate on the tuber. lt would be equally foolish for the 
United States to exclude imports of potatoes from Ice-
land and thus lose a market for its peaches as compared 
with which potatoes can be produced in the Unitcd States 
only at a disadvantage.6 The United States price for 
peaches will be low and the price for potatoes high, as 
compared with Iceland, which means, of course, that the 
contrary will be true of lceland as compared with the 
United States. 
Whatever complications may be introduced by the 
in jection of additional countries and additional commodi-
• Potatoes must, of course, be grown in the Unitcd Stntes since 
lcclnnd could aupply only a. pMt of thc Amc ricnn dcmnncl, Jlow-
evcr, 10 fnr as trnde with Icclnnd reducca Arnerica n p roduction of 
potatoes and increases its production of pcnchcs, thc Un itcd Statca 
will s.hare in thc bcnefita of thc trade, The potato lands in the 
Unitcd States least fit for that crop, relative to an additional output 
of peachca for thc ncw markct, will bc turned over to pcach 
growing. 
58 
ties, it will rer 
tion along line 
or, what is the 
increase total o 
shared more 01 
and that free t 
of prices, prom 
one commodit} 
duce, with the 
other good, an, 
opportunities. 
UNIVERSAL CHJ 
This is the, 
argument for f 
are irrelevant t; 
big .or little, ne 
of living, agri< 
difference. lt is 
ent of environn 
specialization a: 
which unshackl 
There is no I 
cates of a rest1 
accept it as a fa 
be outweighed 
superior impor1 
mate but on ultt 
attention is d~ 
sumption is al~ 
therefrom is cet 
incidental circu 
but it is ever J 
lADE 57 
lustration, has 
tion of wheat 
1paratively in-





l country is in 
! effective pro-
10re commodi-
land may not 
without great 
in othcr coun-
::s more easily 
ish not to con-
foolish for the 
toes from Ice-
s as compared 
U nitcd States 
atcs price for 
:atoes high, as 
)urse, that the 
arcd with the 
duced by the 
mal commodi-
1itcd Statcs since 
1 J emand, IIow-
:i n production of 
he Un itcd Statea 
1to lands in the 
ild<litional output 
1 ovcr to pcach 
58 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
ties, it will remain true in any situation that specializa-
tion along lines of the greatest comparative competence 
or, what is the same thing, the least incompetence, will 
increase total output; that this increase in output will be 
shared more or less equally among the trading groups; 
and that free trading conditions will, through the play 
of prices, promote this specialization. Prod.uction of · any 
one commodity involves the loss of opportunity to pro-
duce, with the same human and material resources, some 
other good, and free trade leads to the best selectiori of 
opportunities. 
UNIVERSAL CHARACTER OF THE FREE TRADE ARGUMEN1 
This is the universally valid analysis underlying the 
argument for free trade. Time, place, and circumstance 
are irrelevant thereto. Whether a country is rich or poor, 
big .or little, new or old, with or without high standards 
of living, agricultural, industrial, or mixed, makes no 
difference. lt is a matter of mathematics, quite independ-
ent of environment, that there is an inherent gain in the 
specialization along the lines of comparative competence 
which unshackled trade tends to develop. 
There is no possible refut~tion of this analysis. Advo-
cates of a restrictive commercial policy must, in logi't, 
accept it as a fact and attempt to show that the gain may 
be outweighed by economic or other considerations of 
superior importance. Their case must rest not on proxi-
mate but on ulterior considerations such as those to which 
attention is drawn in the following chapter . . The pre-
Jumption is always in favor of free trade, since the gain 
therefrom is certain, and the loss, if any, dependent upon 
incidental circumstance. This presumption is rebuttable 
but it is ever prese_nt; and, in this sense, the c~assical 
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economists were right in insisting that free trade is a 
ubiquitous and timeless principle. Other things being 
equal, it will enable people to have more goods of every 
kind than would otherwise be possible.7 
This universal arg~ment may be supplemented by 
noting that collateral in addition to direct, benefits are 
not precluded under a liberal commercial regime and 
- that, over and above its inherent advantages, the chance 
of incidental gains8 is at least as good under free trade 
as under any system of protection not speciall-y chosen 
to secure such gains~ With no change whatever in gen-
eral s.kill or resources, there will be an increase in total 
' output arising from the superior form of their utilization 
which will occur under free trade. This is the inherent 
gain. But it is by no means improbable that the special-
ized character of such production will have favorable 
collateral effects which may even greatly surpass in 
quantitative imp_ortance those which are inherently pres-
ent. This is obvious in the case of occupational spcciali-
zation where increased practice leads to greater skill, in-
volves no waste of time in shifting from one occupation 
to another, and makes possible a more intensive use of 
machinery.9 
1 l'his is the true test of cconomic soundness. Any proccss which 
creates the potentiality of securing, at a given cost, a larger volume 
of every cconomic good is economic, and its converse uncconomic. 
Whether the population concerned actually elects to take more of 
n;ery good, or more of some and not of others, or prefera addi-
tional leisure to more goods, is irrelevant. 
1 Inherent bcnefits are such as are bound to occur. Thcre may be 
a grcater or less assurance with respect to incidental benefits but 
thcy do not amount to a certainty. 
.. • Specialization cnables a worker to usc a single machinc con-
tinuously, whereas in diversified production a large part of the 
equipment of the workcr is nccessarily idle most of the time. With 
a given technique the volume of machinery per unit of output muat 
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lt is equally true of regional specializatioh. ~ In a dis- . 
trict in which a single industry is concentrated the popu-
lation tends to develop a peculiar skill in that industry. 
This is probably because children are reared from in- , 
fancy in familiarity with its ways and instruments and 
so acquire an ability which others cannot match. There 
are other gains. The congregation in any locality of a 
large number of plants of any single industry leads to 
increases in . productivity arising from ( I) the rapid 
diffusion of improved methods, ( 2) inventions stimu-
lated by intimate association and rivalry, (3) the concen-
tration of a.ncillary industries in the same neighborhood, 
(4) the lowering of freight costs, and (5) the lowering 
of costs of labor turnover.\Many of thes.e advantages 
are of course obtained, in esser or greater degree, in 
such protectionist countries as themselves embody a great 
free trade area. The freer the trade, however, the more 
probable is their extension. . 
The improvement of technique is not only furthered 
by the local concentration of industry but is likely to 
proceed much more rapidly under the stimulus of free 
foreign as well as domestic competition than would 
otherwise be the case. lt is no unusual thing for pro-
ducers of a protected product which, as a result of im-
proved processes introduced abroad, is suddenly sub-
jected to keen competition from foreign sources, to 
clamor for an increase in tariffs rather than adopt or 
improve upon the best methods currently in use. Free 
trade will kill such industries as, from the national point 
of view, represent wasted productive power, but it will 
provide a needed stimulus not only for industries of 
present comparative competence but also for such others 
thcrcforc be much grcater without, than with, occupational ape• 
cialization. Thia involvea a nccdleaa waate of effort and rceourcea. 
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as are well fitted for survival, but, at the moment, arc 
stagnating under shelter of the state. The state is 
economically only as streng as its industry in general, 
and it cannot cherish a laggard without subtracting from 
the deserved sustenanc~ of those which are up and doing. 
La1ssez.-f a1re is by no means a sacred principle. lt is 
to be judged solely on its merits and by its results. 
. Where it leads to monopoly or mutually destructive 
competition it should be abando~ed for regulation. In 
international trade, however, there is far less likelihood 
of the development of either of these phenomena than 
in domestic commerce. The case for freedom of inter-
national trade is therefore much strenger than that for 
wholly unregulated internal commercial traffic. 
The argument for free trade can perhaps best be put 
by an analogy with its apparent opposite. If a benevo-
lent and prescient dictator should set himself the task 
of devising the commercial policy which would best 
serve the economic interests of his people, he would not 
limit imports or go i.n for national self-sufficicncy. 
Whether the natural resources under his control were 
good or bad, and whether the population he was direct-
ing was skillful and industrious or inept and lazy, 
thcy would be bettcr adapted to the production of some 
than of other commodities. With self-sufficiency, the 
national standard of living could not but be lower than 
it would be if part of the home production of such goods 
as the country was best fitted to produce were exchanged 
against foreign goods. The dictator would receive im-
ports gladly, as long as they were cheap, in the sure 
knowledge that they would enhance the economic wel-
fare of his people. The productive effort saved in the 
provision of the relatively small volume of home output 
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import~ could then be turned toward supplying thc 
domestic market with goods which it must otherwise 
forego. The margin at which import should cease would 
be that at which the cost of an imported commodity 
would be no less than if it were made at home.- In a 
word, the dictator would follow a policy of free trade 
regardless of the status of wealth and income which his 
people ?ad,_ at any moment, attained. The greatest wis-
dom might w~ll find no opportunity in a direction of 
trade .other than along the lines which the untrammeled 
action of individuals would tend to give it. 
ACHILLES' HEEL 
~t an earlier point it. was stated that, other things 
bemg equal, free trade will enable people to have more 
goo?s of every k!nd than would otherwise be possible. 
lt. is to:var~ · this phrase, other things being equal, 
the Achilles heel of the argument, that protectionists 
must direct their fire. Is the situation which evolves 
~der fre~ trade conditions devoid of objection? Grant-
mg the mherent advantages of laissez-f aire in com-
~erci~l poli~, are the incidental effects in any given 
s!tuation desirable? Conceding the direct loss in restric-
tive measures, what of future indirect results? Accept-
ing the probability of evil consequences from thorough,. 
going protcction, is it not wcll to shape the structure of 
national industry toward certain conscious ends not 
rcaliuble without governmental interference? lt is to 
questions of this sort that attention must now bc turncd. 
CHAPTER v· 
RATIONAL PROTECTION 
IMMEDIATE VS, ULTIMATE EFFECTS 
T11E fundamental frcc tradc argument is potent but 
not necessarily conclusive. lt may be takcn for grantcd 
that the proximate effects of unrestrictcd commcrce are 
good, and that there is no general reason for supposing 
that the ulterior effects may not also be dcsirable. On 
this latter point, however, there is nothing likc a cer-
tainty of beneficence. lt may be that, in givcn circum-
stances, an induced deviation of production and trade 
from its laissez-f aire channels will yield otherwise unat-
tainable ulterior benefits more than sufficicnt to balance 
the present and future direct lasses arising from a policy 
of restriction. Such benefits may be absolute or they 
may be national only, that is to say, correlated with 
more than compensatory lasses to nations other than 
that which imposes the rcstrictions. 
Since protection is csscntially a national policy it 
must, perhaps, be hcld to have bccn successfully ap-
plied whenever a gain accrucs to the lcvying country, 
whether or not such gain is at the grcater expcnse of 
other nations. This is, of course, to grant without con-
;tention the postulates of nationalism, and it should be 
\/ pointed out that gains attained by one nation at a morc 
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~ proportionate cost to others are likely to be nulli-
fied _bv counter activities on the part of· the outside 
world. The result is a net loss all around. Far stronger 
therefore are those arguments for protection which 
center around a rational estimate of the probability of 
absolute unalloyed gains. 
The case for protection is sometimes put upon a 
wholly non-economic basis, with production and trade 
led into ch~mnels adverse to productivity for ends which 
are deemed superior to national opulence. Such ends 
are indefinitcly numerous, subject to few or no scien-
tific criteria, and emotional rather than rational in 
content, with their validity therefore impossible of meas-
urement. O:nly the more widely current of the non-
cconomic arguments will, in conscquencc, be noted in 
this chapter. lt is probable, howcvcr, that nothing of 
major importance will thereby be omitted. 
THE ATTACK ON SPECIALIZATION 
The most sweeping rejection of the free trade thesis 
is associated with scepticism toward specialization as 
such. Since specialization is the sole medium through 
which the asserted economic advantages of free trade 
accnie, an attack on the principle of specialization clearly 
involve_s a shrewd thrust at the very heart of free trade 
doctrine. The pleas for protection based on the allega-/ 
tion of virtue in a diversification of the national eco-
nomic structure carry farther, therefore, than any of the 
numerous special arguments which may be brought in 
aupport of a restrictive policy. 
Divcrsification of the national cconomic atructure 
may bc advocated on thc following grounds: 
: 1 
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( I) Development of Latent Talent.-If, in any given 
nation, free trade would promote specialization in a 
1/ highly restricted group of industries it might have a 
repressive effect upon progress. If, for example, com-
parative competence, in a certain nation and at a certain 
period, lies in agricultural rather than manufacturing 
pursuits it might well happcn, under free trade, that 
there would be much mechanical talent, and perhaps 
inventive genius, which would never find an oppor-
: tunity to express itself. The nation and the world would 
be the poorer for its suppression. This argument was 
used by the original sponsors of protection in this 
country, was greatly developed by Frcderick List, and, 
in certain circumstances, is cogcnt. lt is possiblc, morc-
ovcr, that national spcciali1.ation in mcchanical pur-
suits might smothcr latent gcnius in botanical or 
zoölogical activitics just as spccialization in thc lattcr 
occupations may lead to a waste of_ mechanical gcnius; 
(2) lnsurance.-Dispcrsion of risk is, of coursc, a 
undamental principle of insurancc, and diversification 
of industry disperses the national risk from vicissitudes 
peculiar to single industries or groups of industries. 
The value of insurance depends, of course, upon its 
cost relative to the risks against which safeguards are 
feasible. The risks arising from a specialization of the 
national economic structure are perhaps increasing as 
the ratio of the value of fixed capital to annual output 
rises, and the cost of suddenly effccting a considerable 
alteration in the character of the national production is 
thereby enhanced. The argument from insurance is 
probably, therefore, of growing importance. As eco-
nomic life has developcd in capitalistic countrics, thcre 
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cultural and in manufacturing industry respectively. A 
country fully specialized in agriculture is subject to 
great vicissitudes in the ratio at which it exchanges its 
exports for its imports since the prices of agricultural 
commodities commonly fluctuate, through a business 
cycle as well as over shorter periods, much more widely 
than do those of manufactured goods. When the move-
ment is downward such a country may suffer acute dis-
tress. A country, on the other hand, fully specialized in 
manufacturing industry, though benefiting by ·a change 
in the terms of trade adverse to agricultural nations, is 
likely at such times to experience severe unemployment. 
There is, in consequence, something to be said for a bal-
anced economy in which the fluctuating tendency of the 
prices of agricultural commodities is compensated by 
comparative stability in the prices of manufactured 
goods, while the pains of unemployment in manufac-
turing industry are alleviated by the comparative steadi-
ness of activity on the farms. 
Protection, at a more or less definite price in total 
productivity, may not only be used to secure such a 
balanced economy but, in certain favorable circum-
stances, protective duties may be so manipulated as in 
some measure to prevent disequilibrizing fluctuations in 
the relative prices of agricultural and manufactured 
commodities and the unemploymen.t which issues there-
from.1 The long-run result may be a net gain in actual 
1 Such a country as France, for instance, in which important types 
of agricultural production arc ordinarily somcwhat, but not grcatly, 
thort of domestic consumption, may, by manipulation of protec-
tive dutics, kccp thc intcrnal prices of such production comparativcly 
atable and ao cxert a steadying infiuencc on thc national industry in 
gencral. An economic structurc of this spccial type, howcvcr, incv-
itably implies a. countcr structure in othcr countrics, lt cannot be 
reneralized and it probably imposct grcatcr inatability on othct 
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national production even though productive potontiali-
ties are red uced. 
While the "latent talcnt" and "insurance" plcas for 
protection are perhaps the only rational grounds for 
objection to specialization as such, certain types of spe-
cialization may, on othcr grounds, bc hcld to be less 
dcsirable than diversification. Some forms of concen-
tration of industry may inhibit the growth of an even-
tually superior specialization of a different and more 
complex character. If, in given circumstances, thc for-
mer type would develop undcr free trade, a case may 
be made for protection as appropriate to that time and 
\ 
place. There is in almost every agricultural country a 
strong scntiment in favor of a modicum of protection 
to manufacturing industry on the ground that, in the 
long run, manufactures make for prosperity. This is, in 
· · !arge part no doubt, an illusion ( certainly somc almost 
purely agricultural countrics are in the van of pros-
perity), but there are rcasons for believing that it is not 
wholly so. There are economic activitics which are de-
pendent upon a social environmcnt in which population 
is locally concentrated. The fairly even dispcrsion of 
population which specialization in agriculture tends to 
produce may therefore fail to -sccure advantagcs which 
would more than compensate thc proximate loss in-
volved in discriminatory mcasurcs designed to fostcr 
manufacturing industry. 
1 
Manufacturing pursuits tend to distribute population 
in fish-net fashion along well-developed lines of traffic 
with a concentration at certain nodal points. Such a 
demographic structure greatly lowers the unit cost of 
countrics than would othcrwise obtain. National diversification of 
production as such, howcvcr, may bc univcrsally applicd and, un-
fortunately, ia in fact practiced with excess of enthusiaam, 
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many commodities such as piped water, gas, gasoline 
oil, and electricity; while all economic benefits ass 
ciated with communication, among which may be liste 
education ( including library facilities), social amuse 
ments ( theater, opera, concerts, movies), postal, tele-
graph, and ( within limits) telephone service, road and 
rail transport, news and informai:ion, can then be pro- / 
vided at indefinitely lower per capita outlay. ·!l 
The cost ·of retailing more tangible commodities is J:; 
also lowered by a local concentration of population, 
particularly in goods other than the most common Q, 
staples. Volume of sales is the most important factor j 
in diminishing the cost of distribution of such articles ( \ 
and a large volume is not attainable in the general store 1 · 
so typical of an agricultural environment. Division of l 
labor is limited by the extent of the market, and a !arge b_ 
market for any one purveyor often depends upon a 
coz:icentration of population. A given specialization is ~ 
sometimes, therefore, the enemy of a much more thor- ' 
oughgoing division of labor-the good may be inimical · 
to the better. A restrictive policy which curbs concen-
tration in purswts which scatter population may there-
fore, with fruitful economic results, release a much 
greater volume of specialization than it suppresses. 
Taking all these factors into account, and not coming 
too near to our own times for an illustration, it seems 
not unlikely that the growth in the prosperity of the 
northern relative to that of even the white population 
of the southern states, in our national though not in 
our colonial history, was due in some measure to en-
vironmental factors conditional upon the development 
of manufacturing industry in the North. The South 
was of course bled by the national policy of protection 
to manufactures, and part of the prosperity it would 
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otherwise have enjoyed was drained off to the North.2 
This, however, would merely have tended to equalize 
conditions between the naturally more favored South 
and the bleaker parts of the Union; it does not account 
for the differential in javor of the northern section. 
Greater productive and business energy may be allcgcd 
as a cause of the more rapid advance of the Yankee 
states, but it must remain a question whether this energy 
was not an effect rather than a cause of dynamic environ-
mental influences. 
There are limits, ·of course, to the cconomic bencfits 
to which concentration of population gives rise. Extreme 
density of such concentration makes transport more ex-
pensive rather than cheaper, good housing becom~s more 
difficult to provide, and th.; per capi.ta cost of even some 
services of communication tends to rise. Rising unit costs 
of production are, indeed, the underlying general tend-
ency of an increase of population in a given area. This 
is the well-known "law of diminishing returns." 
But this general tendency may, at any givcn stage, 
be more than offset by counter influences. Any increase 
in population on a given area, under a given industrial 
.structure, is likely, indeed, to be attended by highcr 
unit costs of output. Such increase, however, may itself 
induce such changes in the industrial structure as will 
lower those costs. Moreover, the argument above 
made turns on the form of distribution of a givcn popu-
lation rather than on total numbers. A rise in the total 
numbers in a given area will provide some of the ad-
vantages due to clustering, but clustering will occur 
under certain forms of industry and not under others, 
• The delcterious effect of the Civil War upon the South ia ob-
vious. The contrast ia more effective if only the pre-Civil War 
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however sparse the average density of settl~ment may 
be.• 
OBJECTIONS TO SPECIALIZATION IN SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES 
Protection as a means of nullifying allegedly unde-✓ 
sirable specialization may be directed not only against 
a given type of economic development but also against 
what is held ·to be an undue extension of specific indus-
tries. The positive aspect of this argument is for such 
diversification as will result from the nurturing of in-
dustries felt to be specially desirable. The principal 
economic, or socio-economic, grounds for such negative 
or positive protection are: / 
( I) Conseroation of Natural Resources.-It is usual 
for a country to possess comparative competence in the 
production of commodities for which it has great natural 
advantages. There is an immediate gain in developing 
international trade along these lines, but the gain arises 
in part because valuable and irreplaceable natural re-
, sources are presented to such a nation, by nature, free 
of cost. lt may well happen that under these conditions 
products will be offered to foreign countries at prices 
which at a later time will seem to have been ridiculously 
• Transport is also a factor of great importance. Railroads may 
oftcn justify the expcnditure made upon them though, in the begin-
ning, they wcre uneconomic. Similarly the establishmcnt, by sub-
sidy, of an occan transport line, in lieu of service by c-.asual tramp 
stcamen, may prove to have been well-advised in spite of initial 
cxpcrience to the contrary. Since protection by tariffs is ordinarily' 
not feasible in the shipping industry resort is had to subsidies. Direct 
aub!idies havc, in gcncral, many advantages over the indirect bounty 
involvcd in protective duties. One of their real advantages, how-
evcr, the fact that they do not conceal the truth, accounts for their 
dccline in political favor, and they a.re now 10 little used aa not to 
warrant treatmcnt in thia book. 
1' 1 
' 
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low. This is to sell the national birthright for a mess of 
pottage. Fora small gain now, represented by the differ-
, ence between the volume of imported products obtained 
in exchange for the export of the natural resource in 
question and that of the importcd goods which could be 
produced with the labor and capital devoted to pro-
ducing the export, such a country foregoes the possi-
bility of a much larger gain later on, whether in a regu-
lated export of the natural resource or in the use of 
it at home. 
To take a concrete instance, we probably are getting 
a much lower price for oil, and thcrefore a much 
smaller physical volume of imported goods for our oil 
exports, than we could get some years in the future. lt 
would therefore, perhaps, be a wise policy to cut down 
on our exports of oil. An ordinary protective policy 
could not of course be very effective here since protcc• 
tive duties ordinarily apply only to imports. By apply-
ing dutics against imports we cut down on exports 
somewhere, but there is no guarantcc that this will 
greatly curtail the export of any particular product. 
Aside from direct , regulation of production, an export 
duty would seem to be the only feasible scheme for 
preventing exports of any given product in which we 
hEpen to have a compara~ive advantagc. Export dutics, 
h wever, are unconstitutional in the United States. 
1 re is therefore but slight possibility of supporting 
ervation by a protectionist policy in the U nited 
es, and more direct measures are desirable in any 
c~. 
/~lt should be noted, too, that the argument does not 
l 
ly to replaceable natural resources such as timber 
s long as prices are fixed in competition with those for 
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increased at no great increase in cost, and the natural 
timber might as well be exploited as soon and as quickly 
as a free movement of trade would occasion. This is 
said without prejudice to other arguments for conser-
vation of timber, such as prevention of floods and . soil 
erosion. 
About the only irreplaceable natural resources are 
the products of mines, and the prospect of the exhaus-
tion of some of these is too remote to be of much im-
portance. The probability of exhaustion seems to be 
greater in oil than anywhere else, though iron ore and 
coal resources are not as good as they used to be and 
some of the less widely used metals, such as lead, are 
perhaps in <langer of being used up. There is, however, 
always the possibility that a conservation policy will 
overreach itself in conserving things which scientific 
developments make comparatively useless either be-
call:se better substitutes are found or other ways of pro-
ducing the conserved resource are discovered. All of 
these considerations make the possibilities of protection 
as a support for conseryation extremely limited. 
(2) Amelioration of Human Resources. Compara-
tive competencc in a givcn employment is somctimcs 
due to the prcsence of a relatively low grade of labor 
which shows a special bent for the employment in / 
question. A laissez.-faire policy may result in so great 
an extension of this employment as, over a period of 
years or decades, to exert a marked adverse effect on 
the average quality of the population. The extension of 
cotton growing in the United States, for instance, was 
not only originally dependent upon the presence of 
Negro labor, which we may perhaps not unjustly assume 
was of lower average quality than the white population, 
but it also seems to have tended to increase the ratio 
l, 
1 
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of the Negro to the white element in our racial struc-
ture. A rather casual examination of population statis-
tics goes to show that, in those states of the Black Belt 
in which ·over a period of decades cotton growing has 
been waxing, the ratio of the Negro to the white popu-
lation has shown an upward trend relative to those 
southern states in which cotton culture has been wan-
ing.• In other words, the demand for a certain type of 
labor has elicited the supply. 
lt may be that migration from one state to another 
has been solely responsible for the shifting ratios but, 
on the other hand, the shifting may well be due to 
alterations in the relative birth rates among Negro and 
white fo.lk in the typically cotton and in the other 
southeast,!!rn states. Had a laissez.-f aire commercial 
· policy be~n pursued in the U nited Statcs during the 
whole of the nineteenth century it would, no doubt, 
have enlarged the relative importance of cotton grow-
ing in our economic life. The possibly conscquent higher 
ratio of Negro to white population would, from the 
point of view of most whites at any rate, have been 
undesirable, and would scemingly have lowercd the 
national per capita productivc capacity. 
If, in the long run, through adjustmcnt of birth rates 
to relative economic opportunity, -the quality of a popu-
lation tends to adapt itself to the demands which the 
national industry makes upon it, one might go on to an 
argument for protection for any comparatively incom-
petent industry provided it could be shown that it 
would set up a demand for, and possibly evoke a supply 
of, a !arger proportion of high-grade workers than the 
'Other factors, of course, may have been dominant. A much more 
rigoroua investigation of the data would be necessary to assure con• 
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employments it would, as a result of the . protective 
policy, tend partially to displace. Put thus, the argu-
ment becomes rather far-fetched. The case, indeed, is 
seldom clear enough to permit the degree of assurance 
on which discriminatory legislative action should alone 
be taken. There is ordinarily no strong reason for favor-
ing one industry rather than another. History does 
show, however, some instances in which the artificial 
encourageme~t of trades requiring highly skilled work-
ers and technicians seems to have had beneficial effects 
on the character both of the population and of the in-
dustry of the country concerned. The argument for 
protection can be developed, according to circumstances, 
either toward the diminishing of the ratio of relatively 
undesired, or toward the increase of relatively desired, 
elements in the population. In still other circumstances 
the same objective would call for the abandonment of 
existing protection. 
NURTURING PROTECTION 
The historical instanccs which go to show advantages 
from the artificial stimulation of certain industries 
merge into general "nurturin, .-~•- protection, the foster-
ing of industries during infa · . ' . The infant industry 
argument for protection. · . the most popular of the 
rational pleas for that policy, rs· .. in one aspect, a variant 
of the thesis on the stimulatio"n of latent and otherwise 
wasted talent. The infant industry argument, however, 
goes farther than this, though with decreasing force. lt 
sometimes happens that it is merely the possession of 
the incidental ad.vantages of a particular type of special-
ization ( such as acquired skills) which gives the pro-
RATIONAL PROTECTION 7 $ 
ducers in a given country a continuing comparative com-
petence in any designated product or group of products. 
There is, moreover, always an inertia to be ovcrcome 
in the establishment of new industries and frequently 
heavy costs of initiation. A stimulus to the assumption 
of risk may therefore be in order; and the effort to es-
tablish, by protection, industries already strongly in-
trenched abroad may be justified in any given country 
on the ground that once they have gatten a start they 
will themselves secure incidental economies which will 
enable them to produce at prices which will be less 
than the sum of the prices then prevailing in the stand-
ard location, together with costs of transport . . This is 
always a matter of judgment and the limitations on the 
opportunity for such protection should steadily be borne 
1 
in mind. These limitations may be summed up as 
follows: 
1 
'\J ,. j. I) The infant i~dustry ar~ument hardly ever ap-
.:.. phes to the protect1on of agnculture and only some-
what less rarely to any type of extractive industry. This 
is because: (a) agriculture is chronologically a primary 
industry in every country and is therefore at any mo-
ment as fully developed technically as general condi-
tions permit; ( b) agriculture is an ind ustry peculiarly 
susceptible to increasing costs as production is expandcd; 
and ( c) little capital is, as a rule, necessary to start pro-
duction of most agricultural commodities. Initial diffi-
culties are, in consequence, at a minimum, and no de-
cline in unit costs is to be expected through increase in 
output. With other extractive industries, such as some 
types of mining, the initial difficulties are greater. The 
argument for nurturing protection may thercfore be 
stronger for these industries than for agriculture. 
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' mcntnl. Whcthcr it i11 v:11id or not cnn bc dctcrmincd 
in a fcw years. If the industry contin~es to "need" pro-
tection, this is conclusivc evidencc that it would have 
been bctter nevcr to have granted it. lt should be with-
drawn gradually, but unRinchingly. lt is better ~hat 
sucn industries should decline since, under protect1on, 
they will block the progress of a better industry. If, 
after a few years, any protected industry no langer 
needs shelter, it has justified itself, and ·whether the 
statutcs giving protection are or, are-· n_M· mam:-iirt:d is a 
matter · of •· indifference:· They are as moperat1ve m the 
onc casc as in the other. , . 
(3) Infant industry protection should not even be ✓ 
contemplated unless it can be shown not only that the 
industry concerned is likely to be as well carried on ~s 
a similar industry in competing countries but that 1t 
can be expectcd to provc tcchnically as compctent as is 
export industry in gencral in thc country lcvying the 
duty. To makc thc wholc proccss worth wh_ile thc i~-
. mediate lass must be compcnsatcd by an ult1mate gam, 
and this can bc attaincd only when the money cost per 
unit of output at home becomes less than the price at 
' which such a unit could be imported. / 
· (4) The infant industry argument is becoming less 
and less ap.p½cable as time goes on. In the last century 
, the rapid improvement in productive powers issuing out 
of the inventions of the lndustrial Revolution led to 
a relatively large development of manufacturing indu~-
try since elasticity of demand is much greater a!ong th1s 
line than along the line of food-stuff consumpt10n. The 
protection of manufacturing industry in many countries 
therefore effected merely an anticipation of what would, 
in any case, havc occurred later. In spite of improve-
ment in agri~~ltural methods, the product per acre has 
1r \ · 
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not l>ccn grcntly incrc:m:d. Thc inm.:a~c in thc industrinl 
a.nd urban populati on of thc world has th<.:rcforc bccn 
accompanicd by thc opcning of ncw lands for thc pro-
duction of food-stuffs. Thcrc must bc a limit to this 
proccss, and the price of agricultural products is thcre-
fore likcly, in the long run, to rise relatively to thc price 
of manufactures. This means that the chance of cstab-
lishing profitable manufacturing industry in a non-in-
dustrial country is likely to hecome smaller. There can 
be no large-scale substitution of manufacturing for agri-
cultural production in any country when it c:innot trans-
fer to new and sparsely peopled lands the provision .of 
its food supplies. · . 
~:; ) The infant industry argument is more applicable 
to a large than to a small country. No cxport market 
is immediately open to such an industry. If it wcre thcre 
would bc no objcct in protcction. Most of the adv:in-
tagcs which thc infant industry can hopc to sccurc arc 
advantngcs attcnding a largc scalc of opcrations. Unlcss · 
the home markct is sizable thcsc are not likcly to be 
obtained. lt is quite possible, of course, that the indi-
vidual plants in a little country should be big; but with 
industry organiz.ed in huge units, as is now the tend-
ency, a small market is a handicap which is often de-
cisive. lt is doubtfuJ, for instance, whether the motiori 
picture industry could, through protection, be festere~ 
in a small country, and the same is to some extent tru~ 
of the automobile and other industries where huge 
plants dominate the situation. • 
While, therefore, the infant industry argument is 
valid in some cases, its scopc is much more restricted 
than is commonly supposcd. In the U nitc<l 3tates a 
number of important industries ( e.g., cotton and s_ilk 
textiles, iron and steel) have grown, under pigh protec-' 
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tivc tariffs, to economic•·competence, that is to say, they 
have now reached the stage where they can compete on 
even, or bctter than even, terms in world markets. 
Thcy thus support thc casc for thc nourishing of infant 
industries. Latcr important industries, howevcr, such 
as the automobile, movie, and radio industries, have de-
veloped to a huge size with littie or no real protection, 
and they entered foreign markets almest from the be-
ginning. _This goes to show that nurturing protection 
is no longer needed for the development, in this coun-
try, of any manufacturing industry economically appro-
priate to American conditions, and that any such indus-
try which fails to develop spontaneously is unlikely, 
through protection, to involve other than a waste of the 
national resources of labor and capital. 
The infant industry argument, properly understood,I 
is a mere modification of the idea of free trade. The in-
telligent advocate of nurturing protection proposes that 
his measures be but temporary, and he looks forward 
to the removal at no very ,-4ist~nt date of the protection 
he currently advocates. . , • · 
In addition to the argument for the protection of in-
fant industry, an argument may in certain circumstances 
be made for the protection of infant finance. lt is con-
ceivable that the lack of a comparative competence in 
certain lines may be due to a scarcity of capitalis and that 
protection of certain ·industries will promote the growth 
of cap~tal. This argument, though valid, must be re-
ceived with caution. The immediate effect of protection 
must be to diminish income, the source from . which capi-
1 Forcign investmcnt may bc inhibited by fear, ignorance, or any 
other of those obstacles to mobility which ia assumed in the theory _of 
foreip trade. 
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tal is derived; and, other things being equal, the accum-
ulation of capital will in these circumstanccs bc chcckcd. 
But here again othcr things may pcrhaps not bc cqual. 
Economic history would sccm to show that of two coun-
tries with a givcn incomc, thc onc agricultural and thc 
othcr industrial, thc industrial country tcnds to accumu-
late capital more rapidly than the agricultural country. 
Capital is embodied in instrumcnts of production, ma-
chinery, buildings, and the like. The very process of 
growth of manufacturing industry therefore involves 
the accumulation of capital. Agriculture, on the whole, 
calls for less capital per unit of product than does most 
manufacturing industry,6 and the advantage of capital-
istic methods of production is not so great in agricul-
ture as in manufacturing.7 As a result, a farming com-
munity may tend to consume immediately a !arger share 
of its income than an industrial community and so to 
postpone an improvement in its condition. If this is 
true, such protection as has the effect of turning produc-
tion from agriculture to manufacturing industry may, as 
time goes on, compensate in part or in whole for the 
immediate loss involved through the stimulus it givcs to 
the accumulation of a !arger stock of capital and thus to 
the improv~ment of gcneral productive power. 
This argument applics of course only to an agricul-
. tural country. lt would clearly be useless, on this 
ground, artificially to divert productive power from one 
• Land is hcrc cxcludcd from the conccpt of capital. 
'In many types of manufacture a plant must cxpand or pcrish. 
This is usually not true of agricultural productivc units. Expansion 
calls for capital . which, under the corporatc form of organization 
now typical of manufacturing industry, is often provided by thc 
corporation itself out of profits. Thc owncrs of the corporation arc 
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manufacturing industry to another, and worse than use-
less to divert it from manufacturing to agricultural in-
dustry. Further, the more countries which, for this or 
any other reason, artificially promote industrial develop-
ment, the better it is for the countries that do not. The 
inevitable correlative of an induced development of 
manufacturcs in general is the tendcncy toward increascd 
import or diminished export of non-manufactured 
articles. The · greater the number of countries which 
indulge in the one type of specialization the stronger, 
therefore, is the demand for, relative to the supply of, 
the goods of those countries that remain in the other. 
This means that more manufactured goods must be 
, offered for a unit of raw materials or food-stuffs. The 
resulting gain to the countries of extractive industry 
would quickly wipe away any possible future loss in pro-
ductivity issuing out of the failure to accumulate capital 
as ~apidly as might otherwise be clone. Artificially fos-
tered industrial development involves, therefore, a cer-
tain immediate loss for the sake of a very problematical 
future gain which will surely fail of realization if too 
many countries go angling for it. 
INCREASINO VS. DECREASING COST INDUSTRIE$ 
A liberal commercial policy may lead to specialization 
in industries in which unit cost rises as ·output is ex-
panded, at the expense of industries in which the counter 
tendency is operative for the time being. So far, at least, 
as present or prospective economies are external to any 
given industry it might, at any moment, pay entrepre-
neurs to extcnd their operations in industries of rising 
unit cost rather than continue in those in which the net 
tendency of unit ~osts is downward. As the preceding 
\ 
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production of . the Iatter products shrank and unit costs 
therefore rose, comparative incompetence in such in-
dustries would tend to becomc progressively greatcr. 
Though the industries/the extension of which is accom-
panied by rising unit costs should thus constantly offcr 
better returns than are obtainablc in othcr cmploymcnts, 
the country might stcadily bc losing opportunitics to 
improve its per capita gcncral productivity and might 
even suffer an absolute dcclinc thcrcin. Protcction for 
comparatively incompctcnt ~ndustries of dcclining cost 
per unit of output might then be warrantcd. 
The argument just givcn resembles the infant indus-
try plea, with the significant difference that it is not 
dependent upon the ultimatc acquisition of comparative 
competence in the protected industries. The infant may 
never grow up but may still be worth chcrishing. In its 
broader aspects, howevcr, the argument mergcs into 
that which turns on an economically favorable cnviron-
ment issuing out of the dcvclopment of a special type of 
demographic and industrial structure. 
The general principle on which all such arguments 
are based is that of lower unit entreprcncurial or social 
costs as the scale of output in a given milieu. is expanded. 
The lower unit costs may be dircctly reflected in the out-
put of any given commodity or they may bc spread over 
a wide range of economic goods. The case of joint, or 
rather common, costs also has a bearing on this issue. 
Transport, along with production, costs will furnish an 
example. Most goods, in addition to the cost of produc-
tion at the point of origin, arc subjcct to transport costs 
before they come into the hands of thc consumcr. Rail 
transport requires a !arge initial outlay, and !arge more 
or less fixed charges are currently incurred regardlcss of 
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policy might increase the traffic on a given railroad sys-
tem, thereby lower unit costs on all goods transported 
on the said railroad, and thus more than compensate the 
immediate loss from protection. 
PROTECTION AS A MEANS OF IMPROVING THE TERMS OF 
TRADE 
l. \ c,ycr~~ \. ' ) 
National benefit, at the greater expense of the outside 
world, may possibly accrue to any country levying pro-
tection, by means of a change in the terms on whi-ch its 
foreign trade is conducted. These terms are best ex-
pressed in the relative prices of import and export com-
moditics. From the national point of view the great eco-
nomic desideratum is to sell the national exports at as 
high, and to buy the national imports at as low, prices 
as possible. By protective import duties the nati'onal pro-
d~ction is shifted in greater or lesser degree from prod-
ucts formerly exported to those formerly imported. An 
early consequence of this shift is a decrease in the world 
supply, relative to demand, of the exports of the country 
which levies the protective duties and an increase in the 
world supply, relative to demand, of its former imports. 
The result is a rising tendency in the prices of its exports 
relative to those of its imports. 
The increased national benefit accruing on the foreign 
trade which such country still carries on will reimburse 
that country in some measure for the net loss on· total 
production issuing out of the duties. lt is conceivable 
that the shift in the terms of trade might transfer to 
the country levying the protection so greatly increased a 
share of the reduced total production of the trading 
countries as to more than cover the said country's share 
in the decline in total output. This is the less unlikely to 
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occur when· protective duties are imposed upon goods 
which, under the original conditions, could be produced 
domestically at a price but little above that at which they 
could be imported. 
The advantage so gained might be permanent. This 
would occur if, in spite of the change in relative prices, 
foreign countries should still find it advantageous to 
continue production much as before rather than shift 
to those goods which had shown a relative price increase. 
In fact, however, even a slight temporary rise in the 
prices of one dass of goods relative to those of another 
dass, no alteration having occurred in costs of produc-
tion, is practically certain to result in relative expansion 
of the world output of the former and relative contrac-
tion of the world output of the latter, and thereforc to 
an ultimate price relationship almost the same as had 
originally prevailed. 
The possibility of snatching a trading advantage by 
protectionist measures is, in consequence, very slim; and 
it should further be remembered that, in so far as it is 
feasible, it is a game at which any number of nations can 
play. If A gets a trading advantage through the levy of 
import duties, B, C, and D will probably, through simi-
lar measures, be able to shift the terms of trade, in the 
opposite direction, toward or beyond their original status. 
The world would then be presented with the sorry spec-
tacle of a competitive exclusion of imports, with the con-
sequent fall in exports8 and the reduction of total pro-
ductivity. The scramble for national gain would issue in 
mutual frustration and reciprocal loss. 
1 Even if the interrelationship of thc cxports and imports of any 
givcn country were denied, it ia clcar that cxports and imports, in 
gcneral, arc ticd togethcr aincc thc cxports of any one country are 
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PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
NON-ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS 
Admitting the economic loss involved in protection, 
the proponents of that policy often urge that the state 
is interested in the ethical, bio1ogical, sociological, or 
other welfare of its citizens and that such welfare is 
often best promoted in ways which involve a present 
cconomic loss. They are therefore ready to accept the 
loss as part of the cost of building up a society more in 
accord with their ideal. 
One group of such arguments is usually brought in 
support of protection to agriculture on the ground that 
urbanization is an evil in itself and that the farmer is 
the "hackbone" of the nation. lAn economist is not spe-
. cially competent to discuss these matters, but the assump-
tion that rural activities are superior to those of the city 
as creators of character cannot be said to be proven. 
There may, however, be some far-off economic reason 
for viewing with concern a rapid growth of population 
in a restricted area as a result of specialization in manu-
facture. As the less crowded parts of the earth fill up, 
supplies of food-stuffs and agricultural raw materials 
will be available to industrial exporting nations only. a~ 
increased cost in terms of manufactured goods. 1This 
means that dcnsely populated areas may, in the more or 
less distant future, become poorer relatively to agricul-
tural lands, and c,·cn abs~h~tdy. Considerations of this 
sort might induce a statesman to endorse protection for 
agriculture as a means of assuring a more favored future 
for an otherwise overcrowded country, but such matters 
. are rather in the realm of clairvoyance than of reason. 
The free trade thesis takes account only of total incorlie 
and, to some extent, the sharing of it between nations. 
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lt does not, and should not, consider the social arrange-
ments under which that wealth is distributed among 
individuals. There is no tendency in free trade, as such, 
toward unequal distribution. \On the contrary, this is at 
least as likely to happen under protection.)ln certain cir-
cumstances, however, protection, by encouraging indus-
tries which use a large amount of labor relative to land 
and equipment as compared with the industries which, 
under such protection, would suffcr, may cnlarge the 
share of the laboring dass in the lowcred national in-
come and, per contra reduce the share of thc rentier.0 
The laborer's larger share of the reduccd total income 
might possibly be a greater absolute amount than he 
would otherwise receive. Class legislation of this sort 
may possibly be desirable on sociological grounds, 
though this, of course, is a quite open question. In any 
event it would seem to be better to secure the desircd 
distribution by some means other than that which would 
involve a reduction in the total national income. Hcre 
also a relaxation of protection might, in other circum-
stances than those posited, accomplish the end for which 
· protection is in the present case invoked. 
/ Protection is at times uscd as a wcapon to punish or 
prevent foreign discrimination, to force a more liberal 
trade policy on other nations, to s.crve as a rctaliatory 
measure against restrictions which, though not discrimi-
natory as between foreign nations, are regarded as un-
~ • All international trade tcnds, in any one of the countries con-
cerned, to increase the relative value of such of the factors of pro-
duction as are there comparatively plentiful (and thereforc chcap) 
and to diminish the relative valuc of such of the factors as arc thcrc 
comparatively scarcc (and thercforc dear). Thc increase in total 
production and income will, however, almost surcly lead to a highcr 
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due, and to establish a favorable bargaining position for 
prospective international commercial negotiations. Thc 
certain immediate loss to the levying country is not al-
ways recognized, but where it is, re.taliatory duties are 
levied in the expectation that a still greater loss will be 
imposed on the foreign country against which they are 
specially aimed and that such country will thereby be 
persuaded to take a tractable attitude. In most cases 
this expectation is disappointed and the sole result is a 
competition in mutual injury. No doubt protection, as 
an instrument of economic strife, may sometimes have 
its uses, but it is a two-cdgcd sword quite as likely to 
wound its wielder as the "enemy" against whom it is 
directed. In any event, when used for the purposes dis-
cussed in this paragraph, the object of the protective 
measures is not to restrict but to enlarge the freedom 
of commercial intercourse ;~ it seeks to restrain restraints. 
Th~ protection is then justified not on its own account 
but solely as a means of securing freer trade. 
A similar defence may be made of protective or other 
duties levied in the prevention of dumping. To this 
subject more detailed attention will be given in the next 
chapter. 
Diversification of industry as insurance is frequently 
put upon a military rathcr than an economic basis. An 
assured domcstic supply of the materials of war, through 
the protection of manufacturing industries producing or 
capable of quick conversion to the production of muni-
tions and other manufactured commodities in the 
panoply of Mars, is freely advocated in countries which, 
under a liberal commercial policy, would specialize in 
agriculture. On thc other hand, countries whose com-
parative competence lies in manufacturing arc often 1 
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urged, for the sake of defence, to provide for the do-
mestic production of necessary food-stuffs. 
While diversification of output, provided it is not 
achieved at extremely high cost, may be desirable on 
military grounds, it may be worth while to point out 
that a country like Great Britain could never have shown 
the military power which it has, in fact, exerted, had it 
attempted to secure a domestic supply of food-stuffs and 
so reduced its per capita economic strength, or greatly 
limited its population, or both. Frec tradc here gave 
greater military power than protcction could cvcr have 
clone. Military power is, of coursc, not the samc thing 
as invulnerability, and a strong navy has bccn feit tobe 
essential to the keeping opcn of British avenues of trade 
which, under another policy, might never have existed 
or, at least, been of vital concern. 
SUMMARY 
If now we survey as a whole the various arguments 
for protection gathered in this chapter, we shall see that 
they are in some degree conflicting; that they are, for 
the most part, applicable only in special circumstances 
and for limited ends; and that, under different condi-
tions, free trade might bctter promote cven these ends 
than would the imposition of rcstraints. Exccpt for the 
pleas against specialization, qua spccialization, the argu-
ments for protection could, in a differently constituted 
environment, be turned directly against that policy.10 In 
JO The argument i, not for protection as auch but for the type of 
industry which, in givcn circumstances, protection wouid fostcr. lt 
often appears in negative form as a, protcst againat thc composition 
of industry which, in givcn circumstances, tenda to cvolve undcr 
laiuez f air1. Change the circumstanccs, and the argumcnt in both 
caee1 would 1upport a frce trade policy. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANTI-DUMPING LEGISLATION AND SPE-
CIAL FORMS OF FOREIGN TRADE CONTROL 
THE NATURE OF DUMPING 
DuMPING, scientifically defined as price discrimination 
between national markets/ is a phenomenon of monop-
oly of considerable but perhaps not increasing impor-
tance in international trade. Monopoly can be estab-
lished either by private interests or by governmental 
activity. Since monopoly may make it profitable fo dis-
criminate in the prices charged to different buyers, a 
thing which would be practically impossible under con-
ditions of perfectly free competition, the argumcnts for 
a laissez-faire trade policy, which are based on the as-
sumption of such free competition, are, in the case of 
dumping, open to question. 
The usual type of dumping, however, involves the 
sale of products to foreign consumers at distriminatingly 
low prices and, if the permanence of this situation could 
be assured, there would be no economic reason for re-
strictive legislation by countries subject to such dumping. 
This is true whether the import, at dumping priccs, 
would or would not forcc a local industry to the wall. 
Whether the factors which lead to the prices of a coun-
1 Cf. Jacob Viner, Dumping: A Problem in International Traü, 
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try's imports being lower than domestic cost of pro-
duction are natural or artificial is a matter of indiffer-
ence to such country. Provided the situation will be 
permanent, it will in any case be economically advan-
tageous to secure in foreign markets anything which 
can persistently be obtaincd more cheaply by the im-
port-export process than by dircct production within 
the home territory/.1 
Dumping, however, is so little likely to be permanent 
and is characteristically so predatory that there is a gen-
eral disposition on the part of countries subjected to 
dumping to legislate against it. On the whol~ this dis-
position is to be approved. Except when conducted 
under the regis of mercantilistic governments ready to 
assume lasses indefinitely, dumping is likely to be 
sporadic, with the intention of getting rid of a casual 
surplus or of eliminating competition by financial might 
rather than by productivity. In neither of the latter 
cases is it likely to be in the long-run interest of the 
1 Where dumping is of the cost-reducing type, undertakcn for the 
sake of sccuring lower unit costs by reason of the expansion of out-
put for which such dumping offers a market, some intercsting possi-
bilities occur. lt may not only bc worth while for a given country to 
protect a comparatively incompctcnt industry subjcct to lower unit 
costs as output ia enlarged (a matter treatcd in the prcceding chapter) 
but it is theoretically possible th:it an industry comparativcly incom-
petent at the point of production may, under a policy of price dis-
crimination, bc able to aupply all consumers at lo•wer pricea than 
would be possible for a comparatively more competent industry 
diff erently situated. Whether, undcr the monopoly conditions which 
make price discrimination feasible, it will elect to do so is another 
question. The fact remains that the total cost of goods delivered to 
consumers may, in certain circumstances, bc less if they are produced 
by plants which, under a laissez.-faire trade policy, would nevcr come 
into cxistence, than if thcy were produced by plants which, for a 
given volume of output, would show factory costs per unit con-
sistently lowcr than thcir rivals. For an illustration of thia point, aee 
thc 1pccial note at thc end o.f thi1 chaptcr • 
'. 1. 
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rcop1ent country. Dumped products, in general, may 
therefor~ be eliminated from the list of imports which, 
on economic principles, should be subject to no discrimi-
nation with respect to the source of supply. Anti-dump-
ing legislation, properly drawn, is, in fact, a discrimina-
tion against discrimination, and this, exccpt in rather 
unusual situations, is economically dcsirable. 
"EXCHANGE DUMPING" 
lt is impi>rtant, however, to be clear as to what con-
stitutes dumping. Dumping is freely charged against any 
foreign producer who sells at a price which causes dis-
comfort to domestic competitors. Whatever the price, 
however, there is no dumping in any prccisc use of the 
term so long as factory prices to all buyers are equal. 
This at once rules out so-called exchange dumping. Any 
country abandoning the gold standard is likely, in the 
early stages, to experience a comparatively hcavy dis-
count of its currency in the foreign exchange market. 
The recession from gold has been due, prcsumably, to 
a comparatively high price levcl with a tendcncy toward 
an increase in the ratio of commodity imports to com-
modity exports (aside from gold). Thc suddcn and, as 
compared with internal purchasing power, cxccssivc fall 
in the exchange value of the currency not only nullifics 
this tendency but usually exaggerates the change. The 
ensuing expansion of exports relative to imports then 
operates to r~verse the downward movement in the ex-
change value of the currency in question and to bring it 
up to the point at which equilibrium between its external 
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There is at no time anything in the process which 
can properly be described as dumping. All purchasers 
pay the same price, but foreigners happen to be able 
temporarily to buy the requisite currency cheaply. To 
expose to special restrictive legislation the exports of 
a country whose currency, in terms of foreign exchange, 
is temporarily cheap is to pcrpetuate the evil such legis-
lation seeks to combat. The only effective way to raise 
the exchange value of a currency unduly depressed is 
to have an increase in the ratio of exports to imports 
of the country to which that currency appcrtains. If its 
exports are restrictcd by spccial legislation in othcr 
countrics, the exchange value of the currcncy is likely 
to show a pcrsistently falling tcndcncy relative to in-
ternal purchasing power and thus to make the so-called 
dumping continuous. If the ratio of exports to imports 
of any one country is too low for equilibrium, the same 
ratio in some other country or countries must be too 
high~ To block the adjustment which automatically tends 
to occur through a movement in exchange rates is, 
therefore, to cherish instability and invite collapse.8 
The erring but general tendency to regard exports as 
desirable and imports as at best a necessary evil is re-
sponsible for the disposition, so manifest in recent years, 
toward a persistent compctition in exchange deprecia-
tion. lt is possible, by progressive inflation, to keep the 
1 Attempts not to prevent but to retard the adjustment may, how-
ever, be j ustified. This is one of the cases where a audden change 
may produce violent dislocations. Emergency mea!ures on the part 
of countries subjected to a great increase of certain imports, at low 
prices, from countriea with an unduly depressed foreign exchange 
value on their currcncics, may be desirable if they are not prohibitory 
but are designed mercly to scrve as checks on a tcmporary or runaway 
procesa which threatens the currency of the recipicnt country. The 
time factor hcrc, as elscwhcre, must be taken into considcration. 
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cxchange value of a currency below its value in the 
domestic market (its valuc at home higher than on ,the 
exchanges) as long _ as the home population distrusts the 
currency less than foreigners do. So far, however, as 
the exchange value of a currency is kept below its in-
ternal purchasing power, the country in question is 
selling-its exports at a sacrifice in terms of imports. 
The issue of this proccss is ruin, as the record clearly 
shows in the casc of Germany from the end of the 
World War till latc in 1923. Gcrmany was at that time 
an immense bargain countcr for forcign buycrs and was 
so drained of goods that thc Gcrman govcrnmcnt was 
impcllcd to put an end to thc Gcrman "advantagc" in 
foreign tradc, to f orco Gcrman cxportcrs to raisc thcir 
prices, and to discriminatc against cxports by a differ-
ential which favored thc homc ~onsumcr. 
lt is also possible to keep the exchangc value of a 
free currency low relative to gold standard currencies 
if the country in question is willing to absorb unlimited 
quantities of gold. The competition in exchange depre-
ciation in more recent years is one aspect of that passion 
for gold which has been so destructive of the true ends 
of economic activity. Countries which have abandoned 
the gold standard are often still so eager to acquire 
gold that the holders of the currency of such countries 
are ready to sell it against gold for much lcss than its 
real worth. The great source of gold is in the rcscrves 
of the countries which still remain on the gold standard. 
The depreciation of free in terms {?f gold currencies, as 
compared with their purchasing power ovcr goods in 
their respective centers of circulation, means that the 
ratio of the ordinary commodity exports to the imports 
of gold standard countries tends to fall, the balance being 
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paid in the gold which the other countries so urgcntly 
seek. 
Carried to its conclusion, this will put all countries off 
the gold standard. 4 Gold from bank reserves being then 
no langer attainable, the principal stimulus and prereq-
uisite to e.xchange depreciation would cease to exist and, 
e.xcept through a completely futile accumulation of un-
redeemed claims on foreign currencies, it would be im-
possible to kecp one currency so low in terms of another 
as to lead to any special advantage in expert markets. 
Every increase in the ratio of exports to imports which 
accrued to any country as a result of a relatively low ex-
change value for its currency would automatically ele-
vate that rate. The competition in exchange depreciation, 
the so-called exchange dumping and the acquisition of 
temporary competitive advantages, is therefore not only 
attended by national lasses even to the "successful" 
participants15 but it is sooner or later practically impos-
sible of continuance. 
'Many protective dutiea have been imposed in recent yeara aa 
emergency measures for the preservation of the currency. For reaaon• 
elscwhere given they are of little value for this purpose; but the 
pressure on thc part of the affected industries, combined with the 
general fear of currency disturbance, has overridden all coldly con-
ccived counsels. 
1 lt is true that the excessive stimulus to exports which it affords 
may provide employment in certain industries which would other-
wiac bc idlc, nnd thi~, in it.elf, i• 11. gain to thc country conccrncd. 
llut, in n atntc of worlJ-wiJc unemploymcnt, auch nttivity is likely 
to bc nt the immediate cxpense of aimilar export industries in other 
countries, and their loss will bc attended by a lack of purchasing 
power over cxtemal products which is almost certain to rcact on the 
foreign demand, in general, for the cxport commoditiee of the 
country whose cxport trade was originally favored. The only real 
aolution of the difficulty ia a general atimulue to activity which will 
opcrate equally in the domeatic, export, and import field1 for all the 
countriea concemed. 
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THE CASE OF RUSSIA 
Another type of alleged dumping is frequently 
charged against the Soviet government. The Soviet gov-
ernrnent, ·with its monopoly of foreign trade, is in a posi-
tion to practice dumping on a large scale if it should 
wish to do so.- But the Russian economic structure being 
what it is, it is hard to see how the Russians could ob-
tain any economic benefit by dumping, and there seems 
to be no real evidence that they have ever practiced it 
on any great scale. 6 
To determine whether or not there is dumping from 
Russia is, however, extraordinarily difficult since the 
lack of free domestic markets, and a freely establishcd 
exchange rate between Russian and other currencies, 
. make an accurate comparison of internal and external 
prices out of the question. The best test of Russian 
dumping would be indirect, through a comparison of 
the ratio between thc rouble price of any two Russian 
commodities in the principal domcstic market with that 
of the foreign exchange price at which they were offered 
to consumers in the outside world. If these ratios devi-
ate from equality there is prima f acie evidence of 
dumping. 
The Russians, however, have a very rcalistic attitude 
toward exports in that they rcgard thcm solcly as a 
means for the acquisition of importcd supplics. Thcy 
are therefore prone to develop foreign commerce along 
much the same lines as would evolve under a non-
• At times, nevertheless, when the Ru&Sians have bccn in urgent 
need of foreign exchange to pay for imports on which contracts had 
&lready been signed, they may have indulged in practices which, 
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PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
· monopolistic capitalist regime, with protection for those 
industries which the Russians are building up, not in-
directly by means of tariffs, but by direct control of for-
eign trade. To secure desired imports in the largest 
measure it is obviously better to send out those products 
which can be produced most cheaply in Russia, relative 
to the price which they will command abroad, and so 
long as this policy is pursued there will be no Russian 
dumping. The Russians are unlikely to sell goods 
abroad more cheaply than is necessary; and, with for-
eign trade under a single control which is also respon-
sible for the provision of goods to domestic consumers, · 
there could be no possible economic motive for selling, 
at a given price to forcign buyers, that one of two or 
more commoditics which is the more highly valued at 
home.1 Russia may wcll sell certain commodities at lower 
priccs than competing countries think desirable. There 
is nothing peculiar about this, however, and it is as fav-
orable to buyers as it is detested by competing sellers. 
The control of foreign trade, in Russia or elsewhere, 
has its menacing aspect, but dumping is not one of the 
potential dangers except in an incidental way. lt would, 
for instance, be possible for the Russians· to manipulate 
speculative produce markets by heavy short sales fol-
lowed by dumping of the product on a scale sufficient to 
break the cash, and consequently the speculative, market. 
Such dumping need not approach in volume the amount 
of short sales and it would permit the latter to be cov-
ered at a substantial profit. Several years ago the Rus-
sians wcre chargcd with this practice in the Chicago 
whcat market, but the charges were never adequately 
proven and succeeding events have rather gone to show 
'The prospcct of Russian dumping, if any, must be aaociatcd with 
political rather than cconomic motives. 
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that the Soviet grain administration merely sold while 
the market was comparatively good, leaving other hold-
ers of wheat to wait in vain, for years, for a rise in 
prices. 
National control of foreign trade, by permitting the 
shifting of supplies or orders in toto from one market to 
another, also furnishes a potent bargaining weapon which 
is subject to great abuse. The Soviet practice in this 
matter has been followed by many othcr nations in re-
cent years in the system of exchange control, of quotas 
or contingents of imports from given countries or of 
given products, and of similar devices, all of which run 
counter to the spirit of equality of treatment of one 
foreign nation with anothcr and scemingly to the lctter 
of treaties guarantecing such cquality. 
All of these controls, moreover, dcviate from the 
principle that in every country there is an appropriate 
ratio between the volume of foreign and domcstic trade,8 
and that this ratio is most likely to be closely approxi-
mated if no restraints are put upon foreign commerce 
other than those which, for one reason or another, are 
laid upon domestic transactions. Just as foreign trade 
• The ratio appropriate to any given country may be great or 
11mall accord ing to differing circu mst:i nce. Any country which can 
produce within its own borders, at cost ratios approximatcly equal 
to those which prevail in the world at large, the bulk of the products 
which it consumes, will tcnd to show a low appropriate ratio of 
foreign to domestic trade. Many factors contribute to th is situation, 
among which may be mentioned the size of the country, the variety 
of its resources, its shapc, orientation, ncarncss t-0 foreign markcts, 
transport facilities, and thc like. A country of approximatcly circular 
ahape, for instancc, will tcnq to show a small appropriate ratio of 
foreign to domestic trade as comparcd with a country whosc ahapc 
is more ncarly linear; while a linear-shapcd country ,tretching north 
and south, and thus securing a varied climatc, will tend to show a 
similarly small appropriatc ratio as compared with a country of likc 
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shou!d not, in general, be restrained by discriminations, 
neither should it be so encouraged as, for instance, by 
bounties, dumping, and similar practices. Such discrimi-
nations are usually haphazard, without rational basis 
in the common interest, and evil in their .consequences 
to the discriminating as to other nations . 
BILATERAL EQUIVALENCE OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
One of the most vicious types of discrimination is 
that which is devoted to securing equality of exports and 
imports as between one country and each of the other 
countries of the world. The notion that imports from 
any foreign country should be confined to an amount 
equal to the domestic exports to that country is childish. 
lt is analogous to the situation in which a chewing-gum 
magnate, on the purchase of an expensive automobile, 
should insist that the automobile manufacturer recipro-
cate by buying from him for his own use an equivalent 
value of chewing gum. 
The total foreign income and outlay of every solvent 
nation must balance; but to expect that there should be 
a balance in all the parts is ridiculous. No country buys 
from another, in larger measure than it sells, for any 
other rcason than that it is in its own interest to do so. 
To insist upon bilateral equivalence in the exports and 
imports of any given country with each of the others is 
to force international trade into extremely costly chan-
nels or to render it altogether impossible. Most of the 
advantages of specialization along lines of comparative 
competence are then lost since there is not one chance in 
millions that the appropriate specialization of produc-
tion in the several countries will coincide with an equiv-
alence of imports and exports between each of thcm. 
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British Malaya sends rubber to the United States to 
a large value every year, but it would be foolish for the 
United States to insist that that country import an cquiv-
alent value of American products. The inhabitants of 
Malaysia have no strong predilection for the type of pro-
duction in which the United States specializes and, cven 
if they had, a sizable part of the proceeds of their 
rubber exports accrues to British and other non-Malay-
sian owners of plantations so that purchasing power 
over foreign commodities does not accrue to the Malay-
sians in anything like the full measure of thcir cxports. 
The dollar proceeds of the sales of rubber to thc U nited 
States are sold by their recipients to the highcst biddcrs, 
whatever their nationality, and must be uscd to pur-
chase American commodities. The purchascrs of this 
dollar exchange ( the purchase being typically made with 
goods sold to Malaysia) thus buy more American goods 
than they could get if their acquisition of dollars wcre 
limited to the supplies available from exports of their 
own country to the United States. lt is a matter of in-
difference to the latter country whether the actual buy-
ers of so much of its export as is sent out in payment for 
purchases of rubber are or are not natives of Malaysia. 
To insist thatthey should be would simply be to increase 
the cost of rubber to American consumers, and of Ameri-
can exports to British Malaya, without any compensat-
ing benefit to either country. 
RECIPROCITY VS. MOST·FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT 
A form of foreign trade control of increasing popu-
larity is that associated with reciprocity agreements of 
one type or another. Such agreements require the 
modification· or ~brogation of any unconditional most-fa-
; . . ' '' .. . ~' . .. . . . .. 
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100 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
vorcd-nation trcatics which may stand in thc way. Most-
favored-nation trcatics are intcnded to prevent discrimi-
nation by guaranteeing to all the contracting partien as 
favorable treatment as is granted to any. When the net-
work of treaties containing the most-favored-nation 
clause is widely extended the result is to elimi-
nate special favors altogether. Most-favored-nation 
treaties, as such, are of no effect in securing low, or no, 
protective duties; they merely provide that, whatever 
the height of such duties, they shall be equal as between 
all the countries engaged. 
lt is alleged in responsible quarters that these treaties 
prevent a liberalizing of tariff schedules, inasmuch as 
there are said to be numerous pairs of countries which 
would be ready to grant each other reciprocal conces-
sions in tariff rates but which are unwilling to generalize 
these concessions to the extent which existing most-fa-
vored-nation treaties require. 
· Any reduction in the protective schedules now stran-
gling world commerce seems, prima facie, highly desir-
able; but to secure it through discrimination might well 
prove even more disastrous than no action at all. Rec-
iprocity, in form, may be benevolent or malign; but 
even when, as between the parties concerned, it is an 
exchange of favors rat her than of in juries it must dis-
criminate against all those outside its scope. Protests are 
inevitable and, if unheeded, are likely tobe followed by 
retaliation developing into that most vicious form of 
reciprocity-tariff wars. . · 
Even if such wars can be prevented it does not follow 
that reductions of duty as between given countries, to 
the exclusion of others, will either promote foreign 
trade as a whole or lead to a better utilization of produc-
tive resources. lt may, in _fuct, ~av~ just. th~ opposite cf-
.· ::, , . 
: •. , ... 
' '. , 1 
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fcct. Both the contracting par.tics to a reciprocity trcaty 
may, as a. rcsult of the trcaty, divert thcir productive 
resources into lines of comparative incompetcnce solcly 
because each is sheltered in the markcts of the othcr. 
The diversion may easily be greater with relatively low 
but discriminatory tariff schedules than with a higher 
range of duties equally applicable to imports from no 
matter what foreign source.9 
The vogue of reciprocity proceeds largely from the 
fallacy of supposing that any one nation grants a favor 
to another when it imports goods therefrom and that it 
should therefore be accorded a similar favor in return. 
Since, however, imports are not made except in the 
interest of the importer and of his country, the buyer 
no more confers a favor than does the seller. Unilateral 
reductions of general protective tariffs are quite as ad-
vantageous to the reducing as to other countrics, and 
there are seldom any good rcasons why such reductions 
should not be made available to all comcrs. 
Reciprocity may, in the prcsent state of world opinion, 
be a useful weapon for sccuring, by stagcs, general tariff 
reductions.10 There is, however, no real necd for it 
since the virtue of reductions of protective schcdulcs by 
any one country is in no way dependcnt on countcr re-
ductions by other countries; and such counter rcductions, 
which would give additional advantages to all con-
cerned, can be induced quite as well by a failure to 
negotiate or renew most-favored-nation treaties as by 
• For an excellent discussion of this topic, cf. Jacob Viner, Th, 
Mo1t-favored-nation Clauu, Index, Vol. VI, No. 61, Stockholm, 
193 1. Professor Viner conclusively demonstrates that all of the alleged 
advantages of reciprocity may be obtained without discrimination 
involving the abrogation of most-favored-nation treaties. 
» In support of this view, cf. F. W. Taussig, For,ign Aflairs, Vol. 
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discarding the latter altogether in favor of a system of 
discrimination between different sources ·of f orei gn 
supply. 
All of the more recent devices in the control of foreign 
trade are aspects of the resurgence of protection since 
the close of the World War, which is itself but the cul-
mination of a trend toward economic nationalism under 
way for more than half a century. Some of the causes of 
this neo-mertantilism are obvious. War always releases 
.nationalistic passions; and in the state of high tension 
which has marked the last decade_ and a half, the military 
arguments for protection have assumed enhanced im-
portance. The breaking of certain large states into frag-
ments, and the consequent growth of two or more pro-
tective structures where only one grew before, have also 
contributed greatly to economic separatism. 
This, however, is by no means the whole story. The 
mqre deeply underlying motive is a groping toward se-
curity not only against the dangers of political warfare 
but against the vicissitudes of a world economic order, 
far from stable, and beyond the reach of any single 
state. 
. The groping has, for the most part, been misguided, 
since attempts at economic autarchy in any one country 
have but increased the difficultics of others with later 
adverse rcpercussions on the initiating state, The soli-
darity of the cconomic world as it is now organizcd in-
evitably visits disaster upon those who essay to disrupt 
it. lt is impossible, however, to look without sympathy 
on the many efforts now being made to provide a less 
shaky 'foundation for economic welfare. Since the world 
does not yet seem ready for concerted action in the solu-
tion of its major economic problems, attention is in-
cvitably directed toward action on anational basis. 
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lf there were any convincing evidcnce that the fluctua-
tions in a nationalistic cconomy could bc madc lcss vi~ 
lent than those which must bc prcsumcd to be likcly to 
continue to affiict the world at large, the insurance argu-
ment for self-sufficiency would here have cogency. 
Though self-sufficiency would mean a reduction of the 
national income bclow the potential lcvcl under a liberal 
commercial policy, it would not ncccssarily, over a pcriod 
of years, diminish actually .realized national returns. 
Greater steadiness, moreover, would be a distinct gain 
even at the expense of some reduction in the total. Ex-
cept in the case of a small numbcr of specially situated, 
not necessarily large, countries, there is small reason for 
believing, however, that the attainment of thorough-
going self-sufficiency is other than an idle dream. There 
is still less reason for supposing that it would give the 
stability at which it aims. If, on the other hand, stabil-
ity within any large country can be achieved by other 
means, it is n·ot likely to be seriously menaced by a 
liberal trade policy. The disposition to withdraw from 
international trade is merely a phase of the tendency, 
when things go wrong, to blame the foreigner. There 
is no real ground for belicving that the presence of 
international trade has matcrially increascd the post-
'h'.ar difficultics of any country. On thc contrary, the re-
strictions placcd upon it havc playcd a vcry vicious role. 
Asidc from honcstly intcndcd cmcrgcncy mcasurcs to 
prevent a shifting of tradc currcnts and of industrial 
structurcs in rcsponsc to tempornry storms arising from 
disturbcd currcncy conditions or thc like, the post-war 
systems of control are nothing but a tragic nuisance. 
All control of foreign trade implics a conscious or un-
conscious aim of some sort, but it will usually bc found 
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realization thereof is sought are abortive. Clear-eyed 
pursuit of a rational policy is rare, and there is, in- gen-
eral, no disposition to look through catchwords into the 
realities of welfare. "Control" is appealing regardless 
of its purpose or results and, in the field of foreign 
trade, is quite generally based on wholly untenable 
premises. This is the more generally true when it in-
volves special favors to some, and therefore disfavors 
to other, foreign nations. 
NOTE ON SOME PHASES OF DUMPING 
Let ua suppose two countries, Ex and Fourcx, cach with an 
inel:istic demand for a given product, thc developcd dcmand of 
Fourcx being four timcs that of Ex. The industry meeting this 
dcmand is first established in Ex and, with a given volume of out-
put, would always be able to produce at - lower cost per unit 
than any similar industry in Fourex could do. Since thc market 
of Ex is only ¾ as large as that of Fourex, however, it is quite 
possible that a produccr in Fourex, provided hc has a monopoly 
of the markct in h-is own country, may be able to produce at 
lower unit costs than a producer in Ex who is excludcd from 
Fourex and can seil only in his own limited home territory. More-
over, dumping is a much more feasiblc policy for the producer 
in Fourex than for thc producer in Ex since thc fonner would 
' cut priccs only on I / 5 of his output and makc up for this cut 
on thc 4/ 5 of thc total production consumcd domestically, while 
the lattcr would bc subjccted to the revene conditions. 1f we as• 
aume a scale of costs as in the subjoincd table, and 1uppose that 
Conditiona 
Initiation .•. . .• •. . . ... .. . ....•. 
With only 11 fully dcvelopcd domcs-
tic markct availablc to a singlc 
Unit Cost in Ex 
J1 . 14 
produccr ...... .. ..... ... ... . 
W1th fully devcloped markcts in 
both countrics availablc to a 
ainglc producer ••••• • •••••••• 
J .08 
,85 
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thc cost of transport per unit in cithcr dircction is $.16, thcn 
it is clear that if thc industry werc first developed in Ex, and 
acccss to thc marlcct of Fourcx werc free, no producer in Fourex 
could cvcr become cstablished. Minimum priccs, with thc pro-
duccr in Ex supplyi ng both markcts, would bc $.8 5 per unit in 
Ex and $1.01 (.85 + .16) per unit in Fourcx. lf a prohibitive 
duty on imports werc imposed by Fourcx, the cost per unit of 
production in that country would not fall to the dclivercd pricc 
($ 1.01) at which it could otherwise bc obtained from Ex unlcss 
the producer in Fourex could secure thc markct in Ex, in which 
case it would fall considerably below (to $.94). He could securc 
this market by dumping. All he need do is beat the pricc, $1.08, 
which ia the cost per unit in Ex when production is confine·d to 
thc homc markct. A price at the Fourcx f actory of $.92- per 
unit to conaumera in Ex will bc aufficient. Sincc costs, under thcsc 
conditions, will be $.94 per unit, the loss of $.02+ per unit 
on the 1/5 of total production sold in Ex must bc compcnsatc<l 
by ¼c per unit additional price on the 4/ 5 of total production 
sold in Fourex. Any price between $.945 and $ 1.02 in Fourex, 
with dumping at a delivered price just below $1.08 in Ex, will 
yield }arger profits to the producer in Fourex, and will givc to 
consumers in both countries a chcaper supply, than could be ob-
taincd by production, for sale in home markets only, at $1.08 
and $1.02 rcspectively. 
lt would even be possible for the producer in Fourex to sell 
in both markets at a lower price than would be possible, on a non• 
dumpihg basis, with production for both markets carried on in 
Ex. lf the producer in Fourex sells at f actory for $.69- per 
unit to consumera in Ex, the product can be landcd in thc lattcr 
country at something less than $.8 5 per unit. To sell at $.69-
per unit at f actory in Fourcx involves a loss of $.2 5+ per unit 
on thc dumped aupply. This would bc compcnsatcd by an incrcasc 
of $.0625+ per unit in thc supply sold at homc. Add thia to COftt 
($,94 per unit), and thc pricc in Fourcx could still be bclow 
thc $1.01 dclivcrcd cost in Four.cx of suppli ca from Ex whcn 
thc lattcr country is producing for both markcts. 
We thua havc thc somewhat surprising rcsult of production 
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panicd by dumping, making it poasiblc for all consumers to get 
their 1upplies more cheaply than could otherwise occur. This i, 
true bccausc producers in Ex have not thc samc potcntialitic, 
in dumping as havc those in Fourcx. For eveq cent below thc 
$ 1.01 delivcrcd pricc at which the producer in Ex sclls in Fourex 
he must raisc thc pricc to his domcstic consumers above his $.8 S 
unit cost by $.04. To seil for $1.00 dclivered price per unit in 
Fourex hc must therefore get at least $.89 at home. But if thc 
produccr in F~>Urcx wcre to sell for $.89 per delivered unit in 
Ex hc could afford to takc somcthing less than $1.00 per unit 
in Fourcx. {Thc nct pricc at factory to consumcrs in Ex would 
bc $.73 per unit, a loss of $.21 per unit. This would bc com-
pcnsatcd by an increasc of $.0525 per unit over the $.94 unit 
cost on supplies sold in Fourex.) Similarly, with any other sct 
of discrimin:itory prices, consumers could be supplied at lower 
unit dclivered cost from Fourex than from Ex. 
lt should be further noted that if the price in Ex, for a 
volume of production sufficient to supply the home market only, 
should happen to be $1.10+ per unit instead of $1.08, the 
producer in Fourcx could eventually providc for both markets, 
without Jumping, at lowcr total cost than under any alternative 
method of supply. The price in Fourex would be $.94 per unit 
and, in Ex, $1.10. This would be lower than with production in 
both countries for their own markets. But even with production 
in Ex for both markcts, the $.2 5 per unit reduction to con-
sumers in Ex (unit price $.85 instead of $1.10) would be more 
than balanced by the $.07 per unit increase to the fourfold as 
many consumers in Fourex (unit price $1.01 instead of $.94). 
Protection of a comparativcly incompctent industry of declining 
unit costs as output is expandcd may therefore, in certain circum-
stanccs, not only be advantageous to consumers in the lcvying 
country but may evcntually permit such an industry, though still 
comparatively incompetent in the technical sense, to supply all 
consumcrs, taken as a whole, more cheaply than would otherwise 
be possible, and, when combined with dumping, may make it 
possiblc to seil at lower prices to every individual consumcr than 
onder any alternative distribution of production, 
CHAPTER VII 
THE FUTURE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF 
THE UNITED STATES 
PRESENT CONDITIONS UNFAVORABLE TO PROTECTION 
THE prospects of general benefit from a protectionist 
policy are, as preceding chapters have shown, much 
stronger in some environments than in others. The im-
mediate loss issuing fr0;m such a policy may somctimcs 
be expected to be more than compensatcd by accruing 
economic advantagcs in thc transfcr from a rural to an 
urban economy, from spccialization in agriculturc to a 
more widcly diversified productive structure, and in 
other situations more or less fully exemplificd in the 
history of the American Union up to the beginning of 
the twentieth century. 
There is, however, little if any excuse for protection 
in the United States at the prescnt day. Hardly any of 
the special pleas for protection developed in Chapter V 
apply to the existing situation. In so highly industrializcd 
a country, with capital as cheap as in any part of the 
world, with a great volume of manufactured exports, 
and with new manufacturing industries developing in 
free competition with other nations, the argumcnt for 
nurturing protection becomes all but ridiculous. No one 
will maintain that our manufacturing industries are still 
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strength, or that our finance is infantile, in other than a 
derisive sense. There is now no probability · whatever 
that, under any conceivable commercial policy, industry 
in the U nited States would fail to be so diversified as to 
give scope to whatever talents American citizens may 
possess. All industries important for defence are already 
fully developed within the continental area or are in-
capable of eve~ finding lodgment there. There is not the 
slightest reason for supposing that the terms of trade 
on which the United States carries on its commerce with 
foreign nations are so improved by protection as to com-
pensate the loss from diversion of effort to relatively 
disadvantageous industries. Similarly, the protection as-
sociated with the development of pursuits presenting a 
negatively inclined social or entrepreneurial cost curve 
( decreasing cost per unit) has probably exhausted the 
possibilities available, while changing comparative com-
petence has made it unlikely that a reversal of the policy 
of prohibitory duties would, in the long run, be attended 
by any losses. W e may at present, indeed, be well within 
the stage of rising cost per unit of output as concentra-
tion of population proceeds. 
Natural resources, moreover, are now somewhat more 
likely tobe conserved through a liberal than through a 
restrictive commercial policy .1 If agriculture is a pecul-
iar ly desirable industry for a country to have, its pros-
perity in the United States would be much more as-
sured under a generally liberal trade policy than through 
an attempt to cover certain branches of agriculture by 
1 This is cvidenccd by thc agitation for protectivc duties on certain 
important mineral raw materials of which wc havc hitherto bccn 
exportcn. Their continued frec import would tend to prcvcnt :u 
rapid a use of thc homc supplics of thcsc wasting assets as would 
takc place undcr . protcction. · 
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protection. As long as our great agricultural staples are 
on an export basis, the level of farmer income, even in 
the branches of agricultural pro_duction in which the 
country fails to provide fully for its own consumption, 
cannot over any extendcd pcriod rise above that ob-
tained by producers of agricultural exports. For as soon 
as it does, a movement out of cxport crops and into the 
protected lines is initiatcd, and continucd until no morc 
is to be earned in one crop than in anothcr. 2 
Protection, in general, unless accompanied by monop-
oly, does not raise the incomes even of the protccted 
producers above those of producers in non-protected 
lines, and it always tends to lower incomes as a whole. 
Protection simply makes it possible for producers in rela-
tively incompetent branches of industry to secure the 
going rate of return. lt does so by lowering the real 
return in the relatively more competent branches of 
industry more than it raises the real return in the lcss 
competent. The strongest ground of complaint by ex-
porting industries against the levy or increase of cffec-
tive protection for other industries is not that the cost 
of living is increased thereby without a corresponding 
increase of income. This is true for e<Ueryone, including 
those who shift to some one of the newly protected 
industries; and, on this score, exporting industries have 
no special grievance.8 But effective protection, by shut-
ting out foreign goods and thus automatically cutting 
1 Land values, however, may be affectcd; and the landowner, 
whether he be a farmer or not, might benefit, at the cxf::nse of thc 
population at !arge, from a policy of agricultural protcction. 
1 The rise in the cost of living tends, howevcr, to rcsult in a some-
what less than proportionate rise in money wages in the export in-
dustries, and this increase in the entrepreneur•s costs cannot readily be 
compensated by an enhancement of the prices at which exponed 
products are 10ld. 
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off a foreign market for exports, forces existmg .ex-
porters either to take a cut in prices which -will result 
in selling abroad the same volume of goods for a 
greatly reduced money return or to abandon part of the 
export market altogether. 
In times when population is rapidly increasing and 
when all existing lines of production are therefore be-
ing expanded, the restriction upon exports involved 
in protection tends to express itself only in a retardation 
of the rate of growth rather than in any absolute de-
cline. But when, as at present, population has ceased 
to show a rapid rate of augmentation, absolute declines 
in certain existing export industries, among which agri-
culture is prominent, can seemingly be avoided only by 
the transition to a more liberal tariff policy. 
RELATIONS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
The pressure, in restriction of exports, of a policy of 
protective ·import duties increases as a country moves 
into a net creditor position on international financial ac-
count. International commercial policy bears a definite 
relationship to international finance. Whenever, in any 
country, net interest payments to foreign countries are 
in excess of net current borrowing from abroad, or when-
ever net new lending to foreign countries surpasses in 
volume net receipts of interest from external sources, and 
the country in question is thus subject, on capital account, 
to an excess of claims on its currency over its own claims 
on foreign currencies, the condition of solvency is a cor-
responding net credit in the other international economic 
transactions of the given country. An excess of current 
cxports of goods a~d services over similar imports is 
FUTURE AMERICAN POLICY III 
called for. Restraints on imports are then in line 
with the trend of economic forces, and a protectionist 
policy at such a time is much lcss likely to provoke dis-
turbance than in · the contrary situation. 
However, when a country, either because its net bor-
rowing abroad is in excess of its current net interest pay-
ments to foreign countries or because its net reccipts of 
interest from abroad are in excess of its new cxternal 
lending, has a net current excess of claims on capital ac-
count, the condition of international solvency is a corre-
sponding net deficit of claims in its othcr international 
economic transactions. An excess of current imports of 
goods and services over similar exports is called for. 
To then impose widespread rcstraints on imports and 
thus attempt to lower the ratio of exports to imports, is 
to fight the trend of economic forces and is likely to lead 
to financial and economic disaster. 
ADJUSTMENT OF POLICY TO CHANGING CONDITIONS 
The history of the United States clearly illustratcs 
these propositions. The settlement of the West, with the 
building of roads, railroads, and canals in the decades 
between 1820 and the Civil War, set up a demand for 
capital which resulted in heavy borrowing abroad and 
therefore in a tendency toward an excess of commodity 
imports over commodity exports. In these circumstances 
the highly protective tariff system inaugurated in 18 I 6 
began to play a ·very vicious röle, and the consequent 
drive for lower duties resulted in a progressive liberali-
zation of our tariff schedules until the outbreak of hos-
tilities in I 861. Such a liberal tariff policy facilitated the 
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Foreign borrowing was sharply curtailed a(ter the 
panic of 1873' and, since interest payments on old loans 
were still required, the necessity for an excess of mer-
chandise imports was changed into the necessity for a 
surplus of merchandise exports. is The policy of thor-
oughgoing restrictions on imports pursued in thi~; coun-
try since Civil War days was not, therefore, entirely in-
appropriate to the general situation existing from I 873 
till after the World War. 
This does not mean that either a free trade or a pro-
tectionist policy is inevitable in certain situations and 
impossible in others. Either may be followed under 
almest any external conditions. The ratio of commodity 
imports to exports will, through movements in relative 
national price levels, automatically ad just itself to what-
ever commercial policy may be adopted. U nder a free 
trading regime the import-export ratio will be flexible, 
while under protection it will be much more rigid. How-
ever, where capital movements require a surplus of com-
modity imports in any given country, and such a country 
lays drastic restrictions on the entry of foreign goods, ad-
justment will ordinarily occur through a decline in sales 
of exports sufficient to keep the ratio of imports to ex-
ports high even though imports are greatly curtailed 
by the restrictive policy imposed. If, nevertheless, im-
ports are excluded wholly, or to .such a degree as to 
amount in value to less than the net income due on 
• This panic may well have bcen, in large measure, induccd by the 
contradiction between a net borrowing position on current capital 
items and the shift in commercial policy, introduccd during the 
Civil War, toward restrictive measures against imports. 
• Other factors, such as the dedine in the American mercantile 
marine and the growth of "tourism" among Americans, later worked 
toward the aame rault. 
1; 
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capital account, an international financial collapse is in-
evitable. For, cven if exports should thcn sink to zcro, 
there could be no excess of imports adcquate to effect 
the payments on capital account due to the country in · 
question. 
Under a liberal commercial policy there is no analo-
gous difficulty when the items in capital account call for 
an equilibrating excess of commodity and service ex-
ports. Relative national price levels will then readily 
ad just themselves so as to provoke a more than even 
ratio of exports to imports whatever the volume of the 
imports may be. As far as reconciliation of the phenom-
ena of international trade with those of international 
finance is concerned, therefore, a liberal commercial 
policy is always fitting, while a protectionist policy is 
merely less inappropriate to a situation in which an ex-
cess of exports on merchandise account is required to 
balance an excess of imports on capital account than 
it is to the converse status. 
The large loans madc to forcign countrics during 
and after the W orld War acccntuatcd the tendcncy to-
ward an excess of commodity exports ovcr imports, and 
the protective policy agair:1st imports therefore remained 
for a time comparatively innocuous. Rising interest pay-
ments, however, and a decline in the disposition of 
Americans to continue foreign lending on the scale of 
the early post-war years, have completely altered the 
situation. 
The United States is now in the later phases of a 
cycle of internation~l capital movements in which it 
appeared first as a net borrower, then as a net payer of 
interest in excess of new borrowings ( later attended by 
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and finally as a net recipient of interest.6 The net excess 
of foreign claims to U nited States currency qver Ameri-
can claims in the opposite direction which marked the 
international financial account from 1873 almost to the 
present is the basis for the notion of the "traditional" 
character of an excess of commodity exports over im-
ports, and of a highly protective tariff policy, in the 
United States. The turning point was apparently reached 
in 1929. lt .is true that, if the people of the United 
States resume foreign lending on a scale sufficient, along 
with interest payments and amortization on American 
securities hcld by foreigners, to outweigh such receipts 
of intcrcst, dividends, and amortization paymcnts as 
accruc to thcm on obligations of forcigncrs, the exccss 
of Amcrican exports on mcrchandise account will tcnd 
for some time to continue. This, however, does not 
seem likely and is, in any case, incapable of indefinite 
extension. If the much more probable decline in Amer-
ican foreign lending ( and other overseas transmission 
of capital items from this country), relative to interest 
and other inßowing capital items, now takes place, an 
excess of imports on mcrchandise account seems bound 
• In the ycars prior to 19:29 the trend, apart from the very large 
foreign investmcnts by re~idcnts of the United States, was toward 
an incrcasing ratio of imports to exports. lt would have bcen well if 
the atructure of American and foreign industry had bcen gradually 
adapted to this situation. Instead of dcveloping an economic struc-
ture in the United States consonant with a net import status, and an 
economic atructure abroad consonant with a net export status in the 
debtor countries, American foreign lending, on a suddenly expanded 
acale, was of such a volume aa to promote a trend in national eco-
nomic atructurea quite contrary to that requisite to long-run equilib-
rium. The result was disastcr :u soon as the volume of American 
loans declined. The various national industrial atructures having 
been developed in exactly the opposite direction to that appropriate 
to the evolving aituation, the difficulties of preaent adjustment are 
extreme. 
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to occur at an early date and, in any event, can appar-
ently be postponed to no very distant future. 
There is no reason_ why it should be postponed. The 
artificial restriction of imports runs counter to a funda-
mental financial trend in the opposite direction,1 in-
creases rather than reduces friction, and not only prc-
vents the growth of exports but may imposc upon them 
an absolute decline. Where supply is inclastic, as in 
agricultural output, this dccline is at first likely to take 
the form of so sharp a drop in values that the same, 
or even an increased, volume of exports will be worth 
less than before. Providcd highly protcctivc tariffs are 
maintaincd, it is only, thcrcforc, aftcr a long pcriod. of 
low priccs and distrcss that cxports . will bc sufficicntly 
diminishcd ( through thc climination of somc of thc 
suppliers by bankruptcy) to pcrmit export priccs again 
to rise to the level appropriate to the new equilibrium. 
Higply protective tariffs in the U nited States will 
now, in all probability, thus effect a collapsc in cxports 
disproportionate to the limitation of imports, or will 
make international financial payments impossible, or 
both.8 A certain amount of imports will be required 
to furnish solvent forcigners with the means of payment 
of their more or less fixed obligations on fina·ncial ac-
count with the U nited States. The more we restrict 
imports the nearer we shall get to the point where all 
' In so far as interest and dividends arc being, or will be, paid on 
American foreign investmcnts to an amount grcater than thc annual 
volume of new foreign lending by citizens of this country, 
1 The one great possibility of adj ustmcnt, with the maintenancc 
of high protection, is a wholly unprecedentcd expansion of "tourism" 
on the part of Amcricans. The growth of American travcl abroad 
aincc the World War has, however, gone a long way toward effecting 
adjustment between the conflicting policies of expansion of com-
modity exporta and restriction of comr,iodity imports of ihc ordi-
nary type. 
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of thc proceeds of the imports which we still permit will 
be necessary for this purpose. W e should then be travel-
ing the road toward complete elimination of exports, 
and the international price situation would so ad just it-
self as automatically to bring this state of affairs ever 
closer to realization.· So great an absolute reduction in 
exports, however, could be accomplished only at enor-
mous cost in rendering existing fixed capital worthless, 
in unemployment, and in all similar frictional losses. 
An indispensable prerequisite to a liberal tariff policy 
is a revolution in the popular attitude toward imports. 
Instead of looking upon imports as a more or less neces-
sary evil we must be prepared to welcome them as the 
sole rational end of foreign trade. Exports are the 
means of providing for imports and, from the national 
point of vicw, thcy have no othcr function. A tariff 
policy, grotcsquely named "scicntific," which, through 
the levy of a protective duty on potential imports, seeks 
a general equalization of costs of production ( that is, of 
costs of delivery in the U nited States), is absurd. lt is 
only because costs, and prices, on some products are 
lower abroad than in the U nited States ( with its corol-
lary of costs and prices of other products being lower 
in the United States than abroad) that there is any ad-
vantage in carrying on foreign trade. No more perverted 
notion than that the way to prosperity is to make it 
necessary to spend more than the minimum to secure a 
given product has ever affiicted a great nation. 
MEASUREMENT OF THE TARIFF BURDEN 
To estimate with precision the burden of protection 
in the U nited States upon the consumer ( to say nothing 
of that on the producer of exports) is, for reasons which 
i 1 
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cannot here be taken up, a matter of great difficulty. 
Some of the attempts at such an estimate, by high 
officials of administrations of the not distant past, were 
hopelessly na'ive or deliberately disingenuous. lt was 
alleged, for instance, that the "average" rate of duty 
might be found by taking the percentage relationship 
between total duties collccted and the total value of 
existing imports. The absurdity of this procedure will be 
obvious when we reflect that certain goods come in free 
of duty, and that if, on all other goods, protcctive duties 
were raised to absolutely prohibitive levels, there would 
be no duties .collected at all. On the basis of the official 
reasoning we should then reach thc conclusion that, in 
the prcsence of a widc range of dutics so high as alto• 
gcther to cxcludc thc articlcs affcctcd, thc "avcragc" 
rate of duty was zcro. · 
A "rcfincmcnt" of this proccdurc takcs thc total of 
duties collected as a pcrcentage of the total value of 
dutiable products actually imported and declares this 
to be the "average" rate of duty. This is, in truth, an 
average of a sort but it is very far from expressing the 
gene·ral height of tariff schedules. On most dutiable 
products our tariff schedules have for long years been 
practically prohibitive. On some thcy were not. The 
lower the duty, relative to the price of the product in 
bond, the more likely are imports to occur. Thc tend-
ency, therefore, is for the only duties collectcd to be 
those which form a very moderate percentage of the 
value of the product concerncd. The ratio of total collcc• 
tions to total value of goods imported would thcrefore 
be low when a policy of almost complcte exclusion of 
imports, through a gcncrally towcring range of protec-
tive duties, is followed. Such a ratio could easily fall 
as a result of an increa.se in duties which prevented the 
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II8 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
import of commodities which had formerly been able to 
surmount a somewhat lower barrier. 
lt might seem possible to compute the real height of 
a tariff schedule by taking an average of the actually 
existing rates. lt makes no real difference, ·however, 
whether a rate is 100 per cent or 1000 per cent if both 
are prohibitive. A rate of 5 per cent, moreover, might 
exclude some products, \\'.hereas 500 per cent would 
not exclude others. The real question is not the absolute 
height of the rate but whether or not it excludes the 
import of the whole or a part of the domestic con-
sumption of the commodity affected. 
lt has, in the past, been officially urged that our pro-
tective wall is not really high because a very large pro-
portion of our imports comes in free.9 The question can 
again be raised whether, with a limited free list, with 
all other products subject to prohibitively high rates, 
and all of such imports as occur therefore entering free 
of 'duty, we should conclude that we had no tariff 
barriers. lt must be clear that the reason why about two-
thirds of our existing imports have been those on the 
free list is that these are the only goods which we have 
been disposed to let in at all.10 
A high proportion of free to dutiable imports could 
never show that a tariff policy was liberal but rather that 
it was practically· exclusive of all those things on which 
duties were imposed. The burden of a protective duty 
must not be determined on the basis of the goods which 
• These are almost entirely raw materials of indQstry or food 
products not produced in the United States. Their free entry ia per• 
fectly consistent with-nay, even an expresaion of-a thoroughgoing 
protectionist policy. 
» Of the dutiable importa, sugar yields a major part of the 
revenuea collected1 and, at present prices of .augar {1933), thc duty 




FUTURE AMER.ICAN POLICY 119 
come in but on that of thosc which are shut out. To the 
extent that goods come in over a duty thcre is no pro-
tection, nor, so far as this part of the supply is con-
cerned, is there any national burden. The consumer pays 
more but the govcrnment gets the difference and can 
presumably relax the pressure of other taxes corre-
spondingly. 
But, · under effective protection, the consumer pays 
more, the government gets nothing, and the producer 
makes no more than he could make in such export in-
dustries as would develop under free trading condi-
tions. The extra price paid by the consumer is eaten up 
· in high costs. The real burdert is the difference bctwecn 
the total real income which could be respectively ob-
tained under a comparatively self-sufficing and a special-
iz.ed system. The real height of a protective tariff wall 
can be gauged, even approximately, only by the diffcr-
ence in the pricc of any given commodity as it is in the 
protcctcd markct and as it would bc in that markct if 
the duty wcre removed. 
THE POSSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL LIBERALISM IN TARIFF 
POLICY 
There is no ground for believing that the adoption of 
a really liberal tariff policy in .this country would do 
other than improve our standard of living. Neither in 
theory nor in fact is there any support for the notion 
that we could now or in the future improve, or even 
maintain, that standard by means of tariffs. This is 
true whether or not other countries adopt, maintain, or 
renounce a protectionist policy. Holland, one of the 
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maintained a substantially free trade position in the face 
of rising tariff barriers in the outside world and is cer-
tainly none the worse for it. Its prosperity, in fact, is in 
large measure due to its liberal commercial policy. If 
little Holland, without particularly good natural re-
sources of any kind and surrounded by countries with 
lower wages and standards of living, can prosper under 
a regime of l~w tariffs or free trade while most of the 
world is protectionist, no larger country need have any 
fears of doing likewise. The notion that it is impossible 
to pursue a liberal tariff policy in an otherwise protec-
tionist world is quite without foundation. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the history of British commercial 
policy. Regardless of reciprocity, any given country 
could reduce its protective schedules quite as much to its 
own advantage as to that of other countries . 
lt is true that a measure of self-sufficiency is auto-
matically imposed on any country, however liberal its 
commercial policy, as a result of the protective tariffs 
of others; but this is no reason for an exaggeration of 
the self-sufficiency by "protective" action on the part 
of the country so affected. This, as someone has said, is 
to block up one's own harbors for no better reason than 
that other people persist in putting obstructions in 
theirs.11 
Let us but clearly grasp the facts: 
( 1) that national prosperity is essentially depend-
ent upon the production of the home popula-
11 The absurd contradiction of eff orts to reduce the cost of land and 
ocean transport, through improvements in railroad or marine engi-
neering, and of aimultaneous increases in tariff barriera to keep out 
goods the import of which ia made possible _by auch improvements, 
has often been noted. This, however, is only one of many auch 
con tradictions. 
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tion and is not adversely influenced by the 
competition of foreign countries; 
(2) that prices and wages, whether at home or 
abroad, are, when taken separately, of no 
relevance to prosperity but that the significant 
thing is the relationship between them; 
(3) that wages can be high relative to prices only 
as a result of high productivity; 
(4) that low wages are a mark of low productivity 
and, therefore, of rather high money cost of 
production; 
(5) that exports and imports go hand in hand 
unless, indeed, we give our exports away or 
receive our imports as gifts from foreign 
countries, in which case we should be respec-
tively lowering and raising our real incomes; 
( 6) that buying dear and sclling cheap is bad 
business for a nation as for an individual; 
and we shall have banished the illusion that we can 
be ir..ade prosperous by fiat. 
lt is doubtful whether it is even desirable to attempt 
to protect good working conditions against sweated for-
eign competition. A given trade can, of course, be ruined 
by such competition, but this is impossible for industry 
in general inasmuch as concentration ( abroad) on such 
an industry involves relative deficiency of output of 
other products in the countries concerned and therefore 
a market for the exports of the country with high labor 
standards.12 No country need therefore either wait on 
11 lt will take, of course, only a small volumc of cxporta to pay for 
thc comparativcly low priced imports made by swcatcd labor, Ex-
. pansion of industries producing for homc consumption ( or of ex-
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others in the adoption of an advanced labor code or 
protect itself by tariff duties against the products of 
such countries. Whether it is worth while to protect a 
given industry against sweated competition raises ex-
actly the same issues as those which center around the 
question of protection against foreign competition in 
general. Such protection can be justified only on one or 
more of the special grounds treated in Chapter V. 
An advanced code of working conditions does not 
influence, in one way or the other, the international 
competitive power of the country in which it is in effect. 
Such a code may very probably diminish the daily out-
put per worker. If this is not so, competitive power is, 
prima facie, increased.18 If, however, it is so, and daily 
output falls, the worker will be exchanging better work-
ing conditions for a necessarily lower real daily w~ge. 
The price and wage level in the country concerned will 
sooner or later come into line with foreign prices and 
wages, as affected respectively by foreign exchange rates 
and productivity, and it will be no more or less difficult 
to compete with foreign production than before the 
adoption of improved working conditions.H 
u This situation, however, will not persist sincc the improvemcnt 
in productive power will soon be attended with higher real, and 
probably higher money, wages. Competitive power, thcrefore, will 
ultimately be unchanged. 
16 If, in the conditions cited, momy wages are raised, the money 
will necessarily havc less purchasing power and, provided there is 
no such change in the value of money abroad, will exchange against 
other cu.rrencies on a lower level than before: Real wage, and other, 
incomes can be paid only out of real output 
The point is pertinent with respect to the· program of the National 
Recovery Administration and agitation for increased duties, There 
is no logical connection between the policy of raising prices and 
money wages on the one hand and the desirability of a higher pro• 
tective tariff on the other. If, by thc pricc-raising policy, the intcrnal 
valuc of thc dolla.r ia reduccd relative to the internal value of other 
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lt is no doubt well worth while to attempt to secure 
concerted action among different nations in the improve-
ment of working conditions. This is desirable on humani-
tarian grounds and makes the transition easier for all 
concerned. Concertcd action, howevcr, is- by no means 
necessary, and no country could suffer any permanent 
in jury through adoption, in isolation, of an advanced 
code of working conditions.115 
THE PAINS OF TRANSITION 
Though protection can now do the U nited States but 
little good, and is undoubtedly working harm, the tran-
sition to a more liberal policy cannot be painlcss. The 
economic structure which has been devcloped under pro-
tection could not survive intact under free trade. lt is 
indeed probable that the transformation, in ad justment 
currencies, its external val ue-that is to say, exchange rates-must 
sooner or later, either automatically or by conscious d ircction, undcrgo 
a substantially equal dcprcciation. (At the momcnt of writing thc 
latter is the greatcr of the two.) In spite of highcr dollar prices and 
costs of production, any given tariff duty ten<ls, thereforc, to offer 
precisely the same protection as it has always done. At the very 
moment that American produccrs are claiming that their higher 
monetary costs require the exclusion of forci g-n goods, thc cry in 
foreign countries is that the external dcpreciation of the dollar 
makes it impo~sible for enterprisers to compcte with their American 
rivals. The fact is that there is no inherent tendcncy in the present 
American policy toward increased national sclf-sufficiency. If such 
a movement develops it will be because the proponcnts of protcction 
will have succeedcd in exploiting thc popular confusion to thcir own 
cnds. · 
11 The qucstion may be asked why this is truc of nations and not 
truc of the plants within any g-iven national industry or of the sevcral 
sections in any onc country. Thc answer is that national wage levels 
arc automatically adj usted to onc another in preservation ·of inter-
national equilibrium, while there is no such adjustment as between 
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to a liberal commercial policy, would be much less 
drastic than is ordinarily supposed, since the number 
and importance of domestically produced transportable 
products which are substantially dearer in the U nited 
States than in foreign countries is not great. There 
are industries, however, which would suffer severely 
and a few which might be almost completely eliminated. 
This is the condition prerequisite to the expansion of 
those industries in which this country has a comparative 
as well as absolute competence. No possible good can 
issue out of a reduction of protective duties except 
through prior in jury to the protected industry . 
This is hard doctrine for the Congressman, especially 
if he happens to come from a district which would be 
hurt by the removal of protection. lt is useless, how-
evcr, to talk about a more liberal commcrcial policy un-
less we are ready to face this fact. Those who urge re-
du~tion of duties only where this can be clone without 
any in jury to established American industries might as 
well save their breath. Thcir proposals, if carried out, 
would change some rates on the statute books but would 
have no other effect whatever. If trade is to be made 
more free some Amcrican industries must be in jured. 
Such injury is at oncc the neccssary cffcct of any real 
lowcring of tariff barriers and is the condition of im-
proved foreign purchasing power, the expansion of 
American export industries, and a more productive 
specializ.ation in lieu of the less productive Jack-of-all-
trades type of economy. 
W e must make up our minds that we cannot remove 
a discrimination without damaging those who have been 
the beneficiaries thereof. W e should be serving the pub-
lic interest both by the abandonment of the discrimina-
tion itself and by the improvement in productive powers 
1 1 
FUTURE AMERICAN POLICY 125 
which we should thereby sooner or later attain, but this 
cannot be done without cost to vested interests. The 
cost, however, could be reduced to a minimum if the 
process were made gradual. By revcrsing the trend of 
our policy, by moving almost insensibly toward a more 
liberal regime, by effecting steady reductions in duties 
over a period of years, we could effect the transition 
from protection by attrition rather than by violcnce. 
The opportunities for profit in export, and in domestic 
industries not subject to import, would be improvcd. 
The capital invested in protected industries subjected 
to declining profits would not be rendered wholly use-
less but would not be replaced on as large a scale, if 
at all, when it wore out. On the other hand, invcstmcnts 
of capital in the industries favored by thc changc in com-
mercial policy would increase. Similarly there would 
be a gradual transition of labor from the dcclining to 
the advancing industries. This would, in the main, be 
effected by a diversion, away from the dcclining and 
toward the growing industries, of workers cmcrging 
from adolescer.ce into productive activity. Such diversion 
of labor and capital would yield nothing but bencfits in 
the developmcnt of the comparativcly compctcnt at thc 
expcnse of the comparatively incompctcnt industrics. 
The important thing, thcrcforc, is to change thc 
direction of commercial policy. E ven this is an Hercu-
lean task. The in jury to established industries will be 
patent, while the benefits to other industries and to the 
national economy as a whole, though greater in the long 
run, will be more or less obscured. lt may well be 
asked, therefore, whether such a change is politically 
possible. lt is certain that any brusque change would be 
followed by violent reaction. A sudden great lowering 
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issue in still greater dislocation than is now ( 1933) pre-
vailing. Since a tariff policy should be detcrmincd on 
Iong-run considerations only, it is vcry dubious practice 
eithcr to raise or to lower tariffs as a eure for business 
depressions. The depressions issue from maladjustments 
and there is likelihood that a shift in tariff rates will 
increase them. 
What is needed now is a shift in the national opinion 
in favor of a more libenl tariff policy to be realized as 
soon as may be. There should be strong popular opposi-
tion to any increase in general tariff schedules. There 
should, at the same time, be a determination to lower 
them gradually whenever the busincss situation is such 
as to absorb, without undue strain, the immediate shock 
involved. If schedules are to be lowered there must be 
a complete abandonment of the pseudo-scientific doctrine 
of levying tariffs to "equalize costs of production" 
( t:qualized delivered costs in domestic markets of duty-
paid foreign and of domestic goods). 
N othing could be more ridiculous than the panic 
which has often been manifested in official circles at the 
· discovery that imports are "invading" our markets at 
prices below those at which they could be produced in 
this country. How else could they come in? The very 
use of the word "invade" is cvidence of the psycho-
logical pcrvcrsion which attcnds discussion of this topic. 
Thc vocabulary of war has no placc in sound cconomic 
thinking, though it has unfortunatcly found strong 
lodgment in popular thought. Unless we learn that, 
in war, one, or more likely both, of the parties must lose, 
whereas, in specialized production and trade, both 
parties are likcly to gain, we shall go on indefinitely 
fighting more or less overt trade wars which, like their 
still more serious political counterpart, are ruinous to 
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all concerned and have even less justification in any 
sanely conceived social order. 
THE DUTY OF CONGRESS 
As long as protection is continued it is incumbent 
upon Congress fo justify, to itself at least, a policy of 
discrimination. In the early days of protection in the 
United States the issue was clean cut. Rightly or 
wrongly, the dominant group was of the opinion that 
it would be well to increase the share of manufacturing 
industry in our national economic structure and was 
ready to adopt conscious discrimination to secure this 
end. The discrimii·.ation against the agricultural interest 
was deeply resentcd in the South and, up to the time of 
the Civil War, the struggle for and against protective 
tariffs on manufactured goods was bittcrly waged be-
tween the two sections. Success veered now to one side 
and now to the other. The triumph of the North in the 
Civil War settled the matter for the time being and, 
when the South again began to play its proper role in 
the affairs of the nation, it did not spcak with one voice. 
The situation had changed in two respects . . Thc South 
was no longer purely agricultural and, in the nation , 
at !arge, the issue was no longer sharply drawn bctwcen 
agriculturc and manufacturing industry. In some lincs 
of agriculturc import dutics could,. now give cffcctive 
protcction, while to many lincs of m:rnufacture thcy 
had ceascd to bc a bencfit and become a burdcn. The 
recognition of this fact, however, was slow. The result 
was complete confusion. The tariff, no longer the means 
to a very definite end which it could realize, began to be 
worshiped as an end in itself. lt became the palladium 
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which might conceivably benefit through a protective 
duty, while those who were being harmed · were fre-
quently not conscious of the source of their troubles. 
Advocates of a far-flung protective tariff had a tremen-
dous strategic advantage in the political arena, an advan-
tage which they still possess. lt was always possible to 
point to industries which would be benefited by further 
protection or ruined by its withdrawal. The benefits were 
concentrated but the frequently far greater evils had be-
come diffused and therefore obscure. 
The result was that the plane of discussion fell to a 
low level. Alexander Hamilton and his followers, with 
the definite objective of increasing manufacture at the 
expense of agriculture, were ready to give the candle 
for the game and knew exactly why they were discrimi-
nating between industries.16 But who knows nowadays 
why we so discriminate? Protection of any given indus-
try- or group of industries is an understandable policy if, 
for more or less cogent reasons, that industry or group 
of industries is desired at the expense of others. But pro-
tection for protection's sake is folly. 
If our government continues to pursue a policy of 
interference with the free course of trade, it is at least 
under the obligation of knowing its objective. lt can 
foster any industry it pleases but only at the expense of 
other industries and immediately, and probably in the 
lang run also, at the expense of the population at !arge~ 
lt should always have a clear answer to the question 
why it should favor those industries where protection 
can .be made effective at the expense of those where 
1i1 In Hamilton'• day agriculture was relatively so etrong ae to be 
able to atand thia discrimination without auffering unduly. Thi1 ia 
now far from being the caae. 
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it cannot. There will always be industries which "need» 
protection. This "need" is indubitable evidcnce of rela4 
tive incompetence. The real qucstion is whcther the 
country so greatly needs such indus~ries as to bc ready 
to subsidizc them at thc cost of the population at large 
and to the detriment of the growth of industries of 
superjor competence. 
This question does not turn on having more or less 
economic activity but on the distribution of our human 
and material resources so as to produce, on the one 
band, more than our consumption of those commoditics 
in which we are specially apt and lcss of those in which 
we are not, or, on the other hand, to effect at great cx-
pense an equalization in thc homc production and con-
sumption of each and every commodity. lt should al-
ways be borne in mind that if we produce more of our 
own consumption we shall consume more of our own 
production, that is, we shall cut down on exports. · 
The answer to the question whether we should pro-
duce more or less of 6ur own consumption and, correla-
tively, consume more or less of our own production, is 
the answer to the tariff problem. Is forcign tradc advan-
tageous? If so, can we have too much of this good thing? 
And if we can have too much, what is the optimum 
volume? What goods should we produce at home, and 
in what proportion to our total .consumption? The very 
consideration of these questions would rcmove thc tariff 
controversy from the atmosphere of ignorancc, preju-
dice, and special privilege in which it is now immersed, 
and would force a judgment on specific duties which 
would have at least some relation to reality and would 
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THE CLARIFICATION OF POLICY . 
Assuming an attempt at general protection to be 
abandoncd, Congress might .nore or lcss rationally seek 
to protect this or that product in full or in part. lt 
cannot protcct all; it cannot protcct any except at the 
expense of others. lnstead of imposing upon the Tariff 
Commission · the 'futile task of finding, if possible, the 
difference in costs of production of any given commodity 
at home and abroad,17 Congress should state an intel-
ligible policy and put upon the Commission the task of 
finding the rates· which will realize the will of the leg• 
islature. 
Certain commodities, as now, it will no doubt be the 
will of Congress to admit free of duty or subject to 
levies for revenue purposes only.18 Here the appropri-
ate policy is clear and needs no special study. With re• 
spect to other commodities, such as sugar, Congress 
may desire to have part of the domestic consumption 
produced at home. The decision should then. be made 
either ( 1) to preserve the present absolute volume of 
home production, ( 2) to preserve the present ratio of 
home production to total consumption, or (3) to so 
alter conditions as to augment or diminish the absolute 
or relative share of consumption grown at home. The 
Tariff Commission might then be given the task of 
1
' Futile because the object is to levy a duty which will preclude 
the import of the commodity in question. This result could be ob-
tained without any costly investigation by at once levying a clearly 
prohibitive duty. Such a duty would have precisely the aame effect 
aa if it had been "scientifically" determined. 
11 Such duties would be accompanied by internal excisea of equal 
height wherever, without such excises, they would have a tendency 
to atimulate home production and thus diminish revenue. 
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determining the rate which would best carry out the 
will of Congress thus exprcsscd. 
Finally, commodities which Congrcss dccms it best 
to havc domcstically produccd in thc f ull mcasurc of 
homc consumption offor no difficultic8 with rcspcct to 
tariff ratcs. Thc rate mig ht bc sc.:t at alrnost any lcvd. 
Howcvcr high it mig ht be, it could do no morc than 
prevent import; and, providcd thcre is intcrnal compe-
tition, the price of the product will be dctcrmined by 
that competition and not by the duty. In case of uncon-
scionable exploitation by a domestic monopoly Congress 
could set the duty low enough to offcr the thrcat of for-
eign compctition at prices not bcyond all rcason. Such 
rates would not be difficult to establish. 
If Congress were faced with the task of taking thought 
on its commercial policy rather than on spccific rates of 
duty and if it were moved to consider exactly what 
proportion of the consumption of any given product 
it wishes to have produced at home, we might expect 
more rational action than we now gct. lf, in the coursc 
of time, its experience should clcarly show what is in 
fact the case, that thc relative expansion of any industry 
under the ~gis of a protective tariff is accompanicd by a 
corresponding relative contraction of some more com-
petent industry, the urge to pilc tariff Ossas on Pelions 
might perhaps languish. We might cvcn cventually get 
a recognition of the benefits of a policy of free imports. 
Until, however, the horror which low-priced imports 
evoke has been dissipated and until we are ready, in 
general„ to welcome imports ( at as low a price as they 
can be obtained) as important contributions to out pros-
perity, a rational commercial policy is impossible. 
Production is only a means to the end of consumption. 
Protection, in general, represents a bad choice of means 
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to that end. Forgetting that work is but the necessary 
cost preliminary to the securing of commodities, that 
it is the commodities, not the work, that we are after, 
and fallaciously imagining that impÖrts reduce the vol-
ume of work "available," we have been led into the 
supreme folly of making every effort, by expert, to rid 
ourselves of goods ( almost regardless of payment as a 
national process), 19 and, by restriction of imports, actually 
to prevent the acquisition of any quid pro quo.20 
11 Individual exporters, of course, expcct payment. But this pay-
ment frequently comes indirectly, but none the less truly, from 
their own compatriots through foreign loans, repayment of which 
is hindered by the national policy. From the national point of view 
this is simply giving goods away. 
10 M uch of this confusion ariscs from erroncous notions associated 
with the "bal:mce of traue'' which cannot be bctter illustrated than 
by a quotation from Bastiat's "Sophisms.» 
"A mcrchant fri end of mine having carried through two trans-· 
actions with vastly differing results, I was curious enough to com-
pare in this matter the accountancy of the counting-house with that 
of the custom-house, as interpretcd öy M. Lestiboudois with the 
saoction of our six hundred legislators. 
"Monsieur T .•. dispatched a ship from Havre to the United 
St,tes, laden with French goods, chicfly those known as articks tk 
Paris, amounting to 200,000 francs. This was the figure declared 
at the custom-house. By the time it arrived at New Orleans the 
cargo had incurred 10 per cent. charges and paid 30 per cent. 
duty, bringing the total up to 280,000 francs. lt was sold at a 
profit of 20 per cent., say 40,000 francs, and produced in all 32.0, 
ooo francs, which the consignce converted into cotton. This cotton 
had furthcr to bear an additional 10 per cent. for transport, assur-
ance, commission, etc.; 10 that, on cntering Havrc, the new cargo 
amounted to 352,000 francs, and this was thc figure cntered in 
thc custom-house statement. Finally, Monsieur ••• realised a further 
ao per cent. profit on this retum cargo, that is, 70,400 francs; in 
other words, the cotton sold for 422,400 francs. 
"If Monsieur Lestiboudois so desires, I will send him an extract 
from Monsieur T ••• 's books. He will there sec set down at thc 
credit s· de of the pro fit anJ. loss account, that is to say as gains, 
two cntrics, onc of 40,000 francs, the other of 70,400 francs, and 
FUTURE AMERICAN POLICY 133 
We have retraced the steps toward the self-sufficiency 
which our forefathers so gladly, and rationally, aban-
doned. We have long since accomplished the original 
purpose for which tariffs were levicd, and we now retain 
them, to our own hurt, for no clearly understood pur-
pose whatever. Our modern tariff schedules have been 
built up in absence of thought on the part of the popu-
lace in general but, on the part of the beneficiaries, with 
an exact knowlcdge of what thcy wantcd and a swccp-
ing disrcgard of the intercst of thc nation at largc. lt is 
high time that the national interest were fully con-
sidered. 
Monsieur T . .. feels quite surc that his accounts do not mislead him 
in this matter, 
"Yet what do the custom-house rcturns tel1 Monsieur Lestiboudois 
rcgarding this transaction~ They tel1 him that France has exported 
to the valuc of 200,000 francs and imported to the value of 3 s 2,000 
francs, whence the honourable deputy conclu<lcs 't/,~ s/1e /tAs ex-
pended and dissipated tl,e profits of /,er pre<;Jiotts economies, that 
she is marc/Jing headlong to ruin, t/,at slie hat given r 52,000 Jrancs 
of her capital to the foreigner.' 
"Somc time later Monsieur T •.• dispatched another vesscl, like-
wise laden with 200,000 francs' worth of the produce of our 
national industry; but the unh::ippy ship foundcred on leaving port, 
and nothing remained for Monsieur T .•• to do but to make two 
little entries in his book, as follows: 
"Sundry goods, debtor to X, 200,000 francs for purchasc of 
various articles dispatched by the sailing-ship N. 
"Profit and loss, debtor, to sundry goods, 2.00,000 francs, owing 
to the definite and total loss of cargo. 
"Meantime the custom-housc, for its part, made an entry on ita 
records of 2.00,000 francs exportation I nnd, as there will ncver bc 
anything in the wny of a corrcsponding importation entry, it follows 
that Monsieur Lestiboudois and the Chamber of Deputics will sec 
in this ahipwreck a clear net profit of 200,000 francs for France." 
Bastiat and the A.B.C. of Free Trade, translated and editcd by 
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APPENDIX I 
THE WORLD PRICE SYSTEM IN ITS RELA-
TION TO COMMERCIAL POLICY 
IT II impossible to deal intelligently with commercial policy with• 
out a lmowledge of the clementary facts of national and inter• 
national pricc structures. These may bc laid down in a scrics of 
propositions as follows: 
Propo1ition I 
CommoJity price lecels in all countries lend. lo moce into such 
relatiomhip with one another as will bring about exact equilibrium 
in the r.•alue of tlze reci-procal tramactions of each. country with 
the out1ide world. 
The necessity of paying for imports, and the f act that the 
only ultimate means of payment is a counter flow of goods and 
services, forces the price level in every country carryi!lg on for-
cign trade into such relationship with price levels in the outside 
world as will lead to an equivalcnce in value in its total com-
mercial cxports and imports.1 The means by which this adjust-
ment of national price levels to one another is reached may bc 
direct, or through exchange rates; but it is, in any case, inevit-
1 See Appendix II for a discussion of financial and non-economic 
unilateral transactions. These complicate the situation but do not 
alter the essential principle. Commercial exports and importa include 
commodity and service transactions of a presumptively bilateral 
character, but exclude, among other things, commodity exportl and 
importl which arise in responae to financial transactions involving 
extended credit. 
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able.2 lt may be that, in order to sccure cquilibrium of value of 
the commercial exports of any givcn country with its commcrcial 
imports, it will be nccessary to havc the priccs of thc majority, 
or, in the opposite case, of but a minority, of its mobile products 
below the modal price for the commodities concerned. Whatevcr 
the persistent deviations of national price lcvels from one another 
may be, however, they will be only such as issue from the aitua• 
tion in which the international itcms of commercial income and 
outgo show a atrict equivalencc of value. 
Proposition 11 
Wage rates, and money itscomes in general, may oary in mry 
Jegree from one country to another. 
In contrast with the tcndcncy toward an approximation to 
equality in the various national mobile commodity price levels,8 
there is the widcst varicty of wage, and other, incomcs in different 
countries. The gcncral monctary wage, and other income, levcls 
in any country are, indced, a function of two variables: ( 1) the 
prevailing world price level; and ( 2) the eff cctivencss of produc-
tion in the export industries of thc country in qucstion. 
Apart from minor fluctuations associated with adjustmcnts, 
1 Measuremcnt of the various price levels may bc made in any 
currency at prevailing rates of exchange. The abcrrations of incon-
vertible paper currcncy exchange rates from a fairly close cquivalence 
with so-called purchasing power pars are a matter too intricate for 
treatment in a book of this character. Such aberrations, except in 
circumstances of an extremely unusual nature, are ncither grcat nor 
long-continued, and they can bc dismisscd as of little importance to 
a discussion of elementary principles. For a detailed exposition of one 
exceptional case, cf. Frank D. Graham, Exchange, Prices, anJ Pro-
duction in Hyper-foflation: Germany 1920-1923, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, 1930, Chaps. IV-VI. 
• The tendency is inevitable only on the condition that there ia 
aomething like a free market for currcncies, the one again.st the 
other. If there ia no such market, priccs in any one country are not 
comparable ·with those in another. lt is not necessary, howcver, that 
the market ahould be officially recognized. An active 11bootleg" 
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pricc levela in all countries (measured in any currency one carca 
to take) move up or down togcther. Money wage levels,• so far 
as their mooement is due to monetary f actors, will also move in 
aympathy with one another throughout the world, tending to 
keep the same proportionate relationship, from one nation to 
another, as before the general sympathetic change in commodity 
pricc levels occurred. The morc or less constant relatiomhip be-
tween national wage levels, however (as contrasted with the sym-
pathetic ßuctua.tions in all countries), is proportionatc to the 
second of the two variables above mentioned, the effectiveness 
of production in the export industries of the several countries.G 
Money wages in all export industries in all countries are there-
forc tied, on the one hand, to the world price structure and, on 
thc other, to respective efficiencies in production. Since diff er-
ences in monetary return to the export producers of one nation 
or another arc correlated in direct proportion with differences 
in productive efficiency, money costs per unit of output of any 
commodity tend, of course, to be equal in all countries ~ort-
ing thc commodity in question. 
Proposition I // 
M oney wages in the export indu.stries condition money wages 
in all the other indwtries of any given country. 
Export i~dustries furnish the point of contact with the world 
pric:e structure. The money wages which, at a given level of 
work1 prices for the output of export industries, tend to issue 
f rom a given efficiency of production in export lines arc com-
munic.,ted by competition to the other industries of thc country 
in queition. The equality of money wages which tends to appear 
• Wag• ineomes will here be uscd elliptically to cover incomcs in 
general. 
1 Competition among workers and employers operates to make this 
true in the long run for all the export industries whethcr organizcd 
on the basis of a small or large-scale producing unit. In certain 
cascs, however, it may take some yean for such competition to cxcrt 
its full cff cct, and national monopolies, accompanied by dumping, 
may occaaionallr obviatc thia rcsult altoe-cther. 
WORLD PRICE SYSTEM 137 
for all labor of a given grade, in whatever industry it may bc 
employed, is, therefore, at the level which the combin.ition of 
the existing status of world prices and the efficiency of labor 
in the export industries permits. 
Efficiency of labor in any non-export industry is of no rcle-
vance to the money wage obtained therein. Judged by the standard 
of workers in the export industries, the workers in the non-
export industries of any given country may be grossly ineff ective 
in the tasks at which they happen to be employed ;6 they will 
nevertheless tend to receive the same monetary wage as those 
of their fellows who are engaged in industries where their eff ec-
tiveness is high. In such cases relative ineff ectiveness will be re• 
flected in high prices for the product of the industries in which 
it appears. 
Only industries naturally sheltered, in whole or in part, and 
export industries will develop in any country under free trading 
conditions, and they will tend to expand to absorb the whole 
working population. Under a system of protect~on, however, any 
industry, no matter what the price at which its products must be 
sold in order to cover the high costs per unit of output which 
issue from relative ineff ectiveness, could, if it werc worth while, 
be kept alive. To fostcr it, however, it is necessary to sacrifice 
the expansion of some export industry. The acquisition, or main-
tenance, of the high cost industry :s not a matter for congratula-
tion, or its demise a cause for regret. 
The higher the eff ectiveness of naturally or artificially shcltered 
industries, relative to that of industries producing for export, the 
lower will sheltcred commodity prices tcnd to bc, :md the lowcr, 
therefore, the gencral pricc level in the country conccrncd, 
Changes in thc relative cfficicncy of industrics producing mobile 
• Such relative efficiencies can be determined only by comparison 
with the ratio of per capita output in the same industries in aome 
other country. Without such a standard of measurcment one could 
never say whether or not a.ny given ,per cap-ita output in any given 
industry showed an absolute, or even relative, efficiency with that 
of another industry, The relevant comparison is a comparison be-
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goods may at any time lead to thc cntry of any givcn industry 
into thc cxport group and thc concurrcnt climination of some 
othcr industry from that group.1 
Pro,position IV 
Diff erence, in inJioiJual commodity prices (not in pric, 
leoels) tmz,ong the c,arious countries of Jh.e wor/J "'e conditioneJ 
hy J/u relatic,e e ffectiomess of tlu c,arious indu1trie1 in etUh 
country, absolute eff ectioeness · heing irrelevant; Jifferences in 
moncy wagca between countries ar, conditioned hy international 
Jifferences in absolute effectivmess in common export indu1tri11, 
Jijf erem:es in real wage, hetwem countrie1 are conditioned hy 
international diff erences ln absolut6 1J!ec.tit1ene11 of it1du1try '" 
" whole. 
Somc of thc cxports of cvcry country arc also cxports of aomc 
othcr country. Through these common cxports wage lcvela in all 
countrics arc linkcd. In shcltcred industrics the hcight of money 
wagcs will dc:pcnd not upon effici~rcy but upon what workera in 
thC' export trades can carn. Prices for the output of shcltered 
'While, at any given time, money wages in the export industries 
may be said to condition money wages in all other industries, it would 
be wrong to ,,uppose that any fixed group of industries is of more 
importance than any other group of equal size in the determination 
of national wage scales. The export industries are such because, at 
any given wage scale, they are the comparatively most competent 
industries producing mobile goods. Any price and wage structurc 
established in isolation will, on the opening up of international trade, 
be brought into line with the world price system, and industries will 
move into or out of the export group according as their comparative 
competence waxes or wanes. The existing wage scale, coupled with 
comparative competence, determines the export industries, rather 
than fJic1 fJersa. All industries employing a given number of worken 
of a given grade are of equal importance in setting the wage scale 
for that grade of labor. The point of contact with, and adjustment 
to, the world price structure is in the export industries, but the rela-
tionship between national and world price structures determines 
what those industriea ,hall be. There ia interdependence in the 
facton. · 
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goods industrics must bc enough to covcr thc moncy wage, paid 
thcrcin. 
Real wagcs arc detcrmined by thc rclation of moncy wages to 
prices. Diff erences in real wages bctwecn countrics arc thcrcforc 
dependent upon ( I) diff erenccs of cffcctiveness in common cx-
port trades, which condition thc rcspectivc money wagcs in thc 
acvcral countries, and (2) differcnccs in thc relative cffcctiveness, 
from onc country to another, of thc sheltcred industries, which 
dcterminc for each country thc prices of all gooda not aubjcct 
to cxport or import. Variations in real wagcs between countric1 
arc thereforc dcpcndent upon thc abaolutc cff cctivencsa, in cach 
country, of cxp.ort and ahcltcrcd induatric1 taken ae a wholc, 
Proposition Y 
In International trade, go!J is a commoJity pure tmJ simpld 
@J will mor.,e continuousiy a1 an export oniy from those countries 
in which effectiveneu in go/J production i1 high its relation to 
eff ectir.,eneu in o,•,i .~r inJwtries. In all other goid standarJ coun-
tries goJJ will movt now out of, and now into, any gir.,en national 
area to the extent neceuary to bring the national ,price level itsto 
such relatiomhip with the worid price structure as will leaJ to 
commodity prices below the world let1ei in the relatir.,ely eff ectivd 
industrie1 of the said country and above the worlJ iet1el in th.4 
relatively ineffectir.,e inJustries.8 In inconvertible paper standt1rd 
countries the same result is achieceJ by shifts in the exchange 
c,alue of the currency relative to its internal purchasing power.9 
South Africa off ers a case of a country so cff cctive in the pro-
duction of gold, relative to its eff ectivcncss in other industrics, 
as to be led to rely very hcavily on gold cxports as a mcans of 
• High cfficicncy in any type of cxport is cquivalcnt to high 
efficiency in the production of gold, sincc gold from abroad can be 
bought, by any country, with othcr commoditics. 
• In countries with a metallic standard othcr than gold thc casc, 
whilc analogous, is too complcx for trcatmcnt herc. China. is the 
only important country in this catcgory. Cf. Frank D. Graham, 
"The Fall in the Value of Silver and its Conscqucnccs," Journal of 
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payment for imported goods_. In commodities other than gold 
South Africa is likely to be "undersold" by other countries. Thia 
ia not because South Africa would necessarily be ineffective, in 
any absolute sense, in the production of many of thcse commodi-
ties, or that money wage rates in South Africa are unduly high. 
lt is simply the nccessary condition of the expansion of the rela-
tively effcctive gold mining industry. For South Africa to be 
undcrsold in commodities other than gold is simply the correla-
tive of-indced, it ia idcntical with-South African undersclling 
of othcr countries in the commodity gold. 
Comment on the latter phases of the present propoeition i1 in-
cluded in the dis~ussion of Proposition VI. 
Pro,position V 1 
Th, worJJ price system at any given tnoment l, a ,ystem of 
generat etjuilibrlum, am,löK,öW lo 1/u 1"'1/M eqt1iUbrlum, fo wMch 
eiuery pric11 exerts ""' /tlfl1,t111ee on er,,ery other, Et1cl1- cotmtry, 
tenJ, to produce in exceu of it, ow11 con1umption (and there-
fore to export) tho1e commoJities in which its effectir,,eneu in 
p,-oJuclion is relat{vely high, and to p,-oduce in deficiency of its 
own consumption (anti therefore to import from other countries) 
those commodities in wh.ich. it1 effectiveneu in production is ,-e/a-
titlely low. T /se export of any given commodity from any coun-
try is pwhed until the price of th.e commodity in que1tion falls 
to the point at which. it is equally profitable for th.at country to 
export some other (additional) co-,nmodity or to ·concentrate more 
fully on th.e home market.10 The lines dividing the export, 
Jome1tic, and import commodities of ony country 1ft,Of,le in re-
1pon1e to ,light ch.anges in the relatiomhip between Jomestic 
md world price levels, and these changes are th.emseloes Jepend-
ent upon the neceuity for equilibrium in t/,,e country,, interna-
tio,u;l account,. Any indUJtry producing mobile good, may, as a 
so It ia pcrhap,_ unncccaaary to point out that in most countric1 
thi, h11ppcn1 11utomatically through the aearch for profitJ and thc 
avoidance of lo11e1 by individulll citiicn,. Thc word "country„ 1, 
uaed clliptically to mean thc citi:i:en, thereof. 
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result of technical changes or clu1nges in reciproca/, national Je-
mand,, 1hift from one of the above categoriet into another. 
In comment on this proposition it will serve to cite a case in 
which the existing equilibrium in the international accounts of a 
given gold Standard country is not stable but is bcing maintained 
by the export of gold takcn f rom bank rescrves. The tendcncy of 
the export of gold is to lower the domcstic and to raisc thc 
world pricc lcvel. Commodities at the time ncither cxported 
nor imported (domestic commoditics) will feel the full force of 
the relative lowering of domestic prices, but both export and 
import commodities will be subject to a dual influcnce, the one 
tending to lowcr and the othcr to raisc prices. Export com-
moditics will tend to fall in pricc so far as {the homc) conditions 
of supply arc dominant and to rise in price so far aa (forcign) 
conditiona of dcmand excrt thc atrongc r influcncc. Thc oppoaitc 
i, truo o! import priccs, Thc nct cfTcct ia likcly to bc but littlc 
changc in thc pri cca of thc cx iating cxpor ta and irnporta t11 kcn 
Al 1\ wholc, Domcstic commo<litics, howcvcr, }uving fallen In 
pricc will now entcr to some cxtcnt into thc list of cxports; whilc, 
1incc domestic money costs of production will tend to fall with 
domestic commodity prices, some of the former imports will now 
be produced in whole, or in !arger measure at least, at home. As 
a result of the high price of the old exports relative to the prices 
of domestic commodities, a smaller sharc of such exports will tend 
to be consumed at home and a !arger share will therefore go 
abroad. The old imports, on the othcr hand, will to some extent 
tend to be replaced by thc relatively chcapcncd domestic com-
modities. Capital and labor will in some mcasurc shift11 from 
the production of domcstic commoditics to the production of 
morc of the old or new cxports or of thc old imports which arc 
selling at relativcly bettcr prices. All of these f actors will increase 
thc ratio of commodity exports to commodity imports and thus 
restorc atablc equilibrium in thc international accounts. 
u Thcrc ia not likely to be 11n cibsolutc ehift but r11ther a diver• 
aion of ncw cnpitcil in lugcr menaurc to thc cxport industrica nnd 11 
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PR.OTECTIVE TAR.IFFS 
The aame rcsults are obtained under papcr curren~ies through 
a ahift in e.xchange rates. The aomewhat different proceas ia auffi-
ciently explained in the text. 
Proposition VII 
T he tlividing lines between exports, Jomestic commodities, 
tmd im-ports of any gioen country being establiJ!uJ in tlu mann,r 
;ust stateJ, momy wage, for a girJen grade of Labor tenJ to 1ettl, 
al tlu ftgure which, with the wlwle popuJation employeJ, repre-
sentJ the momy productivity of workers in the export in.Jus- · 
tries under such prices ,11 c"11 be obtaimJ for export products 
in worlJ markets. 
That money wagcs in the cxport industries f ocus money 
wages in all industries has already been posited. Suppose now 
that a growth in the working population of a given national 
unit occura. The augmentation in the number of workera will be 
diatributed among domestic and export industriea in greater 
or lesa proportion according as the one or the other type of in-
dustry offen a temporarily superior rcturn to labor. The money 
rcward off ered will depend on profita, and these will in turn dc-
pend on the relative movcmcnt of the pricea of domcstic and 
export commodities (no change in the rebtive cffort costa of pro-
duction, or relatifle wage rates, in the two types of industry being 
assumed). The new, and indeed all, workers must takc such real 
wages as thcy can earn under the new conditions. They can, as a 
whole, get no more than they produce.12 
Proposition VIII 
Commodity price leue/J in th.e t1ariou1 countries, t/z.ough tenti-
ing towarJ mbst11ntial equality, will slww persistent differences 
11 Any increa.se in thc supply of labor and thercfore, prcsumably, 
of products, ia inevitably accompanied by an increase in thc "outlet„ 
for producta, and therefore for labor to bc used in their production. 
The aupply both of labor and of products implies, under anything 
likc a 1mooth process of adjustment, a correlativc demand for labor 
and for producu. Thia is aa true of an improvcment in ,.,. capit. 
output aa it ia of an incrcuc in the numbcr of workcn. 
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eON'esponJing to t!,,e special economic position of eoch of th, 
eountries concerneJ. 
From what has already been aaid, it will be clear that there ia 
no reason for believing that identity of national commodity 
price levela would bring the international accounts into cquilib-
rium or, if we look at the interacting phenomena from thc 
other angle, would issue .from equiljbrium in the international 
accounts. As far as goods freely cxchanged intcrnationally arc 
concerned, national pricc levels cannot, it is true, depart very 
far from equality. Prices of sheltered commoditics may, how-
cver, vary grcatly from one country to another.18 Ncvertheless, on 
thc whole, efficiency in the naturally sheltered industries of any 
given country is not likely to diff er in any marked dcgree from 
cfficiency in the export industries of that country. In f act, com-
modity price levels, thercforc, arc not likcly to diff cr widcly in 
diff ercnt countrics. u 
:u Those commodities which are ahelt~red only by costs of tranafer 
cannot, of courae, vary in price from one country to another by more 
than the amount of auch costs. Those, howevcr, which are ,heltered 
by the fact that they are necessarily procluced at the point of con• 
1umption (roads, rai1ways, houscs, rctail distribution, personal acrv-
ices, etc.) may vary in price indcfinitely, but even thcsc variationa 
are kept within aome bounds by the fact that the production of 
immobile goods requires the use of factors also employcd in the 
production of mobile goods. The price of any given factor of pro• 
duction will, of course, be the same whether it is used in the pro-
duction of a mobile or immobile finishcd good, and the relative 
effectiveness for the one or the other usc is not likely to vary in 
any extreme degree. · For a discussion of this topic, cf. Bertil Ohlin, 
Inter-regional and. International Trade, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 19331 pp. 141 ,e seq., a. work which seems of outstanding 
importance in the theory of international trade but which was un-
fortunately not available at 'the time of the preparation of the 
present manuscript. 
u This atatement runs afoul of a popular illusion to the con-
trary. By anyone, however, who has lived in several different coun-
tries, it is likely to bc received without much question. The pricc of 
,p,rsonal services, of course (and of goods into which scrvice entera 
in exceptional degree), tends to bc low in poor, and high in rich, 
countriea. This i11 no more than the inevitable corollary of the 
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Therc arc; howevcr, ccrtain factors which tend to hold thc 
gcncral commodity price level in certain countries somewhat 
abovc, or somewhat below, the modal level for the world as a 
whole at any given time. The following list of such factors 
(making for a high, and its conversc for a low, national com-
modity price level), while not intcnded to be completc, will 
perhaps bc indicative. 
( I) The prcsence of gold mines sufficiently productivc to fur-
nish a stcady e~port of gold. 
In order to cxport go]d continuously, the commodity pricc lcvcl 
in the producing country must bc high enough to encouragc so 
grcat a ratio of commodity imports to commodity cxport• as will 
compensatc the value of the cxported go]d. 
(2) Thc presencc of a largc net "unilateral incomc," or a 
nct incomc from services, in thc international transactions of the 
country concerncd. 
Such an income (arising from intercst payments in excess of 
new lending to foreign countries, net receipts from foreign bor-
ro~ing or fr9m the export of services, net receipts on repaid 
foreign loans and the like) inevitably leads to an excess of com-
modity imports ovcr commodity exports. This is induced by a 
relatively high commodity price level. 
( 3) A narrow list of exports. 
Certain countries, usually small, find it advantageous to con-
centrate on only a very f ew commodities for export and to pay 
for a wide variety of imports with the proceeds of such exports. 
Since the prices of imports will ordinarily be higher than in 
the country of origin by the amount of transf er charges in-
volved, and since, in the case under consideration, imports are 
low money wages, and prosperity in high moncy wages, with com-
modity pricc levcls substantially cqual. Povcrty might show itsclf 
in not unduly low money wages but in an extremely high price level, 
and prosperity in very moderate money wages and an extremely 
low price level s but either of thesc could occul' only in a closed 
price ,ystem and, in the world as it is, this does not happen. There 
i, no evidence whatever for the notion that countrics of high wage, 
are counuiea with a high commodiJJ pricc level, or fJicl "'""· 
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numerous relative to exports, thc chances of thc gcncral com-
modity pricc levcl being rather high arc strong. 
(4) Protectivc !arif;fs. 
Both the reduction of imports and thc consequential limita-
tion of cxports duc to protective duties arc associated with an 
increase in the g.eneral cornrnodity price level in the country 
imposing such drities. The protected goods will obv:iously tcnd 
to seil at higher prices than if they carnc in frcc. 16 Gold, being a 
frec import, however, will comc into the country to thc cxtcnt 
requisitc to raise the general cornrnodity price lcvel to the point 
wherc exports are clirninatcd in the dcgrce adcquate to compen-
aate thc check on comrnodity imports. Undcr inconvcrtiblc papcr 
monetary standards thc sarne rcsult is achieved through a shif t in 
cxchangc rates. 
( 5) Efficiency in a majority of non-cxport industrics rclatively 
lower than efficiency in export industrics. 
This factor has already been, adcquatcly discusscd. 
( 6) The presence of national rnonopoly on a large scale, 
especially if accornpanied by durnping of commoditics in for-
eign markets. 
Such monopolies raise prices in the domestic market by re• 
stricting supply thereto; and, if a policy of dumping is followed, 
they lower prices in foreign markcts by augmcnting thc supply 
which would otherwise be sold thcrein. The influcncc on com-
modity price levels in the several countries is obvious, 
( 7) High transport costs on imports relative to those on cx-
ports. 
The higher the transport costs on imports, the greatcr will bc 
the augmentation of the prices of imports over the prices of those 
goods in the countries of origin; and the lower the transpart 
costs on cxports, thc ncarer will the prices of exports bc to the 
i. After protection has bcen imposcd for some years and an efficient 
industry developed bchind the protective barrier, pricea of the 
protected producu may indeed fall to the level which would prevail 
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PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
relatively high pricei on those gooch in thc countrics of desti-
nation. 
Proposition IX 
T lu tJ!nolute height of prices and the absolute h.eight of woges 
and other money income1 in tmy given country are, in th.em-
se/cm,, of P,tJClictJlly no consequence lo prosperity. T he signiftcanl 
thing is the relationship between them. 
Since prosperity is dependent upon commodity prices being 
low relative to monetary wage and other incomes, high wages 
with low priccs and full cmployment is the great dcsideratum. 
Thia goal can bc achieved only through cfficient production; it 
will be unattainable through attempts to keep moncy wages in 
any given country above the lcvel which world priccs and the cur-
rcnt cfficiency of workers in that country prcscribc; and it can 
never be endangcred by competition from merely low-wagc 
labor. 
Proposition X 
The genertJl rtJte of money wages operatic,e in any country, 
heing proportionale lo the eff ectir1ene11 of labor in the re/atively 
effectir,,e export inJustries, inec,itably raises money costs of pro-
Juction in oth.er mobile gooJs' proJucing industries in that 
country abor;e the /ec,el preoailing in the same industries in parts 
of the outside world where such industries ore relatir1ely eff ectic,e. 
lt makcs not the slightest difference how eff ective industry in 
gcneral in Country A may be, or how low in B may be the gencral 
rate of wages; it will always be impossible for the relatively in-
effcctive industries to meet foreign competition on cvcn terms. 
The· inability to mect foreign prices in these industries is not due 
to wage or othcr conditions at home or abroad, or to lack of a 
rather high degree of absolute efficicncy in the industries in 
question, but to competition for labor from those industries able 
and willing to pay auperior wagea though sclling in world mar-
keta at world priccs. 
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Pro-position XI 
Export industries Jo not grow up because of ®Y lack of 
general consuming power on the part of the home population 
but bec(IU.Je the rel<Jtion.ship of the home to the world pric11 
structure makes it profitable for domestic entrepreneurs to con-
&entrate, beyonJ the "require~nts" of the home market, in tlu 
industries in question, anJ, ipso facto therefore, to refrain 
from entering certain other industries to the extent necessary 
to prooide for the home, consumption of the products con-
cemed. 
The consuming ability of a population is neithcr morc nor 
lcss than its total production. Whenevcr, in any coontry, morc 
of a certain commodity is produced than is consumed at homc, 
it follows, thercfore, dut less of somc othcr commodity or 
commodities is bcing turncd out than thc homc population can 
and will consumc, or lend. Thia provides the necesaary balancc 
of importa with cxports. 
Export industries arisc not because markcts at homc arc lim-
ited in any general sense, but merely bccause it pays to cxtcnd 
such industries rather than build up a productive structure which 
corresponds, item by item, with home consumption. The notion 
of the necessity of foreign markets as a means of kceping a 
population employed is wholly iUusory and, indced, ailly. Sincc 
thc exports of one country are the imports of another, such 
a necessity, if it existed, would mean that it would be possiblc 
for any one country to have full employment only by a corrc-
sponding volume of unemployment in another. Fortunately this 
is far from being the case. Rather is it true that full cmployment 
in any important country, accompanied by an expansion of both 
exports and imports, is accompanied by likc phcnomena in the 
rest of thc world. 
To individual entrepreneurs in an industry morc than capable 
of supplying the "requirements" of the domestic market, a for-
cign outlet for products in general aeems essential. But cxport 
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therc was a bcttcr market abroad than at homc. This growth 
was automatic.tlly and incvitably parallcled by a _better market 
in the exporting country for certain foreign products to fill the 
gap which thc concentration in export industries necessarily 
leaves in othcr lines. The export status for any industry ia thua 
duc not to any natural tendency toward cxpansion beyond the 
''rcquirements" of the domestic market but solely to the rela-
tionship of the national to thc international pricc structure on 
thc funda~ental basis of comparative competence in one linc 
rather than ahother. When, in response to foreign demand, ex-
port status in certain lines has been developed „nd that demand 
for some reason then shrinks, the notion arises that expansive 
forces have been at work which "require" that the export outlet 
bc maintained by hook or crook. Thc true conclusion, however, 
is that the shif t in demand requires a withdrawal, at least in 
part, from export status in the industry in question and a de-
velopment of other export industries or of industries hitherto 
upon an import basis. 
Foreign markets are good only so far as they permit expansion 
of comparatively compctent industries; they ought never to be 
sought for their own sake, provide no net increase of employ-
mcnt, are automatically accompanied by an cquivalent aharing 
of the domcatic market with foreign produccrs, are not essen-
tial to full cmployment, and arc bcneficial to all concerned only 
a, thc:, devclop in rcsponse to the play of priccs. Exports and 
imports arc not cnds in thcmsclves but mcans of securing a 
greatcr prospcrity. Encrgctic action ia good in itself, but if it ia 
dcvotcd to export tradc in greater measure than to domestic it 
is misplaced,u The appropriate, most productive, relationship 
u Thc colunu of foreign tradc is frequently taken as an index of 
prosperit'y, but it is of practically no value for this purpose. lt i1 
quitc possiblc to havc a growing foreign trade whilc prospcrity is 
dcclining and an increasing prosperity whilc foreign tradc is shrink-
ing. Thc discovcry of a cheap synthetic process of producing rubber, 
for instancc, would tcnd to diminish thc imports, and thcreforc thc 
exporta, of thc Unitcd Statcs, though it would cnhancc our pros-
perity. A dcstructivc pest, affccting thc corn crop ao u to put ua 
on an import basia for that product, would, on the othcr band, 
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between foreign and domestic trade will tend to develop natu-
rally if both exports and imports arc left frcc of interf crcnce, 
Such interferencc can be justified- not on thc ground of any 
assumed general nccessity but solely on such special grounds as arc 
indicated in Chapter V. 
tend to increasc our total foreign trade, both importa and exporta, 
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSAC 
TIONS AND THE BALANCING OF 
CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS 
AT ANY givcn moment somc of the residents of any given coun-
try will have matured monetary claims upon foreigne~s while 
foreigners will, in turn, have matured monetary claims upon 
the same or other residents of the given country. 
If, for cxample, we take the United States, we shall find 
that, at any moment, American residents (individual or corpo-
rate) will have matured claims against foreigners arising from 
(1) the sale of commodities, (2) the performance of services, 
(3) rents and royalties for the use of American-owned prop-
cfty by the foreigners in question, (4) interest, dividends, and 
profits on investments in foreign securities or businesses, and 
(s) loans and monetary gifts made by foreigners to Americans. 
In addition to these private claims, governmental agencies may 
havc matured claims against foreign citizens or governmentl 
cither for goods and servic:cs rcndered or aa imposts of one or 
anothcr sort. Foreign private individuals, corporations, or gov-
ernmcnts would in turn have claima upon Amcrican rcsidcntl 
or governmental agcncics undcr some or all of the above-mcn• 
tioncd hcads. 
The monctary claims of residcnts of the United Statcs on 
rcsidents1 of thc outside .world might be ex,presseJ cither in dol-
1 The word "resident," as cmployed throughout this discussion, 
haa a rather special meaning associated more closely with the source 
of accruing income, and the currency in which it is received, than 
with atrictly gcographical phenomena. Tourist• and other morc or 
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lars or in some other money, but, however this might be, thc 
American claimants will normally be finally satisfied only with 
receipts in dollars. The monctary incomcs of thc foreign 
claimees, apart from counterclaims on Amcricans directly pos-
sessed by them, will, howcvcr, ordinarily accrue in somc other 
currency. In order that the paymem:s may bc made, an cxchangc 
of other currencies against the dollar will be necessary. The 
American claimants will either sell foreign currencics for dol-
lars (buy dollars with foreign currencies) or thc forcign 
claimees will do the same thing. The form of transf er depends 
on whether the American claimant draws on thc foreign claimec 
or the latter remits to the American. The situation of the claim-
ants in the Unitcd Statcs is, of course, paralleled in every other 
country. Foreigners who have claims against American residents 
will, in consequence, either sell dollars for their own currcncy 
(buy their own currency with dollars) or the American claimeca 
will takc the initiative in a similar tr:msaction. 
Since international economic transactions are typically, and 
under normal conditions, all but universally, carricd on by 
less permanent expatriates, who arc deriving their monetary income 
from a country other than that in which they are sojourning, are 
to be regarded as residents ·of the country from which thcir monetary 
incomc derivcs rather than of that in which they are at the mornent 
living. For purposes of international accounting the goods :md serv-
ices bought and consumed in situ by such morc or lcss tcmporary 
cxpatriates are as truly exports of thc country of salc, and imports 
of thc country of "residcncc," as if thcy had bccn delivcrcd across 
thc respective national boundaries. On similar principlcs goods sent 
from the country of residcncc to the country of sojourn, for the 
use and account of an expatriatc "resident„ who pays for thern out 
of funds accruing to him in his country of residence, are not to be 
counted as exports, or, if so counted, should be balanccd by some 
such itcm as "Reduction in thc home monetary holdings of residenta 
sojourning abroad effected in payrncnt for exports." Services 
rendered in one country to residents of another who are on home 
territory are, however, to be regarded as on a par with an actual 
transfer of commodities. The service can, in this ca.sc, be held 
to have crossed the frontier as one side of a bilateral transaction 
for which money or its equivalent, crossing the border in the oppo• 




































































n, for the 
~ them out 
not to be 
d by some 
>f rcsidents 
" Servic11 
: on home 
, an actual 




frccly contracting, profit-sceking, private individuals or corpo-
rations who ~.uitc rightly take no thought of cquilibrium in the 
international accounts, it is clcar that the cash claims of residente 
of any onc country against thc foreign world may at any given 
moment tend to exceed or to fall short of claims in the opposite 
direction. lt would, indecd, be miraculous if they did not. As 
far as claims and counter claims offset one another, however, 
those residents of any one country who havc claims on foreign-
crs may seil their claims on foreign currency to thosc of their 
own nationals· who have obligations to rneet in the foreign 
currcncy in qucstion. Thc latter can then transmit these claima 
to their forcign payeca who will collcct in thcir own currcncy 
from thosc of thcir own nationals against whorn the claims 
apply. 
lt is thc business of exchange dealen in any country to bring 
togethcr thc two groups of citizcns of that country who havc 
respectivcly claima against, and obligationa to meet in, aome 
othcr currcncy, and to off er them the opportunity to buy and 
scll such claims in thcir own currcncy. When, howevcr, in any 
country, thc existing matured claims to foreign currencies cx-
cecd or fall short of maturcd counter claims on thc domestic 
currency, some of the parties concemed would, in the absence of 
some aJjustment of claims or of same supplementary means of 
-payment, be unable, in thc one case, to convert into their OVfn 
currency their claims to foreign moncy or, in thc other, to 
rnakc payment to foreign claimants in the requisite currency.' 
E quilibriu,m in the internationaJ accounts is consequently essen-
• Though, for reasons prci.ently to bc adduccd, it is normal for 
the total clnirha to forci gn currcncica of thc citizcns of nny given 
country to balancc the total forciA"n claim.1 to the currcncy of thc 
country in qucation, it is most unlikely that thc claims of the citizcn1 
of nny onc country on any aingle foreign currency will balance the 
counter claims of paycca dcsiring that particular currcncy, But, since 
any currcncy with an international market can bc frccly exchangcd 
for nny othcr, no difficulty arisc, on thia acorc, Thc dcsircd forcign 
currency can bc bought either dircctly with the domcatic or with 
aome other moncy which has firat bcen acquired with domeatic 
currcncy, commoditics, scrviccs, or the like. 
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lial to this orJinary settlement of intern<JJionaJ claimJ takm as 
"who/1, 
Since an exi:ess of claims to foreign currencies over foreign 
claims in the opposite direction implics, in its obverse aspect, 
a corresponding deficit, it will be sufficient to consider the effects 
either of an excess, or a deficit, of claims to foreign currencies 
in relation to the foreign counter claims to the currency of any 
given country. Whatevcr happens in a country which has an 
excess of claims to foreign countrics is simply the obverse of 
what happens in some othcr country which has a deficit, and 
t1ice t1erso, Let us thcrefore take as an illustration a casc in which 
Amcricans have claims to forcign currcncics in exccss of the 
foreign claims to döllars.8 
lf, at a given status of rates of exchange bctwcen dollars and 
foreign currencics, the cash claims of Amcricans against forcign 
currcncics should excecd forcign cash claims to doll:m, the 
exccss of the off cr of forcign currcncies in c_xch:mgc for dollars 
over the off er of dollars for foreign currcncics would lowcr thc 
dollar value of the forcign currcncies or, what is the samc thing, 
would raise the foreign currency value of the dolla~. So f ar as 
the American claims on foreigners were exprcsscd in forcign 
currencies rathcr than in dollars, thcir dollar value would sink 
automatically with the shift in cxchange rates, and the foreign 
parties under obligation to make paymcnt on thesc claims vyould 
be able to cxtinguish thcm with fcwer dollars than would othcr-
wise be neccssary. 
lf, at the same time, forcign claima on Americans were cx-
prcsscd in dollars, the amount of dollars immcdiatcly available 
to forcign dcmandcra would, of coursc, bc un:dTcctcd. A changc 
in thc rate of cxchangc might thus ao alter the relative valuc of 
rcciprocal obligations in any one currcncy as in itself to elimi-
natc thc discquilibrium which originatcd the movcmcnt in the 
rate. 
• Thc only claims in question herc, as clsewhcrc in this discu,-
aion, arc those which their holdere arc dcsiroua of convcrting im-
t1Udiately into their own currency. They are matured claims which 
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lt might happcn, howcvcr, that Amcrican claim1 on forcign• 
en wcre prcdominantly cxprcsscd in dollan, and forcign claimt 
on American1 prcdominantly in forcign currcncice, and in thi1 
casc thc aaaumcd movcmcnt of cxchangc ratc1 would augmcnt 
thc di1cquilibrium a!Jld would thcrcforc bc aclf-accclcrating 
rathcr than sclf-limiting. The currencica in which international 
obligations tcnd to be cxpressed are a matter of varying tradc 
practicc, and no rule can be laid down as to the probability of 
one of thc a~e results rathcr than the other. 
In all but highly pathological cases, however,' it is a matter of 
comparative indiff ercnce whether the tendency of a movement 
in exchange rates is, in its~lf, to incrcase or to diminish thc dis-
parity between claims and counterclaims. This is becausc thc 
disequilibrium bctwecn the American offer of foreign currencies 
and the forcign offcr of dollars, 11 at thc hitherto prevailing ex-
. change rates, will, in normal circumstances, alwaya be reduced 
by the new dollar demand for foreign currencies which will ap-
pear as the dollar prices of thosc currencies fall, and by the con-
cu{rent decrease in the foreign currency demand for dollara on 
the part of all forcign sceken of dollan who can defer their pur-
chasca of that currcncy. 
Thc discquilibrium will not only bc reduccd but it will be 
eliminatcd, cither by a sufficicnt fall in thc dollar valuc of for-
cign currcncics or, if such a fall ia neccssarily confined within 
narrow limits by the prescnce of a gold standard in the coun-
trics conccrncd, by the substitution of direct paymcnts to Amcr• 
icana in gold in lieu of payments in dollar exchange. In both 
cases thc nccessary supplementary mcans of payment are evoked 
by the movcment of exchangc rates. Under normal circum• 
• Such u prevailed in Germany from the end of the World War 
to late 1913. · 
• lt i• immaterial whether the aituation i• expreased in terma of 
offer (,upply) or of <femand. An American offer of foreign cur-
renciea is but the obvcne of a foreign currency dcmand for dollan, 
and a foreign off er of dollar• the obverse of an American demand 
for foreign currencics. We may thereforc apcak either of reciprocal 
demand, or of recipro~l aupply, u covering the whole aituation. 
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atancca, cvcn with a papcr atandard, no vcry largc movcmcnt 
in cxchangc ratca will bc neceasary to thia end. 
Ther, u at all mome11t1, tlsMefor,, exoct eq"ilibrium betw11t1 
t/,,d JolltJr (or any other) tlemanJ fot' fore/gr, &1'rrmcie, a11J 
th, foreign curre11cy Jemand for Jollar, (or any ot-1,er money), 
the mOtJement of exchange rate1 or the trmsf er of go/J being 
the equilibrator. Therc can, at moot, be but a tendency toward 
discquilibrium which may be recurrcnt or, for a time, continu-
ous, but is always counteracted by a shif t in the rate of exchangc 
of onc currency against another to the degrec necessary to pro-
voke at least tell)porary equilibrium. 
Since time is but a succession of moments, this series of 
momentary cquilibria strctchcs out into a permanent moving 
cquilibrium. T h.tJ exchange equilibrium pret?ailing at any mc-
ment may he stable or unst(l/;le. lf, for instancc, thc accruing 
cash claims of Americana against foreigncrs ahow a continuous 
tcndency to exceed the foreign countcr claims on Amcrican dol• 
lara at thc gold cxport point for foreign gold currcncics or at thc 
rate of cxchangc momcntarily in cff ect on frec currcncies, thc 
cquilibrium temporarily attained will bc unstable. Undcr thcae 
circumstancca do}Jar cxchangc r:atcs will ahow a persistent upwud 
tcndcncy or gold will continuc to flow to thc Unitcd Statca 
frorn auch forcign gold standard countrica as havc an insufficient 
accrual of claima to dollara (and othcr forcign currcncica) to 
cffcct a balancc with accruing Amcrican (and othcr extra• 
national) claims to their rcspcctive currcncics, until a stablc 
equilibrium is achicvcd eithcr on thc gold basia or on thc incon• 
vcrtiblc papcr basis to which auch countries may be forccd. In 
the latter casc, .as in the casc of all countrics originally pos• 
acsscd of such a !rce currency standard, the dollar value of thc 
currcncy conccrned will fall until thc rcquisitc stable cquilibrium 
i1 attained. 
For a time, it is true, a quasi-permanent cquilibrium rnay rc• 
ault !rom thc cxtcnsion of short-tcrm loans (including all othcr 
than aight bills of cxchangc) by which thc residcnts of coun• 
trics having an excess of claima against forcign moncy f urnish 
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with thc rcquisitc supply of thc scarcer currency. But this only 
palliates, it does not eure, the situation, since such loans soon 
havc to be paid back. A morc lasting cquilibrium may issue from 
a similar extcnsion of vari:>us types of long-tcrm loans,6 cspe-
cially if this takes on a steadily curnulative aspect. Such loans 
may be a percnnial factor in thc· establishment of what, in such 
situations, must be regardcd as a fairly stable long-term equilib-
rium. Bot cvcn in these circumstances mounting interest pay• 
mcnts will sooner or later compel more fundamental adjustments 
which will be initiated by movements of exchange rates along 
the lines already indicated. In any event there is no escape for 
any nation, in the long run, from a position of stable equilibrium 
in its international accounts, a position in which, with a stable 
rate of cxchangc and no abnormal rnovement of gold across its 
borders, thc clairns to foreign currencies steadily accruing to its 
nationals are exactly balanced by the claims to its own currency 
ateadily accruing to foreigners.T 
The sustained augmentation of accruing claims to foreign 
currencics relative to accruing foreign claims to the domestic 
currency which occurs as a corrective af ter a country has suf-
f ercd an adverse movement in exchange rat es, or a drain of 
gold, ordinarily issues from the resulting shif t in relative prices 
in the country in question and in the outside world. 
In the case of gold Standards, a country which is persistently 
losing gold frorn its bank reserves, or from circulation, must get 
its price level down relative to that of the outside world, if it is 
not to be forced sooner or later to abandon its chosen standard 
and adopt an inconvertible paper currency.8 When relative pricc 
• Short loans, or a rescrvoir of them, constantly rcncwed, bccomc, 
for purposcs of international balances, loans at long tcrm. 
'Claims by forcigncn may bc cancclcd or commutcd by bank-
ruptcy, rcpudiation, or the refusal of the authoritics of thc dcbtor 
country to pcrmit the purchase of thc foreign cxchange nccessary 
to thcir paymcnt. This ia onc way to sccurc cquilibrium but, necd-
lesa to aay, it doea not facilitate future adjustmenu through the 
borrowing proccss. 
• The losa of gold, of course, is itsclf a atrong atimulua toward 
the reduction of credit and convertible papcr currency in the coun-
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k,els are sufficiently altered, the resulting relative incrcase in 
foreign buying in the country of comparativcly lowered prices, 
and the relative decrease in the purchasea of citizens of that 
country in countries of comparatively higher prices abroad, will 
bring about the requisite equilibrium in accruing foreign claima 
and counter claims.11 
In the case of inconvcrtible papcr monctary standards, 
whether originally in forcc or latcr voluntarily or involuntarily 
adopted, the inevitable fall in the cxchangc valuc of thc cur• 
rency of any country on which forcign cash claims are in cxccas 
of thc domestic cash claims to foreign n1onies will, of itsclf, 
lower the forcign currcncy pricc of all commoditics and scrvicca 
in the country in question and will, convcrscly, incrcasc thc 
domestic currency price of all forcign commodities and services. 
The result is the same as undcr gold standards. 
Under gold standards, exchange ratcs are all tut absolutcly 
fixed, and adjustment takes place through a shift in relative 
prices in the various countries. Under free currency standards, 
on the other hand, it is rather prices which take on a fixcd 
character, 10 and adj ustmcnt takes place through a ahift in ex-
try in question, and this is the mechanism which is ordinarily relied 
upon for a lowering of the price level. But, to take a recent case, 
this was an insufficient stimulus, or the process could not be effected 
rapidly enough in Great Britain in 19 3 1, with the abandonment of 
the gold Standard as a neccssary rcsult. 
• The mere diminution in monctary incomes in a country which 
has been subjected to contraction in its moncy supply will tend to-
ward smaller purchascs, at givcn prices, of all kinds of goods, both 
those produced domestically and those importcd. More domestic 
commoditics will thercfore be available for cxport and will be ex-
portcd in response to thc relativcly good marketing opportunitiea 
which · will then be opcn in forcign countrics. The rcquisite cxpan-
sion of commodity cxports, relative to imports, of the country in 
question may thus be attaincd, through a movcment in opposite direc-
tions in both catcgories of foreign trade, without any aignificant 
change in relative national price levels having first taken place. 
10 Price levcls in paper atandard countrics are, of coursc, by no 
means absolutely fixed. But tlu J.omestic tric, level is not nec11sarüy 
much altered, al gnlJ. ,pric,s in any giv,n country t1ntl to b1, by 
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change rates. In the case of gold, paper, or any other monetary 
Standard, there will be no surcease from a movement of thc 
metal (with accompanying changes in the relationship between 
prices in the several countries concerned) or, in thc alternative, 
a progressive shift in exchange rates in a given direction, until 
a stable equality between the accruing claims and counter claims 
on any and all currencies is attained. Such a stable equilibrium ia 
of course but a norm around which there ::re constant minor 
ßuctuations, largely canceling one another, but it is the condi-
tion to which there is always an irresistible tendency to return 
whenever any deviation therefrom happens to occur. lt is indeed 
thc condition indispensable to national solvency; and national 
solvency, if not .voluntarily assumed, is in the long run imposed 
from outside by the impossibility of obtaining imports. 
If immediate claims and counter claims with respect to thc 
currcncy of any given country show a persistent adverse tend-
cncy, an (unstable) cquilibrium will nevertheless bc attaincd 
f rom day to day by means of ( I) thc export of gold f rom banlc 
rcserves or circulation, ( 2) a shif t in exchange rat es which 
brings about the circumstances noted on page 154, ( 3) short-term 
loans, cither voluntary or involuntary, 11 ( 4) the cancellation or 
commutation of some of the claims through bankruptcy of the 
obligor, rcstrictions on payment imposed by his government, or 
more or less voluntary gi f t on the part of the payee, or ( 5) the 
lif ting of some of the claims through a long-term loan. 
Long-tcrm loans, in appropriate circumstances, may be a more 
or less continuous and healthy phenomcnon. But no one will in-
volition of the monetary authorities. If the price level is shifting at 
the same time that exchange rates are moving as a result of unstable 
equilibrium in the international accounts, the exchange rates must 
eventually settle at a level which will take into account the change 
in relative prices in the various countries as well as bring stable 
equilibrium into the international accounts. Under paper standards 
adjustment of the international accounts can be left to the movement 
of exchange rates1 under gold standards it necessarily involve1 
ioternal price levela whenever disequilibrium is great. 
u An involuntary loan ariaca when a debtor arbitrarily poatponea 
a payment which ia due, 
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definitcly continue to make long-term loans to thc rr.sidenta of 
any country merely for the purpose of postponing thc inci-
dcnce of immediate obligations on such pcrsons or their com-
patriots. That way lies ,füaster.12 lf, and when, the disaster oc-
curs (and it frequently issues from a rcfusal on the part of 
lenders to take furthcr risks), many maturing claims are wipcd 
out by default or by bankruptcy, and a healthy, if disillusioned, 
situation develops in whith no country livc3 in an inevitably 
temporary luxury f ar beyond its mcans and at the cxpcnse of 
unwary forcign invcstors. All thc other mcans of securing tem• 
porary equilibrium are at least as quickly exhaustible as are the 
resources from ad hoc long-term loans. 
When such emergency resources are exhausted, a stable equilib-
. rium is automatically established by a downward movemcnt 
of the exchange value of the currency of the country in question 
to the point which will restrict purchases abroad to a value no 
morc than the accruing value of claims on foreign currencics. 
Thc only means for preventing the cxhaustion of emergcncy rc-
sourccs, once there is a tendency toward an cxcess o! forcign 
claims over domestic counter claims to the respective currcncies, 
is the reduction of the national price leve], relative to price 
levels in other countries, to a figure which will providc a stable 
equilibrium without drawing further upon any of the emcrgency 
resources above noted. This reduction in the price lcvel will 
tend to be absolute under gold standard conditions while, under 
paper standards, it may bc mercly relative to the rise in foreign 
exchange rates. · 
Apart from cancellation of claims through bankruptcy and 
the like, the total maturing claims of the residents of any given 
country upon foreigners must therefore continuously meet the 
counter claims of foreigners against residents of that country, 
and flice r,ersa; and the· movement of relative national price 
11 Such disasters are by no means rare I we are, at the moment of 
writing, passing through a period in which the process just de-
1cribed ha.a reaultcd in numerous dcfaults on long-tcrm obligatione. 
Such happenin_ge, however, put an effective quietu1 on the proce11 
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lcvels, or of cxchange rates, is the principal mechanism by 
which permanent equilibrium is achieved. The fotces involved 
are as inevitable in their operation as is the motion of the stars; 
and no cff ort permanently to raisc thc total of accruing claime 
on foreignen over thc total of accruing forcign claims on the 
nationals of any country can result in anything but frustration. 
The claima may indeed be acquired but they can nevcr be 
cashcd. A country aeeking continuously to acquire claims on for-
eigncrs in cxcess of foreign counter claims on its own nationala 
ia, in the deg;.ee in which it attaina its aim, thcrefore quite 
sure of mulcting itself. 
This is why it is the height of folly to go on year af ter ycar 
in a blind policy of stimulation of exports and restriction of 
imports. This can be done with some success as long as claims 
are postponed through the lending process, but it cannot be done 
indcfinitely without making repayment of the loans impossible. 
Carried far cnough, it renders cven interest payments impos-
sible cxccpt in a crescendo of new borrowing and lending. 
Whatcver the volumc of loans, an cxact balance of realizable 
clai'ms and counter claims, including those arising from past and 
prcsent capital transactions, is incvitable, and equilibrium will be 
achieved by way of bankruptcy if other roads arc closed.18 
However slow legislatures may be in apprehending this f act, 
it has, in administrative circles, been more and more fully recog-
nizcd in rccent years. Thc Departmcnt of Commerce of thc 
Unitcd Statcs, for instance, has for about a decadc been publish-
ing an annual account of thc international paymcnts of thc 
United States in which an attempt is made to assess all inter-
national economic transactions to which rcsidents of thc Unitcd 
Statcs, or the Amcrican govcrnmcnt, have bccn a party in the 
ycar in qucstion. The account for the ycar 1930 is reproduccd, 
with somc changcs in grouping, on page 168. Thc Dcpartmcnt 
has itsclf cxpressed dissatisf action with somc of the itcms in thi1 
18 Fortunatcly for mercantilistically inclined nations, automatic 
forces tenJ. to producc this result without bankruptcy, in apite of all 
efiorts to _prevent it by misguided commercial policiea. 
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account, but though thc approximatc balancc statcd may bc, in 
10mc dcgree, meretricious, this is due to errors in the atatistics. 
Therc is no disposition to question the f act that cquality in thc 
two sidcs must be, and was in f act, achicved. 
In any givcn ycar thc matureJ claima arising out of present 
or past long-tcrm loans or othcr capi tal eh arges ( claims of thc 
borrowera or rccipicnts in thc one case and of rcccivers of in-
terest, of repaymcnts of principal, and of tribute in thc othcr), 
as well as gifts, must of course be included in the balancc shcct 
sincc they givc to the borrowing countrics, or to the countriea 
rcceiving interest, repaid principal, tribute, or gif t prcciscly thc 
same immediate claims to other currcncics as would have ariscn 
out of the export from the recipient countries of a volume of 
commodities, over and above that actually sent, equivalcnt in 
value respectively to the loans, the interest, the repaid principal, 
the tribute or the gift.14 Defen-ed claims, arising out of long-
term loans or other capital charge_s ( claims which will accruc to 
the lenders as interest and rcpayment of principal only in ycan 
· to come), are, on the other hand, not included. 
The international balance of paymcnts for any given pcriod 
( usually a certain year) shows only the claims actually matured 
16 The immediate position of a borrowcr from abroad is precisely 
the same as that of an exporter or of a rccciver from abroad of 
interest, repaid principal, gift, or tribute. All have immediate clairna 
on foreign currencics. The immediate position of a lcnder on foreign 
account, on the other hand, is preciscly thc samc as that of an im-
porter, a payer of intercst, of the principal on an old loan, of tributc, 
or of the donor of a gift to residcnts of forcign countries. All are 
subject to immediate claims on their currency by forcigners and may 
be called claimees. For this reason the words "dcbtor' and "crcditor," 
or "debit" and "credit," as used in international accounts, are very 
confusing. They are therefore not used in this book. The interna-
tional balance sheet deals with prescnt transactions only. The lender, 
whom wo are accustomed, in looking at the future rather than the 
present, to call the creditor, is, in the first instance, a claimee under 
an immediate duty to turn money ovcr to the foreign borrower. He 
is, thercfore, at the moment a debtor on international account. 
Similarly, a borrower is, in the fuat instance, a creditor on inter-
national account. 
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. in that pcriod. lt is thc international cas!J account. lt dcals, in 
conscqucnce, with international financial items o~y so far as 
these havc given rise to cash daims during thc period covcrcd 
by the statemcnt. The general status of any country as an in-
ternational lender or borrower, the "statement of condition,"11i 
could be detcrmined only by far-!etched implication from thc 
statement of cash daims and counter claims. To show clearly thc 
atatus and trend of international capital assets and liabilities, it 
would bc necessary to have a quite different type of account 
dcaling aolely -with international invcatment and othcr accumu-
lationa of dcf crrcd claims and not at all with tr.2dc, service, · and 
even financi.21, itcms of a current charactcr. With thi• type o! 
account wc ahall havc littlc to do in thi, book, eince thc matter, 
with which it dcala arc, at most, ancillary to the purp01c in 
hand. 
The ordinary Balance of Payments atatement showa only such 
transactions as were actually consummated ( either completely or 
unilaterally) in the period to which it refers, and it is with 
thesc that wc arc primarily concerncd. The statement of thc 
international ftnancial status of any givcn country would show, 
on · thc other hand, a mass of futurc claims and counter claims 
which will not become of importance in the international bal-
ancc of payments until they mature. Financial items appear in 
thc balance of international payments only as maturities, i. e., 
whenever a payment is Jue. This may be the transfer of thc 
original principal of a loan, amortization of an cxisting obliga-
tion, interest, or any other payment. Such items would appear 
u lt ia somewhat misleading to develop analogies between thc 
accounting of private business and that of international trade. The 
end of a private busine11 is monetary profit and thi, monetary ·profit 
ia tumed over to the owncrs. But the international a.ccounta include 
both the transactions of busincsses, as auch, and of the ownera thereof. 
Just as the earnings of a corporation are a debt to its 1tockholder1 
and the two items as debit and credit cancc:l out, ao it ia with a 
country in ita international accounts. The aim of international trans-
actions ia not, or should not be, a . national monetary infiux, but im-
provement in national economic welfare. Profit can be made without 
any change in the national 1upply of money. 
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in the Statement of Condition, on the other hand, only when 
they are not due but wcre simply the cstimatcd prescnt worth of 
rights to future income or the as yet unmatured obligations from 
which these rights take their substance. These rights and obliga-
tions may have been acquired or assumed in exchangc for a 
past quid ,pro quo, or they may have been acquircd or assumed 
by way of tribute. The significant thing is that thcy do not 
impose any ,present payments on anyone. 
Since Balance of Payments accounts are conccrned only with 
matured items, it uaually makes littlc diff crence whcthcr or not 
capital transaction1 are ecparatcd from thc othcn. Capital 
(crcdit) tunsactione in thc international balancc of paymcnts are, 
howcvcr, a complic.ating f actor to which attention must now 
bc givcn. Their significancc will be bctter gmped aftcr an 
analysis of some characteristic f eatures of such items. 
The volume of long-term international loans made in any 
year by an1• one of the great lending countries ordinarily far 
_exceeds the net outward movement of gold, if any, from the 
lending country in question. Similarly, the great borrowing coun-
tries do not ordinarily receive any great influx of gold. The 
loans are 1herefore almost entirely consummated in exported 
and imported goods or services other than gold, though thc 
goods are usually exported, or the services performed, not 
by the individual lenders but by some of their compatriots to 
whom the lenders, on order of the borrowers or of assignees of 
the latter, turn over the borrowed sums. Similarly, the individual 
borrowers do not themselves hecessarily, or even ordinarily, 
import goods or serviccs, but oell their claims to others who havc 
made, or wish to make, such imports, 
Thc actual purchasc of foreign securities is, indeed, from 
thc cconomic as contrastcd with thc financial point of view, 
merely an undertaking to make a foreign loan, and is not by 
any means its full immediate consummation. The loan is not 
cconomically consummated until an equivalent valuc of good, 
is sent, or serviccs performed, by resident& of the lending to or 
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othcr country to whom the borrowers have assigned thcir claima. 
The loan is thcrcforc real.ly made in commodity cxports, or in 
Services performcd for foreigncrs, by residents of thc lending 
country. The only immediate compensation for such commodity 
or scrvicc cxports is a written promise, or a mcre un~xpresscd 
hope,16 of futurc tangible receipts which the investors can 
cventually rcalizc only through direct commodity imports,11 the 
purchase of goods or services in thc country of investment, or 
thc salc of thcir forcign currency receipts to such of their own 
countrymen as wish thus to import commodities or pay for goods 
or serviccs rendered them abroad. Intcrest can, in fact, bc paid 
only in thc way in which thc loan can only be really madc. 
lf, carly in its history, the invcstment is dcfaultcd or otherwiac 
f ails, therc will nevcr bc any real compensation for thc real 
commoditica cxportcd, or the aervicca pcrformcd, · at the time 
that thc loan was madc, On the othcr hand, if thc invcatm,mt 
continuca to yield intcrcst or dividcncla ovcr a long period of 
yean, the real commodities cxported or servicea performed, in 
paymcnt of intcrest, by citizens of thc borrowing country will 
cvcntually mount up to a much · greater total value than thc valuc 
of commodities or services cxported from the lending country 
at the time the loan was made. 
Interest, in whatever form received, might perhaps be re-
garded as the payment for the scrvicc of continuous rcfrain-
mcnt by thc lender from the consumptive use of his property. 
Wc somctimes, indeed, speak of interest payments as paymenta 
of "servicc„ on the loan. For this service, as it is rendered, im-
mediate payment is duc. lnterest payments, thus considered, are 
on a par with paymen~s for any other present service or for 
commodities. 
The case is necessarily different, however, with loans and 
investments. The loan or investment itsclf ia an obvious servicc 
rcndcrcd to thc borrowcr, or country of invcatmcnt, by thc 
" Such as the hope of profita from a direct investment in, let ua 
1ay, the building of a fo.ctory on foreign soil. 
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lender. For this service, however, no immediate payment is made 
by the recipient, individual or country, but only an express 
or implied promise or prospect of paymcnt at a later date is 
given. In the case of fixed intcrest securities, which may be 
taken as typical, the loan gives to residents ot the , borrowing 
country claims against the currency of the lending country which 
are acquired without the present expert of any commodity or 
the pre,ent pcrformance of any service as a quiJ pro q:Jo. The 
value of the present cxports of goods or services, by rcsidcnts of 
thc lending country, will therefore exceed the value of the prcs-
cnt irnports of goods or services for residents of the lending 
country, by the full amount of the loan. Thc contrary will, of 
course, be true of the borrowing country. So far as international 
transactions include net borrowing there can thus be no real 
prceent balance of valucs in international outgo and rcceipt of 
goods plus scrviccs, and nn accounting babnce can be aecured 
only by including the item of loans and invcstments in the in-
. ternational cash balance shccts as if such loans and investmcnts 
were a commodity or service expert of the borrowing, and im-
port of the lending, country. 
A casuist rnight assert that the reccipt of the proceeds of an 
international loan is the prcsent payment for a prescnt export of 
promises or prospects of profit (sccurities or the hope of future 
earnings). lt seems better, howevcr, frankly to recognize the 
f act that, where loans are concerncd, no prcscnt bal:rnce in thc 
v~ue of exported and imported commodities and scrvices occurs. 
The same is truc, of course, in the oppositc direction, where re-
payment of a loan is made or foreign property is sold. More• 
over, so far as international loans are ncver repaid,18 and so far 
18 Loans, in thc sense of the word as here used, necessarily include 
the more or less slowly changing total of book accounts and auch 
aimilar itema .u are sccured by promissory notes, bills of exchaoge, 
or any other form of credit. Thc growth of the total of foreign 
invcstment meana, in cffcct, that therc ia 11.n increaaing volume of 
international indebtcdneaa nevcr rcpaid. The ,.,serooi,. of ahort-term 
indebtcdncss, however rapid the ahift in in~ividual itcma, i, equiva,. 
lcnt to & loa.n of thc m ,p,,.p,tuum type. 
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as voluntary gifts or tribute cnter the picture,1~ a real balance 
in the valuca of international outlay and rcceipt of" goods :rnd 
acrvices by :rny givcn country ia no more attaincd in thc long 
run than it is in the immediate prcscnt. 
Whether intcrcst paymcnts should or should not be put in thc 
aame catcgory with the principal of loans and with gif ts, dcpcnds 
npon whethcr interest is to bc rcgarded as a payment for pres-
ent or past scrvices. As has bccn indicated abovc, it is theoreti-
olly morc appropriate, pcrhaps, to regard interest payments as 
the retum for thc scrvicc of continuous abstention on thc 
part of the lender from the consumptive use of his property-
thc rental for the Service of leaving that propcrty in thc hands 
of thc borrowcr--than as the return for the original transf er 
of the capital.20 Sincc, however, services of this sort can bc 
rendercd without prcsent labor cost, in the sense that the provi-
sion of this service in no wise forestalls other productive activity 
on the put of the lcndcr or rcquircs that hc givc any currcnt 
'luiJ pro quo in thc form of concrctc gooda or activc cff ort for 
thc intcrcst paymcnts rcccivcd, it is, for aome purposcs, morc 
useful to classif y intcrcst paymcnts along with principal on 
capital account · and othcr unilateral itcms. This has been donc 
in the table on pages 168 and 169. 
In thc construction of international balance of paymcnts ac-
counting shccts the logical issuc of the discussion in the prcccd-
ing pages is a · distinction bctwecn ( 1) bilateral transactions, in 
which for cvcry individual item and as bctwcen the parties 
dircctly conccrned, there is, within the accounting period, a prc-
,.. The items "Loans" and "Gifts" are, as noted above, ordinarily 
entcred in international cash balance sheets as if they were payments, 
by the recipientt, and receipts, by the donors, of some quid pro qt:Jo 
for the goods, money, or eervices by means of which the loans or 
gifts are actually consummated. This achieves an accounting balance 
but it hardly squares with reality. There is no present, and there 
may never be any, economic quid pro quo. 
111 The appropriate return for such original tra.nsfer is thc repay-
ment of principal. The view of interest here taken encounters diffi-
culties when the annual payments are in the form not of contract 
interest but of dividends or profit on direct investment of capital. 
The view preaently to be adduced may therefore be preferable. 
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1umptive fJUU ,pro <;uo,21 and (2) unilateral tr:insactions for 
which, as between thc partiea directly concerned, there ia, within 
the accounting period and perhaps in pcrpetuity, no auch prc-
aumptivc quid ,pro <JUO, As f ar as contractuat transactiona arc 
concerned, this division will mcan simply a scparation of cash22 
and capital (credit) · itcms, but thc unilateral tr:ms.actions will 
also includc thosc which arc pcrmanently, aa weil as currcntly, 
one-sided. 
The bilateral transactions are merely ,presumptively auch, 
even as · between the parties directly concerncd, sincc any givcn 
item in the accounts, e.g., merchandise exports, may contain 
goods which have bcen sent direct to a resident of foreign coun-
tries as a gratuitous remittance f rom a f ricnd or relative in thc 
sending country. Any net balance on the unilateral transactions 
must, in f act, be covered by a like balanct, on the opposite side, 
in the transactions pre1umptic,ely bilateral. Thc grcat bulk of thc 
,premmptively bil:itcral transactions, howevcr, uc, 111 bctwccn 
. thc individuala dircctly conccrncd, r,al/y bibtcral though nny onc 
of thc individu:ila in question may have obtained thc <;uid pro 
<JUO which he off ers in a trading transaction through a prior 
purchase, with his own currency, of a claim on a foreign cur-
rency arising from some unilateral trans:iction. lf the unilateral 
international monetary transactions of thc United States should 
bc all in the one direction-giving claims to residents of for-
eign countries on Amcrican currency-the ostcnsibly bilateral 
transactions would, with exact accounting, ncccssarily show an ex• 
cess of American claims on residents of forcign countries, ovcr 
thc corresponding countcr claims of residents of foreign countries 
on Americans, equal to the total claims of foreigners in the 
unilateral category. As a matter of fact, in thc table as givcn, 
the United Statea in 1930 showed a small dcficit of claims as 
against counter claims on bilateral transactions and, at thc same 
time, a similar deficit on both contractual and non-contractual 
a Either in goods, services, or money. The transaction may involve 
an exchange of goods (including acrvicea) for money, of gooda for 
goods, or moncy for money. 
• Including· ahort-term credit ch:ugca incurred and paid off within 
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168 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
UNITED STATES 
EsTIMATED BALANCE or INTER.NATIONAL PAYWltNTS JN TEP.MS 
or DouA1t.s 
(Calendar Year 1930)21 
Arnerican Residents in Account 
with Foreign Rcsidents Claims 
ltems fro~ which Recipr~cal C_laims Matured Claims 
upon Fomgn nnd· on Unitcd Stute• of Amcrican Rcsi-







dente on Persona 
RcMiJing in the 
Unitcd Statea 
(M illions of 
Dollars) 
I. Bilateral Transactions (involving 
1. Merchandise (ordinary exports 
11 presumptive cur rent quid pro quo) 
and imports) ............ .. . 
2. Gold, silver, and currency• .. .. . 
3. Freight charges .. . ...... . .. .. . 
+ Tourist expenditures ....... .. . 
5. Bunker coal and oil. ........ . . 
6. Ship chandling, ship repairs, etc. 
7. Vessels sold ......... . ....... . 
8. Parcel post shipments (so far as 
otherwise unrecorded) . ... .. . 
9. Sales of electric power, advercis-
ing, cablegram and telephone 
ch_ar~es, underwriters' com-
m1ss10ns, etc . .. .. .. . ..... . . 
10. Adjustments, for differences in 
year-cnd lags, etc . ... . .. ... . 
Total Bilateral Transactions 
18 
S3 




tions (including direct in-
vestmen t, international 
transfer of existing securi-
ties, refunding, and repay-
mcnt) ..... ...... .. ..... . 2249 
2, Earnings oflong-tcrm private 










currcnt quid -pro 
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American Residents in Account Claims Counter Claim, with Foreign Rcsidents 
3. Earnin~s of short-tcrm pri-
78 vate mvcstments .... , ... . 'i -4. Motion picture royalties ..... 90 
5. Pat.ent and copyright royal-
t1es, etc •............•... 15 is 
6, In11 urnnce trnn 11actions ..... . 70 70 
7, Net chnngc in international 
485 bnnking nccounta6 • , • , , , , • -
Toul Contrnctual Unilateral 
Transnctions 3340 3443 
b) Non-contractual 
I. Migrants' contributions ..... 33 199 
2. Mission,ary. and charitable 
contr1but1ons ..... , ....... - 49 
3. War-debt payments .... , .... 241 -
4. Other inter-governmental 
46 payments ... , ............ 127 
Total Non-eontractual Unilat-
eral Transactions 310 37S 
III. Adjustment for errors and omis-
sions• 323 -
GuND TOTAL (all items) 8567 8567 
• Tbis includcs gold carmarkcd for foreign account or taken out of cnrmnrk . Whcn 
gold is carmnrkcd for forcign account it is to bc construcd o.a cxporlcd and wbcn takcn 
out of carmark it is to bc construcd as importcd. 
• Onlr, thc net chanitc is herc lfiven since figurcs arc not availnblc for the transaction1 
ln deta1l. Evcrything outside of the net figures reprcscnts, of co4rse, a cancrllalion, 
within the pcriod, of claims and counlcr daims. 
• Rigid precision is impossible in cslimatt:~ such as thesc; b11t In aclcl ition to inevitable 
error in thc figures it ahould be remcmbercd that thc itcms uc all trnnslntrd inlo dollar1. 
Any itcm may, however, accruc in dollnrs or in any othcr currency. Shil ts in u chan~e 
rates betwecn the dnte of contrncting 1ind paying obligntiona (though b,i th occur within 
tbe accounting year) may, therefore, canccl a pnrt of, or cnlnrge, thr obfö:ation u mraa• 
ured in dollara. Such cbangca might ea.sily account for the wholc of the item herc includcd 
undcr errora and omissions. II obligat1ons expressed in forci gn gold currcncica wcre 
translatcd in the year in qucation into gold dollau at pnr, aome error mu!l nrlac 111 a 
!~n~~l~~t:;~ti~':n~\~ai:tfr~~x~hfarifir;a:~s ,r::::cp~~~~c!~c~h;:trt nl:od~~-CT~:: 
illvoluntary loans would not ordinarily appcar as loans in the officinl atatistic,, which 
would asaume their payment, and the account1 would thcn fail to bahince by thi1 amout 
• This is the latest year for which revised estimates are available 
at the time of writing. The actual figures are a matter of indiff er-
ence since the table is presented for illustrative purposes only. Data 
from Tlu Balancd of International Payments of tlu Uniutl StaW 





















total · valu, 






















( cann11rk. Whcn 
i and wbcn Lu ken 
r thc tran51\Ct iona 
;c, a c11ncC" ll11tion, 
ition to incvitahlc 
1la tC"d into dollars . 
~}~' o~~i:c!\~hf~ 
blil:a tion as mraa-
item hcrc included 
d cur rencics wcre 
, r must arisc aa a 
1ay a lso bc CC'rlain 
1 1t ia due. T hese 
,l statist ic1, which 
ce by this amout 
, arc :1v:1ilable 
:er of indiff er-




unilateral account. Errors and omissions somcwherc must be re-
sponsible for this anomaly, and the dcficit on all thtee accounts 
of course adds up to the total of auch errors for which ;µlowance 
is made. 
If perfcct accuracy could be attained, the di.fference between 
presumptive bilateral claims and countcr claims would show 
cxactly the ~i.ff erencc between thc value of goods and services 
cu"ently given and of goods and services currently received by 
the United States in its international dealings. The same could, 
of course, be said of the di.ff erence between the unilateral trans-
actions, the excess or deficit of claims over counter cla ims ac-
quired on the one account balancing the deficit or excess of claims 
over counter claims acquired on the other. The net national 
b:i.lance of unilateral claims is met by a corresponding net balance 
of bilateral claims in thc opposite direction. Loans, interest, etc., 
are paid in goods and, in the Balance of Payments, involve 
duplication. This is necessary to achieve an accounting balance. 
Though thcre is thus no necessary cquivalencc betwcen thc 
total value of present commodity and service exports and the 
total · value of present commodity and service import~ and, so 
f ar as total foreign investment grows or goods are voluntarily or 
involuntarily given away,2' no equivalence even in the long 
run, there is nevertheless a close sympathetic relationship bc-
tween commodity and service exports and imports. 
Thc items entcring at any time into the international eco-
nomic accounts may conveniently be classified as ( I) fixed, ( 2) 
independently variable, and ( 3) appropriate!y clastic, that is, 
varying in such a way in response to a disturbance as to produce 
a new equilibrium. 
The fixed items are those arising out of maturing uncondi-
tional obligations to pay a given amount of a given currency on 
which no dcf ault is made. The best example is intercst on hon-
ored bonds though all maturing obligations to pay a definite 
amount of money are, if met, in this category. Fixed items, un-
less climinated by b~nkruptcy or the like, cannot, of counc, 
"On one of the interpretatiom above given thia i, alao true of in-
terat paymenta. 
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respond in adjustment of any tendency toward disequilibrium 
in the international balance of payments. 
Any variable item, on the other hand, obviously might re• 
spond in the direction required to adjust a tendency toward 
disequilibrium. lf, however, the variability is indcpendent of thc 
results of such a tendency, it will respond in this manner only 
by accident. In the category of independently variable itcms 
would come almost all new long-term investments, repaymcnt 
of loans in advance of maturity, and many services. 
The f actors principally conditioning long-term international 
loans are diff erences between national markets in long-term in-
ter< 5t rates and in the prospect of profits at home and abroad. 
Such diff erences remain for long periods pretty much the same 
regardless of the changes in the international accounts. (The 
latter changes tend to be results rather than causes of such varia-
tions as may occur in international long-term lending and bor-
rowing.) Long-term lendcrs and invcstmcnt banking houscs 
.quite properly leave to the commcrcial bankcrs the task of ac-
commodation to a tendency toward an exccss of foreign claims 
over domestic counter daims, and procecd with their opcrations 
whether or not those opcrations will incrcase the tendcncy toward 
d.isequilibrium.211 Therc is little if any induccment for them, in 
111 A long-term loan is, however, sometimcs dcferrcd, or evcn 
transferred to another lcnding market, whcn thcre is a "tight" 
banking situation in the prospective lcnding country and the connec-
tion between banking and investment houscs is close. A stringency 
in the banking situation, with temporarily high short-term money 
rates, tends to recur in lending countries whmever the scale of 
long-term lending is extcnded, since such an extension usually leads, 
in the first instance, to an outward drain of gold. TI1is tightness in 
short-term money markcts is by no mean~ to be confused with in-
ability of residents of the country concerncd to lcnd. lt is more frc-
quently cvidencc of a very great ability. High ahort-term money 
rates are likely to bc a fairly rcgular ,-esult of so low a rate of 
interest on long-term loan, as tci prompt heavy foreign invcstments. 
Convcrsely, countries in which the banks have !arge gold reserves, 
and where short-term interest rates therefore prevail, are by no 
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PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
the tendency toward disequilibrium in the international ac-
counts or the corollaries thercof, to adopt any other policy. Thc 
same can be said with regard to repayment of loans by former 
borrowers before the date nominated in the bond. lmportant 
service items, such as total freight payments and tourist trade, 
are also but very loosely correlated with changes in the status of 
the international accounts as a whole. This is likewise true of 
most of thc miscellaneous unilateral items. 
Under nor~al conditions, the most highly variable and, at 
the same time, appropriately elastic item in the international ac-
counts is short-term international indebtedness. A shif t in the 
relationship in any country between claims and counter claims 
on other items is, in the first instance, likely to be compensated 
by an · opposite change of equal magnitude in the short-term 
international borrowing or lending of that country. The adjust-
ment is, for moderate amounts, so easy as to be, at first, . almost 
insensible. lt occurs through a shif t in banking funds from one 
international ccnter to another as a result of paying out funds in 
one monctary medium, in exchange for receipts in another, in 
the · purchase and sale of bills of exchange. 
Banks require, however, a more or less fi.xed distribution of 
their funds as betwecn the domestic and foreign markets, and 
when this distribution is disturbcd by exchange opcrations thcy 
will alter their cxchange rate quotations in an attcmpt to rc-
store thc desircd relationship. The banks, and particularly thc 
central bank, in the country to which the cxchangc rate movc-
ment is adverse will also ordinarily raise the discount rate (bank 
rate of interest) and this will tend to draw in further short-term 
funds. All this furthers immediate equilibrium in the interna-
tional accounts. Under abnormal conditions, however, where fear 
pbys a great part, the movement of short-term funds may not 
respond to changes in interest rates or it may respond inappro-
priatcly. The movement of short-term fu„ds, far from cff ecting 
equilibrium, may then be of major importance in exaggerating 
disequilibrium.26 
• In the critical situation of recent years, for instance, a sharp 






































172 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS 
the tendency toward disequilibrium in the international ac-
counts or the corollaries thereof, to adopt any othei policy. The 
same can be said with regard to repayment of loans by former 
borrowers before the date nominated in the bond. lmportant 
service items, such as total f reight payments and tourist trade, 
are also but very loosely correlated with changes in the status of 
the international accounts as a whole. This is likewise true of 
most of thc mi1cellaneow unilateral items. 
Under nor~al conditions, the most highly variable and, at 
the same time, appropriately elastic item in the international ac-
counts is short-term international indebtedness. A shift in the 
relationship in any country between claims and counter claims 
on other items is, in the first instance, likely to be compensated 
by an · opposite change of equal magnitude in the short-term 
international borrowing or lending of that country. The adjust-
ment is, for moderate amounts, so easy as to be, at first, almost 
insensible. lt occurs through a shif t in banking funds from one 
international center to another as a result of paying out funds in 
one monetary medium, in exchange for receipts in another, in 
the · purchase and sale of bills of exchange. 
Banks require, however, a more or less fi.xed distribution of 
their funds as between the domestic and foreign markets, and 
when this distribution is di sturbcd by exchange opcrations thcy 
will alter thcir cxchange rate quotations in an attcmpt to re-
storc thc desircd relationship. The ban ks, and particularly thc 
central b:mk, in the country to which thc cxchange rate move-
mcnt is adverse will also ordinarily raise the discount rate (banlc 
rate of interest) and this will tend to draw in further short-term 
funds. All this furthers immediate equilibrium in the interna-
tional accounts. Under abnormal conditions, however, where fear 
plays a great part, the movement of short-term funds may not 
respond to changes in interest ratcs or it may respond inappro-
priatcly. The movement of short-term fu •• ds, far from c.ff ecting 
equilibrium, may then bc of major importancc in cxaggerating 
disequilibrium.26 
• In thc critical situation of recent years, for instancc, a sharp 
rise in a central bank interest rate has, often with good reason, been 
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Even in comparatively normal situations where the tendency 
toward disequilibr.ium, though momcntarily slight, is thorough-
going, the minor movement in exchange rates possiblc undcr 
gold standards, and the raising of the rate of intercst, will be 
inadequate to the attainment of equilibrium. Rcsort ia then had 
to a transfer of gold. Such transf ers are also a highly variable 
and appropriately elastic item in the international accounts. 
lf, as a result of free currenc;:y standards, gold is not available 
at a fixed rate in the currency of the country against which for-
eign claims are tending to outrun counter claims, exchangc rates 
will have to alter until a temporary, and eventually a stable, 
equilibrium in the international accounts is achicved. With or 
without gold standards, stable equilibriu m is likcly to come only 
through a more or less permanent shift in the relationship be-
tween commodity exports and imports27 which are the third 
interpreted as a danger signal preliminary to abandonment of the 
gold standard and restrictions on withdrawal of funds. lnstead of 
attracting short-term deposits it has therefore led rather to a "run" 
on the currency of the country in question. Short-term funds have 
been withdrawn from countries where so much as 15 per cent intcrcst 
was offered, to be deposited in countries where only one per ccnt 
was to be obtained. 
rr Along with a shift in such scrvice itcms as rcspond in an appro-
printely elnstic direction. The principal scrvice itcrn in the American 
international account is "tourism," This 'ia in part nppropriatcly 
elastic nnd in part indcpcndcntly mobile. There may, no doubt, bc 
some increasc in Amcrican travcl abroad whcn, as a result of a tend-
ency toward excess of Amcrican claims on foreigners over the 
counter claims, foreign priccs fall in terms of . American currency. 
Such an increase in American foreign travel would augment foreign 
counter claims on American currency and so operate to restore stable 
equilibrium. In the main, however, American tourist traffic, both 
ways, is largely independent of relative prices in the United States 
and abroad. The balance of income and outlay on this item ßuctu-
ates in response to quite other causes, principally the atate of general 
economie well-being in the United States; and there would, in any 
case, be almost no tendency toward appropriate adj ustment except 
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and most important of the appropriately elastic items in thc ad-
justment of disequilibria. 
Gold movements are convcnicnt emcrgency resources, e~cellent 
shock absorbers, but they are, by their •·~ry nature, imper-
manently operative in any one direction. Shif ts in merchandisc 
movements are dower to occur, but ultimate reliance must bc 
placed on changes in the ratio of ordin;iry commod.ity exports 
to imports to compensate any deviation from equilibrium in the 
other items. Aside from temporary adjustments through short-
term loans, the movement of gold or of exchange rates must 
continue in response to a deep-lying lack of equilibrium until it 
is sufficient so to alter the relationship bctween priccs or monetary 
purchasing power in the scveral countries as to bring about in 
each such shif ts in the ratio of commodity exports to imports as 
will, whcn all items are included, lead to an equality of claims 
and counter claims in current international accounts. 
The great permanent make-weight, the fundamental equili-
brator, in the international account is, therefore, commodity 
trade. All other important and permanently eff ective items being 
independently determined, any more or less permanent deviation 
f rom parity of claims and counter claims which occurs in these 
items is automatically balanced by an opposite deviation from 
parity in merchandise transactions. Whatever the total volume 
of exports and of imports, the spread between them must there-
fore, over any reasonably extended period, maintain a constant 
relationship of equality with the sprcad, in the opposite di-
rection, between claim, and counter claim.s arising from other 
permanent items in the international account.28 At any ·given 
time and under any given status of the fixed and the inde-
pendently determined mobile items, commodity exports and 
imports arc therefore tied together. An increase in commodity 
cxports thus involves an equal increase in commodity imports, 
• Temporary items such as gold movements, and short-term loans, 
must eventually be canceled by counter movements of gold or repay• 
ment of the loans or elsc must change their character and take a 
place among the permanent items calling for compensation in com-
moJ.ity trade. 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 175 
and an increase in commodity imports will automatically give 
rise to a corresponding augmentation of commodity export1, 
The same is of course true of decreases. 
This conclusion, as noted in the text, is of superlative impor-
tance in a consideration of commercial policy since it means 
that the most drastic measures in curtailment of commodity im-
ports will, .in the degree in which they are eff ective, rnerely re-
duce commodity exports in equal rneasure. Similarly, the utmost 
energy devoted to promoting export trade in goods cannot over-
come the eff ect of a restriction of imports and will not succced 
in changing the spread between commodity exports and com-
modity imports which results from other items in the inter-
national account. lt may, if not checked by rigid import restric-
tions, increase both exports and imports but it will not incrcasc 
the one at the expense of the other. The res_trictions on imports 
imposed by many countries in the last f ~w years in an attcmpt 
to relieve unemployment, have for this reason bcen quitc nuga-
_tory for the purpose for which thcy were intcndcd and have, 
in other ways, been extrcmely harmful. The passion for exports, 
and the eff orts to promote them without a willingncss to rece.ive 
a corresponding volume of imports, are open to the same con-
d~mnation. Exports as an outlet for a falscly conceived "sur-
plus" of general productive power are a broken recd. Their 
only real function is to serve as a paymcnt for prcscnt or pros-
pective imports which are not a curse but a national blcssing. 
The volume of employment is not aff cctcd by thc volume of 
imports. However ]arge the latter may be therc is, in the f act 
itself, no reason to expect uncmployment in the importing coun-
try since exports will liOOn develop pari -passu with any cxpansion 
of imports. Restraints on imports may possibly prevent for thc 
moment a drain of gold but, if so, they arc likely to perpctuatc 
thc condition they are designed to combat, 
Control of foreign trade, to prevent a drain of gold or a 
fall in the exchange value of thc currcncy of the country rc-
sorting . to such meai:ure~: ln: !torri • cffe~ting a~y. qdinitive rem-
c~y of a maladjustn\et'lr, =a;ggcNitei ~;-.i~port:ip.tc:: Such control 
reduce1 ·th"o •P"~ibilily. of .H~t ,through forcing forcigncrs to 
~ ;:. ; : u·· L. ~:. i.) (U · .. ... L :\:\ T \ ... 
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pay, in t 
control a 








pay, in thcir own currcncy, for thc goods of the country of 
control a much highcr pricc than would othcrwise be neccssary. 
At the ume time it incrcascs the domcstic demand Jor importa 
by kccping the domestic price level relatively high or the pur-
chasing power of the domestic currcncy over foreign goods 
gr(;ater than an equilibrium position warrants. The eff ects of 
such measurcs are thcref ore perverse in the extreme. Herc, as 
clsewhere in thc pheno.mena of international trade, control tends 
to dcfcat ita own enda. 
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